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ABSTRACT 
 
SANYA CARLEY: Electricity diversification, decentralization, and decarbonization:  
The role of U.S. state energy policy 
(Under the direction of Richard N. L. Andrews) 
 
 
In response to mounting concerns about climate change and an over-dependence 
on fossil fuels, U.S. state governments have assumed leadership roles in energy policy. 
State leaders across the country have constructed policies that target electricity sector 
operations, and aim to increase the percentage of renewable electricity generation, 
increase the use of distributed generation, and decrease carbon footprints. The policy 
literature, however, lacks compelling empirical evidence that state initiatives toward 
these ends are effective.  
This research seeks to contribute empirical insights that can help fill this void in 
the literature, and advance policy knowledge about the efficacy of these instruments. This 
three-essay dissertation focuses on the assessment of state energy policy instruments 
aimed at the diversification, decentralization, and decarbonization of the U.S. electricity 
sector. 
The first essay considers the effects of state efforts to diversify electricity 
portfolios via increases in renewable energy. This essay asks: are state-level renewable 
portfolio standards (RPS) effective at increasing renewable energy deployment, as well as 
the share of renewable energy out of the total generation mix? Empirical results 
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demonstrate that RPS policies so far are effectively encouraging total renewable energy 
deployment, but not the percentage of renewable energy generation.  
The second essay considers state policy efforts to decentralize the U.S. electricity 
sector via instruments that remove barriers to distributed generation (DG) deployment. 
The primary question this essay addresses is whether the removal of legal barriers acts as 
a primary motivating factor for DG deployment. Empirical results reveal that net 
metering policies are positively associated with DG deployment; interconnection 
standards significantly increase the likelihood that end-users will adopt DG capacity; and 
utility DG adoption is related to standard market forces. 
The third essay asks: what are the potential effects of state energy policy 
portfolios on carbon emissions within the U.S. electricity sector? The results from an 
electricity modeling scenario analysis reveal that state policy portfolios have modest to 
minimal carbon mitigation effects in the long run if surrounding states do not adopt 
similar portfolios as well. The effectiveness of state-level policy portfolios can increase 
significantly if surrounding states adopt similar portfolios, or with the introduction of a 
national carbon price. 
 iv 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This research would not have been possible without contributions from many 
individuals and organizations, only a few of which I have the space to acknowledge 
below. Completing a dissertation is a special personal accomplishment, indeed, but it is 
the act of recognizing those that have inspired, financed, and encouraged me that 
provides me with the greatest sense of satisfaction.  
This research has received financial support from Progress Energy and from the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Institute for the Environment through its 
Center for Sustainable Energy, Environment, and Economic Development. Additional 
research support was provided by UNC’s Department of Public Policy. The Nicholas 
Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, with the oversight of Etan Gumerman, 
provided computer and software resources that were crucial to this analysis. I was also 
most fortunate to receive great assistance from Anne Cavitt Schwarz and Tony Reevy. 
I am most grateful to my adviser and dissertation committee chair, Pete Andrews, 
for his unwavering support, constructive feedback, and the substantial amount of time 
and effort that he invested in my academic development. Of greatest importance on a 
personal level, Pete has demonstrated the possibility of a successful career in academia 
without a loss of enthusiasm for the most meaningful elements of life. Indeed, if it were 
 v
not for Pete, my career aspirations would not have included academia. His character was 
the best study guide that I had in graduate school. 
It would not have been possible to complete this dissertation without the 
magnanimous support of my dissertation committee. I would like to thank Gary Henry 
for his guidance on methods and for always looking out for me; Tim Johnson for his 
instruction on energy modeling and for the great attentiveness and care that he devoted to 
my papers; Richard Newell for his insightful feedback and generous provision of his 
time; and Doug Crawford-Brown for years of assistance and support, despite the distance. 
With a committee comprised of great physical height and that has achieved great heights 
of scholarship, it is apt to acknowledge that, in the spirit of Bernard of Chartres and later 
Isaac Newton, if I have seen anything it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. I was 
profoundly fortunate to be advised by such a generous and exceptional committee; I look 
forward to returning the many, many favors some day. 
I am additionally grateful to the many individuals who provided feedback on 
earlier versions of my dissertation essays, including Edward Norton, Cathy Zimmer, 
Barry Rabe, Evan Ringquist, Michael Foster, Karen Palmer, Darrene Hackler, Doug 
Noonan, several anonymous reviewers, and many participants of the Association for 
Public Policy Analysis and Management conferences. My colleagues in the Department 
of Public Policy also provided years of encouragement, and helped me initiate and 
routinely assess the validity of my research. I would like to give particular recognition to 
Christen Holly, Shana Judge, Jeff Summerlin-Long, Jennifer Miller, Tyler Felgenhauer, 
and Amber Peterman. I was exceptionally lucky to have such stellar colleagues. 
 vi 
I still remember the day in grade school when our teacher asked us to write an 
essay on a hero that has directly influenced our lives. I recall scoffing at the assignment 
and incredulously asking myself, “What makes a hero, anyway?” (in retrospect, perhaps I 
was destined for academia). Although I had little to draw on at the time—I, along with 
the majority of my class, went with the trite but true subject matter: Mom—I have had 
the distinct pleasure of gaining numerous “heros,” or life mentors, through the years. 
Each mentor has provided me with a unique perspective on life, a belief in me that was 
nearly palpable, and unconditional encouragement to pursue any path that I could dream 
up. In the order of time that our paths crossed, I would like to express my extreme 
appreciation to Liz Krieg, Carr Everbach, Nazmul Chaudhury, and Wendy Grapentine.  
Although there are many other individuals I could name that have made this 
accomplishment possible, I owe my deepest gratitude to my family. From my earliest age 
my parents, Michal Ann Carley and Frank Lewis, encouraged me to belt out big belly 
laughs and to always speak my mind, even before I knew how to substantiate my claims. 
More than believing in myself, they taught me to foster and exhibit compassion for 
others, and proceed through life with awareness—awareness for the natural world, for the 
minutia of everyday happenings, and for the energy and emotion of others.  
I am profoundly appreciative of the years of support from Claire Gargalli and 
David Carley. David, my Grandpa, was the one person in life that I never wanted to 
disappoint. Through the years, I tirelessly tried to prove to him that I could throw a 
baseball like a boy and argue like a lawyer. It was during the last years of his life, that I 
finally realized that that wry—and often devious—smile of his meant that he was proud 
 vii
of me; and I did not have to prove myself to make it so. Yet I still wish that I could share 
this accomplishment with him now.  
Other family members have provided immense support and encouragement 
through the years. I would like to thank Eli Carleyolsen, Adele Carley-Hake, Carl Hake, 
Marc Olsen, Donna Olsen, and Liz Rude.  
On a final but distinguished note, I owe great gratitude to my husband and dearest 
friend, Joe Carley, for being strong and ever supportive, and for sharing a lifelong 
partnership with me that is rooted in happiness, adventure, and trust. 
 viii 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………..xi 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………..xiii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………...xiv 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………...……1 
II. DIVERSIFICATION: THE CASE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY  
AND PORTFOLIO STANDARDS……………………………………...11 
Introduction………………………………………………………………11 
Background………………………………………………………………13 
Methodology……………………………………….…………………….17 
Data……………………………………….…………….………………..21 
Empirical results…………………………………………………………31 
Discussion………………………………………………………………..36 
References………………………………………………………………..44 
Appendix: Alternative Estimation Approaches………………………….49 
III. DECENTRALIZATION: THE CASE OF DISTRIBUTED 
GENERATION AND METERING STANDARDS…………………….51 
Introduction……………………………………….…………………..….51 
Distributed generation: Moving beyond a definition…………………….52 
 ix 
Empirical approach………………………………………………………59 
Data………………………………………………………………………62 
Results……………………………………………………………………67 
Discussion………………………………………………………………..79 
Limitations……………………………………………………………….85 
Conclusions………………………………………………………………88 
References………………………………………………………………..90 
IV. DECARBONIZATION: THE CASE OF CARBON  
MITIGATION AND ENERGY PORTFOLIOS………………………...94 
Introduction………………………………………………………………94 
Background………………………………………………………………96 
Modeling framework…………………………………………………...100 
Modeling parameters…………………………………………………...105 
Results of Scenario Analyses…………………………………………..118 
Discussion………………………………………………………………141 
Limitations……………………………………………………………...147 
Conclusions……………………………………………………………..151 
References………………………………………………………………153 
V. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………156 
Policy instruments………………………………………………………158 
Complimentary and conflicting policy efforts………………………….172 
Trends in the era of state energy policy innovation…………………….174 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………...187 
 x
References………………………………………………………………189 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
2.1. State RPS Final Targets and Terminal Years……………………………….14 
 
2.2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics……………………………….22 
 
2.3. Regression Results with Dependent Variable: Logged Share of  
Renewable Energy Electricity..…………………………………………………..32 
 
2.4. Regression Results with Dependent Variable: Total MWh of  
Renewable Energy Electricity…………………………………………………....35 
 
2.5. Alternative Estimation Approaches with Dependent Variable:  
Logged Share of Renewable Energy Electricity…………………………………49 
 
2.6. Alternative Estimation Approaches with Dependent Variable:  
Total MWh of Renewable Energy Electricity…………………………………...50 
 
3.1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample………..71 
 
3.2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Subset  
of the Sample with Distributed Generation Capacity……………………………72 
 
3.3. Two-Part Model Results with Dependent Variable:  
Distributed Generation Capacity in MW………………………………………...74 
 
3.4. Bootstrapped Marginal Effects from the Two-Part Model with  
Dependent Variable: Distributed Generation Capacity in MW………………….76 
 
3.5. Probit Model Results with Dependent Variable:  
Distributed Generation Capacity in MW………………………………………...77 
 
3.6. Bootstrapped Marginal Effects from the Probit Models with  
Dependent Variable: Distributed Generation Capacity in MW………………….78 
 
4.1. New Resource Option Parameters included in Baseline Scenario…………106 
 
4.2. Fixed Operations and Maintenance Costs for Baseline  
and Tax Incentive Scenarios……………………………………………………113 
 
4.3. Carbon Capture and Storage Technological Improvement  
Model Assumptions…………………………………………………………….115 
 
4.4. Carbon Capture and Storage Policy Scenario Parameters………...……….116 
 xii
 
4.5. Baseline Scenario Summary Results for Utah  
and Arizona, 2020 and 2030……………………………………………………121 
 
4.6. Utah Baseline Sensitivity Analysis Summary Results, 2030…………...…122 
 
 4.7. Arizona Baseline Sensitivity Analysis Summary Results, 2030…………..123  
 
 4.8. Utah Portfolio Scenario Results in 2030…………………………………..126 
 
 4.9. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline  
and Portfolio Scenarios, Utah…………………………………………………..127 
 
 4.10. Arizona Portfolio Scenario Results in 2030…………………………...…130 
 
4.11. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline  
and Portfolio Scenarios, Arizona……………………………………………….131 
 
 4.12. Utah Carbon Price Portfolio Results, 2030……………………………….135 
 
 4.13. Arizona Carbon Price Portfolio Results, 2030……………………………136 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figures 
2.1. RPS Timeline………………………………………………………………..12 
2.2. Directed Acyclic Graph for Renewable Energy Deployment……………….19 
3.1. Visual of Sample Distribution………………………………………………65 
3.2. Percent Distributed Generation by Fuel Type………………………………69 
3.3. Percent Distributed Generation by Technology Type………………………69 
3.4. Utility-owned Distributed Generation by Fuel Type………………………..70 
3.5. Customer-owned Distributed Generation by Fuel Type…………………….70 
4.1. Utah Baseline Generation………………………………………………….119 
4.2. Arizona Baseline Generation………………………………………………119 
4.3. Utah GHG Emissions……………………………………………………....126 
4.4. Utah Retail Price of Electricity…………………………………………….126 
4.5. Utah Net Exports-Imports………………………………………………….129 
4.6. Arizona GHG Emissions…………………………………………………...130 
4.7. Arizona Retail Price of Electricity…………………………………………130 
4.8. Arizona New Generation……………………..……………………………132 
4.9. Arizona Generation, State………………………………………………….133 
4.10. Arizona Generation, Regional……………………………………………133 
4.11. Arizona Net Exports-Imports……………………………………………..134 
4.12. Utah Carbon Price Scenarios……………………………………………..138 
4.13. Arizona Carbon Price Scenarios………………………………………….138 
4.14. WECC GHG Emissions…………………………………………………..140 
 xiv
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ADAGE Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy 
CCS   Carbon capture and storage  
CHP   Combined heat and power  
DAG   Directed acyclic graph  
DSM   Demand side management  
DSIRE  Database for State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency 
DG  Distributed generation  
EIA   Energy Information Administration  
FERC  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
FEVD   Fixed effect vector decomposition  
GHG   Greenhouse gas  
GSP   Gross state product 
LCV  League of Conservation Voters  
NEMS  National Energy Modeling System  
NM  Net metering  
NERC  North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares  
RE   Renewable energy  
REC   Renewable energy credit  
RPS   Renewable portfolio standard  
WECC  Western Electric Coordinating Council  
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The U.S. electricity sector is a major contributor to global climate change. The 
sector accounts for roughly 40 percent of total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions and 30 
percent of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The majority of these emissions come from 
large, centralized fossil fuel plants, which dominate the electricity sector and generate the 
bulk of our electric power. Alternative sources of electricity, such as renewable energy, 
make up only a small fraction of the total electricity mix. As the global understanding of 
climate change evolves, and interacts with other significant energy concerns—including 
but not limited to over-dependence on foreign fossil fuels, energy security, air and water 
pollution, and fuel price volatility—the need for a change in electricity generation and 
operations grows. 
In response to the proliferation of these concerns over the past decade, and a 
growing consensus that the combination of these issues may require public policy 
solutions, state governments across the country have assumed leadership roles in the 
energy policy arena. In the absence of a comprehensive federal congressional initiative to 
address climate change, states have introduced, on a piecemeal basis, a surprising number 
of new policy instruments in attempt to decrease their carbon footprints, increase the 
percentage of renewable energy in their generation portfolios, and increase the amount of 
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generation that comes from local, dispersed energy resources. In fact, these three policy 
objectives—decarbonization, diversification, and decentralization—have broadly defined 
and guided state energy and climate policy efforts to date. 
Standard policy instruments, such as a grant or tax incentive, are not well suited to 
deal with problems as substantial and difficult to measure as global warming or over-
dependence on fossil fuels. Nor are they suited to deal with an industry in which private 
and public firms share a market, regulated and deregulated systems share power lines, 
utility service territories are not confined by state borders, utility development decisions 
last decades, and price signals cannot be observed when the consumer purchases 
electricity. In light of these challenges, state governments have exhibited immense 
creativity over the past decade and a half in designing new and tailoring existing 
instruments to meet current circumstances.  
Some states have already experienced notable success with the implementation of 
these instruments. Texas, for instance, has increased wind energy deployment 
significantly as a result of its renewable portfolio standard, which requires that a certain 
percentage of Texas’ overall electricity generation come from renewable energy sources. 
Aside from Texas, and a few other scattered success stories, however, the policy 
literature lacks compelling evidence of the effectiveness of these instruments to date on 
shaping electricity generation changes. Furthermore, there are few empirical studies that 
test whether state energy policy instruments are effectively achieving their stated 
objectives. The majority of literature on the subject is either qualitative in research 
design, or focuses exclusively on national-level policies and effects. Empirical state level 
electricity policy analyses are largely absent from the literature. This void in the literature 
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is due to the difficulty of measuring state level energy policy effects, attributable to the 
complexity and variation of the instruments across states, the patchy nature of their state-
by-state adoption, and the long time frame over which policy results become measurable. 
This lack of empirical evidence limits the lessons that are available to other states 
regarding how these instruments work, which are effective in what circumstances, and 
which work well together. This type of information will become increasingly important 
as the federal government’s discussions of energy and climate policy evolve, and as steps 
are taken on the national level to address the policy concerns listed above. 
This three-essay dissertation seeks to contribute empirical insights that can help 
fill this void in the literature, and concurrently advance policy knowledge about the 
effects of state level energy policy instruments within the electricity sector. Specifically, 
this dissertation focuses on policies adopted by state governments throughout what I 
phrase as the “era of state energy policy innovation” to try to diversify, decentralize, and 
decarbonize the U.S. electricity sector. All three essays contain empirical analyses 
focused on the effects and effectiveness of current U.S. policy instruments that uphold 
these policy objectives. The research approach of each essay is tailored to its guiding 
research question and the inherent limitations of the data. Particular attention is given to 
the selection and application of each empirical model in effort to maximize the statistical 
and external validity of the combined analysis. 
 
Essay 1. Diversification: The Case of Renewable Energy and Portfolio Standards 
The first essay considers recent state efforts to diversify their electricity portfolios 
via renewable energy development. This essay primarily focuses on the renewable 
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portfolio standard (RPS), which, to date, is one of the most prevalent and innovative 
renewable state level energy policy instruments. RPS policies aim to increase the 
percentage of renewable energy generation in the total generation mix over time. 
  This essay evaluates the effectiveness of these programs with an empirical 
assessment of the relationship between state RPS policies and the percentage of 
subsequent renewable energy electricity generation. This essay addresses two guiding 
research questions. First, are RPS policies effective at increasing states’ total renewable 
energy generation? Second, are RPS policies effective at increasing the percentage of 
renewable energy generation out of the total generation mix, as they are intended to do?  
  In this vein of inquiry, I compile state level data between 1998 and 2007 from a 
variety of sources, including the Energy Information Administration, the Database for 
State Incentives for Renewable Energy, and the U.S. Census Bureau, among other 
sources. After a thorough consideration of the causal mechanism between RPS and 
renewable energy deployment, and the methodological conditions that maximize one’s 
ability to appropriately estimate this mechanism, I apply both a fixed effects model and a 
variant of a standard fixed effects model that is new to the empirical literature, referred to 
as a fixed effects vector decomposition model. 
Model results demonstrate that RPS policies are, to date, effectively encouraging 
total renewable energy deployment, but not the percentage of renewable energy 
generation in states’ electricity portfolios. These findings reveal a shortcoming of RPS 
policies, potentially attributable to weak, poorly enforced, or slowly implemented penalty 
mechanisms, RPS benchmarks that are too ambitious, or a lack of integration between 
supply-side and demand-side measures.  
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In response to these findings, this essay asks, should one care if states are falling 
short of their renewable energy percentage goals if they are still increasing total 
renewable energy generation? Some would argue that we ought not to care. RPS policies 
are effectively encouraging renewable energy investment and opening electricity markets 
to development, thereby making renewable technologies more competitive with 
traditional systems. Others would argue differently. RPS policies are one of the strongest 
and only mechanisms that the U.S. has yet to adopt to address climate change. Twenty-
seven states have crafted regulation in promotion of renewable generation and, within the 
next several years, additional states and the federal government will consider adopting 
their own version of an RPS. Yet if the ultimate intent of renewable energy legislation is 
to reduce emissions associated with climate change, then increasing renewable generation 
without enforcing a relative decrease in the proportion of fossil fuel generation will not 
achieve these objectives. Increases in fossil fuel generation will continue to increase 
carbon emission levels in the atmosphere. One may conclude, therefore, that RPS policies 
may ultimately be more effective if implemented in conjunction with programs that target 
energy demand with efficiency and conservation measures or, alternatively, with carbon 
cap-and-trade mechanisms. 
 
Essay 2. Decentralization: The Case of Distributed Generation and Metering Standards 
While centralized electricity and large-scale transmission and distribution 
networks still dominate the U.S. electric industry, this model of electricity generation has 
been challenged in recent decades. Critics of large-scale electricity operations question 
their costs, security vulnerabilities, environmental impacts, and waste in generation and 
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transmission, and advocate instead for a more decentralized industry composed of a 
greater number of smaller-scale and more localized generating facilities. In view of these 
concerns, some industry leaders have begun to modify the scale of their electricity 
operations. Federal and state policymakers have concurrently enacted legislation that 
specifically focuses on size and scale of power generation.  
The second essay of this dissertation considers policy efforts to decentralize the 
U.S. electricity sector, specifically via instruments that remove the barriers to distributed 
generation (DG) deployment.1 The primary research questions of this essay are, what are 
the motivating factors behind the trend toward a more decentralized electricity industry, 
and how great of a role do public policy incentives play in DG adoption and deployment? 
This essay primarily focuses on two policy instruments: net metering policies and 
interconnection standards. Net metering policies allow end-users to “hook” their DG 
units to the electricity grid, and buy (or “sell”) electricity from (to) the grid when the DG 
capacity is short (in excess) of the customers’ electricity needs. Interconnection standards 
are state-implemented standards that explicitly outline the protocols that a utility must 
adhere to when hooking DG units up to the grid.  
I begin this essay with a review of the associated literature, and a synthesis of the 
varied definitions and classifications of DG systems that populate the literature. I 
additionally discuss how the link between DG deployment and decentralized energy 
policies remains tenuous in the literature. In effort to classify this link, I compile a 
database from a variety of public sources and aggregate the data at the utility level. The 
                                                          
1
 Distributed generation is a small-scale electricity unit, generally between 1 kW and 5 MW in size, that can 
be isolated from the electric grid. DG units are generally located close to the end-user—“decentralized”—
in order to maximize transmission and distribution efficiency. DG is generally touted as a cleaner and more 
efficient electricity supply option, relative to large-scale fossil fuel operations. 
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data are in 2005 values. In testing the relationship between DG capacity and these two 
policy instruments, I additionally control for confounders that affect both policy 
implementation and DG deployment, including utility characteristics, electricity market 
conditions, socio-economic factors, and supporting state legislation. I also estimate the 
association between RPS policies and renewable-based DG deployment. 
The empirical model considers utility decisions of whether to adopt DG 
operations and, if so, how much capacity to deploy. According to these objectives, I 
estimate a two-part model and bootstrap the standard errors of the marginal effects. I 
additionally divide the sample into customer- and utility-owned DG, respectively, and 
estimate separate probit models for the likelihood of DG ownership for each sample.  
The results of this analysis demonstrate that state policies that aim to reduce these 
barriers are effectively obtaining their policy objectives. Interconnection standards and 
net metering policies significantly increase the likelihood that a consumer will adopt DG 
capacity. It is evident that a trend toward more integrated and standard protocols for 
electricity interconnection reduces costs and bureaucratic hassles associated with 
consumer DG hook-ups. Net metering protocols, it can be further inferred, reduce the 
technical barriers to DG deployment and make DG adoption on the customer side of the 
meter more feasible. Utility DG adoption, on the other hand, is not enhanced by technical 
and technological standards, as are customer DG operations, but is instead strongly 
related to standard market forces that introduce competition and price signals into a 
historically heavily regulated market. Specifically, deregulation, electricity price, and 
household income are all positively and significantly associated with utility DG adoption.  
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The empirical results indicate, however, that there may be conflicts between 
concurrent movements or transitions within the electric industry, specifically between a 
move toward greater reliance on renewable energy versus on distributed generation. 
Utilities that are mandated to comply with an RPS policy are less inclined to deploy DG 
power, and appear to prioritize their investments in renewables over their investment in 
DG. This paper suggests avenues for further investigation of this issue. 
 
Essay 3. Decarbonization: The Case of Carbon Mitigation and State Energy Policy 
Portfolios 
Concurrent with diversification and decentralization efforts, state governments 
also seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, or “decarbonize” the U.S. electricity 
sector. To date, most state level decarbonization efforts typically include a portfolio of 
state-selected and -tailored energy policy instruments. The number of states that have 
already adopted or are currently drafting energy policy portfolios continues to rise. The 
empirical literature, however, has yet to conclude that state energy policy portfolios can 
generate results in a similar magnitude or manner to their presumed carbon mitigation 
potential. 
The third essay considers state level policy efforts to decarbonize the U.S. 
electricity sector, and is guided by the following research question: what are the potential 
effects of the adoption of state energy policy portfolios on carbon emissions in the U.S. 
electricity sector? This essay seeks to address the lack of policy evidence of state level 
decarbonization efforts and contribute empirical insights on the carbon mitigation effects 
of state energy portfolios within the U.S. electricity sector. Following the precedent set 
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by national-level energy modeling analyses, this essay analyzes the effects of portfolio 
scenarios in a dynamic modeling environment. Additionally, this analysis considers the 
carbon mitigation effects of state portfolios both with and without a national carbon price. 
Using a dynamic, long-term electricity dispatch model with U.S. power plant, 
utility, and transmission and distribution data between 2010 and 2030, the third essay 
models a series of state policy portfolios in a comparative scenario analysis. The effects 
on greenhouse gas mitigation, electricity price, and generation resources are compared 
across state scenarios. 
Model results reveal that state energy policy portfolios have the potential to 
reduce greenhouse emissions over the long run. Coordinated energy policy portfolio 
efforts, as facilitated across multiple states, a region, or the nation, can produce minor to 
significant improvements in the decarbonization potential of policy actions. The 
difference in decarbonization potential between isolated state policies and larger, more 
coordinated policy efforts is due to in large part to carbon leakage, which is the export of 
carbon intensive fossil fuel-based electricity across state lines. Results also confirmed 
that a carbon price of $50/metric ton CO2e can generate substantial carbon savings. 
Although both policy options—energy policy or climate policy—are effective, neither is 
as effective alone as when the two strategies are combined. 
The third essay concludes that, in the continued absence of national climate 
change legislation, the effectiveness of state decarbonization policies can be improved 
with efforts to coordinate energy and climate policy action across state borders, via either 
state partnership agreements or regional policy coordination. Assuming that the primary 
objective of energy policy portfolios is to reduce GHG emissions over the long run, 
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individual states can also make concerted efforts to align the policy objectives, and 
therefore the policy design features, of the various policy instruments in their portfolios. 
 
 
The concluding chapter combines findings from each of the three essays, 
compares and synthesizes them, and discusses implications as they relate to the role of 
public policy in altering operations within the U.S. electricity sector. Among other 
questions, the conclusion addresses the following. What are the effects and how effective 
are state level energy policy instruments at attaining their policy objectives? How 
compatible, or not, are policy instruments that focus on decentralization, diversification, 
and decarbonization? Which lessons can be extracted regarding the role and potential 
limitations of state policy efforts? Based on these findings, what are possible avenues for 
future research? 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
DIVERSIFICATION: THE CASE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY AND 
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
 
Introduction 
Perhaps now, more than ever in the realm of environmental history, does Carl 
Van Horn’s assertion that state governments are “arguably the most responsive, 
innovative, and effective level of government in the American federal system” (Van 
Horn, 1993, p. ix) ring true. Indeed, in response to global calls for a systematic solution 
to climate change, state governments are proving themselves as clean energy pioneers. 
State leaders across the country are adopting renewable energy incentives, enforcing 
integrated resource planning programs, and some have even set carbon abatement levels 
to reduce future emissions.  
While states have a variety of incentives and regulations from which to choose, 
one of the most prevalent and innovative policy instruments is the renewable portfolio 
standard (RPS). An RPS is a state-mandated program in which a percentage (or share) of 
a state’s overall electricity generation must come from renewable energy (hereafter 
denoted as RE). Under an RPS program, utilities are required to invest in RE systems in 
order to meet their percentage requirement. In 1998 only three states had adopted an RPS 
policy. By 2001, nine states (18%) had adopted an RPS and by early 2008, 27 states 
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(54%) had non-voluntary RPS programs; the adoption rate continues to rise. Figure 2.1 
presents a timeline of RPS adoption across all states according to the year in which each 
policy became effective. Supporting incentive and regulation packages, created on a 
state-by-state basis, also aim to assist in the development and deployment of renewable 
energy. 
 
Figure 2.1 RPS Timeline 
 
This trend of state energy policymaking is encouraging to those who fear the 
ramifications of global warming and an over-reliance on foreign fossil fuels. Yet few 
studies verify that state initiatives toward these ends are highly effective at increasing the 
electricity sector’s diversification of fuel sources. Despite the resurgence in research 
attention that is now devoted to RE policy, the causal link between state RE policies and 
RE development remains tenuous. This study aims to explore the relationship between 
state policy incentives and RE deployment and, by doing so, shed light on the current 
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debate surrounding the effectiveness of state RE policy innovation in the wake of climate 
change.  
 
Background 
RPS policy design 
Different renewable portfolio standards across the country have considerable 
variation in policy objectives and policy design. The majority of policy objectives aim to 
facilitate the diversification of electricity generation mixes, increase renewable energy 
deployment, reduce state reliance on fossil fuels, help renewable energy sources become 
cost-competitive with conventional energy sources, reduce carbon emissions, enhance 
economic development, or various combinations thereof. Policy design features tend to 
vary in the following attributes: structure, size, application, eligibility, and 
administration. For a more thorough discussion of these variations in design, refer to 
Wiser et al. (2007). Despite these sources of variation, all RPS policies aim to increase 
the percentage or the total amount of renewable energy. All non-voluntary RPS policies 
mandate that such a percentage or total must be attained by a given year, save 
Massachusetts’ RPS policy. Table 2.1 presents the final percentage goal and year for all 
states with mandatory standards. States with a non-percentage based goal have an 
equivalent percentage displayed in parenthesis. Voluntary standards are not included in 
this table, although all statewide voluntary RPS policies are included in Figure 2.1 above.  
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Table 2.1. State RPS Final Targets and Years 
State Current Final Target Current Terminal Year 
Arizona 15% 2025 
California 33% 2020 
Colorado 20% 2020 
Connecticut 27% 2020 
Delaware 10% 2019 
Hawaii 20% 2020 
Illinois 25% 2025 
Iowa                105 MW (~2%) 1999 
Maine  30%a 2000 
Maryland   22.5% 2020 
Massachusetts   4%b 2009 
Minnesota  25%c 2025 
Montana 15% 2015 
Nevada 20% 2015 
New Hampshire 24% 2025 
New Jersey 25% 2021 
New Mexico  20%d 2020 
New York 24% 2013 
North Carolina     12.5%e 2021 
Ohio 25% 2025 
Oregon  25%f 2025 
Pennsylvania 18% 2021 
Rhode Island 16% 2020 
Texas                5,880 MW (~4.4%) 2015 
Utah  20%g 2025 
Wisconsin 10% 2015 
Washington 15% 2020 
Washington D.C. 11% 2022 
a. In 2006, Maine enacted new RPS legislation that mandates that 10% of all new generation must come from RE by 
2017. 
b. Massachusetts’ RPS mandates 4% RE by 2009 and an additional 1% for each year thereafter with no specified 
terminal year. 
c. Minnesota’s RPS mandates that Xcel Energy deploy 30% RE by 2020 and that all other utilities deploy 25% by 
2025. 
d. New Mexico also mandates 10% RE by 2020 for all rural electric cooperatives. 
e. North Carolina also mandates that 10% of all 2020 retail sales be RE for cooperatives and municipal utilities. 
f. Oregon also mandates that small utilities deploy 10% and smallest utilities deploy 5% RE by 2025. 
Utah’s RPS, passed in 2008, is considered by some to be a “goal” because the mandate specifies that RE must be 
deployed when “it is cost-effective” to do so (DSIRE, 2008). 
 
RPS policies require utilities to invest in RE systems in order to meet their 
percentage requirements. The majority of states with RPS policies allow utilities to 
exchange renewable energy credits (RECs), or renewable energy certificates, to help 
utilities comply with RE mandates. RECs are tradable wholesale electricity commodities 
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that represent one MWh of renewable energy generation. Utilities that face RPS 
mandates, therefore, can purchase RECs in lieu of deploying one MWh of their own 
renewable energy. RECs are generally exchanged within a state or region; inter-regional 
or national wholesale REC markets are not yet well established (Holt and Bird, 2005). 
 
Previous findings on renewable energy policy effects and effectiveness 
The majority of literature on RE instruments relies on exploratory analyses. Some 
use case studies (Gan et al., 2007; Gouche et al., 2002; Langniss and Wiser, 2003) and 
others use additional qualitative evaluation techniques (Bird et al, 2005; Harmelink et al., 
2006; Wiser et al., 2007). These analyses reveal that RPS policies have experienced a 
number of successes to date. In Texas, for instance, RPS legislation effectively led to the 
deployment of 915 MW of wind in 2001 alone, more than twice the Texas 2001 RPS 
benchmark (Langniss and Wiser, 2003). Some analysts, however, have noted that not all 
states are on a current trajectory toward meeting their RPS mandates (Wiser et al., 2007; 
Wiser et al., 2004). Possible reasons for these shortcomings include: inadequate policy 
enforcement; policy duration uncertainty; overly aggressive RPS benchmarks; too many 
exemptions; or too much flexibility offered to utilities (Wiser et al., 2007; Wiser et al., 
2004). 
Kydes (2006) and Palmer and Burtraw (2005) have modeled RPS policies using 
bottom-up energy models. Kydes analyzed the potential effect of a 20 percent federal 
non-hydroelectric-based RPS on energy markets in the U.S. using the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) National Energy Modeling System. He concluded that RPS 
policies effectively increase RE adoption, reduce emissions, and increase the cost of 
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electricity by three percent. Palmer and Burtraw modeled variations of federal RPS 
policy proposals and tracked policy effects on electricity prices, utility investment levels, 
resource deployment portfolios, and carbon emissions. They concluded that RPS costs 
are low for goals of 15 percent or less but rise significantly with goals of 20 percent or 
higher. 
Despite RE policy’s growing popularity in research publications, however, there 
are few studies that attempt to empirically estimate the effectiveness of state RE policies, 
nor that explore the causal inference between RE policies and RE deployment. This 
dearth of research is potentially attributable to the nascence of these programs, the lack of 
comprehensive data, the variation in RPS designs across the country that make empirical 
analyses difficult, or the long time frame over which energy results become apparent. 
Menz and Vachon (2006) present the only empirical analysis on the effects of state RE 
policy incentives to date. Constrained by data limitations, Menz and Vachon estimate an 
ordinary least squares regression model on a single-year sample of 39 states2 to discern 
which state policies significantly affect the amount of wind energy capacity and the 
number of wind development projects, respectively. The results of this analysis, while 
insightful, likely suffer from statistical and external validity threats. Omitted variable bias 
and low sample size likely affect the authors’ statistical validity and their method of 
sample selection affects the external generalizability of their results. Furthermore, Menz 
and Vachon’s analysis considers the effects of RPS policies on wind energy development 
and deployment, not the percentage of wind energy in total generation portfolios. The 
                                                          
2
 The authors draw their sample as follows. They begin with all 50 states, then drop Alaska and Hawaii 
because they do not have data on wind potential for these states. They drop nine more states—Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee—
because they have no or low wind energy potential. After running the model once, they additionally drop 
the two states with the highest wind potential, Texas and California. The remaining sample size is 39 states. 
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overwhelming majority of RPS policies, however, aim to alter the percentage of RE, not 
simply the total amount of RE. The collective limitations of their findings highlight the 
importance of critical analysis of the methods and variables related to state energy 
policies that are used to assert causality and verify the effects of RPS legislation. 
Given the lack of consensus on whether an RPS policy is an effective RE policy 
instrument, accompanied by a rise in new state RPS legislation and the possibility of 
future federal RPS legislation, there is a distinct need for further empirical exploration of 
the subject. The present analysis builds on previous efforts, particularly those made by 
Menz and Vachon, by directly testing the association between RPS policies and total RE 
generation. I additionally test the association between electricity-based RE policy 
instruments and the percentage of RE generation across states. I aim to answer the 
following question: do renewable portfolio standards increase a state’s share of RE? This 
study contributes further empirical evaluation of state RE electricity policies, and also 
corrects for problems of low sample size, limited statistical generalizability, and omitted 
variable bias that have limited the applicability of previous studies. 
 
Methodology 
The primary objective of this analysis is to explore the effectiveness of RPS 
policies to date. I am, therefore, interested in identifying the causal effect of state RPS 
policies on the percentage of RE deployment. I begin this exercise by drawing a causal 
diagram that identifies the directional relationship between the treatment effect, an RPS 
policy, and the outcome of interest, the share of RE electricity. This diagram, or directed 
acyclic graph (DAG), is presented in Figure 2.2; it accounts for all common causes of the 
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treatment and of the outcome, and helps identify and manage relationships between the 
confounders, treatment, and outcome. The selection of the DAG components is 
influenced by theoretical foundations of public policy and the empirical findings of the 
associated environmental policy literature (Bennear, 2007; Mazur and Welsh, 1999; 
Ringquist, 2003; Ringquist and Clark, 2002; Sapat, 2004), as well as by recent analyses 
that specifically focus on RPS policy choice (Huang et al., 2007; Vachon and Menz, 
2006) and their outcomes (Menz and Vachon, 2006). 
Assuming this DAG is an accurate representation of the relationship of interest, I 
can use it to first identify important elements of my methodology and then to minimize 
bias in the estimates of the parameters. This DAG demonstrates, for instance, that I must 
control for factors that confound the policy treatment variable and that, if omitted, would 
otherwise be captured in the error term. Omitted variable bias would cause the 
explanatory variable to be correlated with the error term, and thus bias the coefficient 
estimates. This DAG also demonstrates that it is important to control for unobservable 
variables that may concurrently determine the percentage of renewable energy deployed, 
as well as selection of policy treatment. I must use an estimation procedure, therefore, 
that controls for both observed and unobserved characteristics. 
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Figure 2.2 Directed Acyclic Graph for Renewable Energy Deployment 
 
Beyond controlling for observed and unobserved confounders, I also proceed with 
one other objective—although it is not explicitly modeled in the DAG—in effort to 
maximize statistical validity. I aim to estimate the model on a larger sample size than 
those that are used in previous studies, which ought to improve the precision of estimates 
and generate more reliable standard errors. With only 50 states, the obvious solution is to 
include time series data. There are additional benefits to using state-specific panel data:  
it will allow me to control for unobserved characteristics that I may not otherwise be able 
to model explicitly; and it will allow me to track state trends over time both within and 
between states, which will, in turn, give me an understanding of whether the 
counterfactual is appropriate.  
With these objectives in mind, one could choose among a variety of estimation 
models. One would expect a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) model to estimate 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates due to this analysis’ omission of time-
invariant covariates. Similarly, an OLS model that does not control for state-level time-
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invariant characteristics will estimate biased standard errors when the errors are 
heteroskedastic or dependent within group. When omitted time-invariant variables are 
correlated with the policy instrument variables, a fixed effects model will provide a 
consistent and unbiased estimate of the parameters while concurrently controlling for 
unobserved unit heterogeneity.3 The state fixed effects model used in this analysis is: 
Yst = α0 + β1Xst + δ1Z1st + δ2Z2s + γtZt + εst,    (1) 
where, for state ‘s’ at time t, Y is the logged share of renewable energy electricity out of 
all sources of electricity, X represents RPS implementation, Z1 represents all covariates 
that are time-variant, Z2 represents covariates that are time-invariant4, and Zt represents a 
vector of time dummy variables. The error term, εst, can be decomposed into a time-
constant state-effect and an independent and identically distributed random state-year 
term: 
εst =  µs + ηst.      (2) 
For equation (1) to correctly identify the causal effect of an RPS policy, it must be 
the case that unobserved heterogeneity among states that adopt or do not adopt an RPS 
policy affect RE deployment but not the trends in deployment. In other words, in absence 
of an RPS policy, the trends in RE deployment would be parallel among states with and 
without RPS policies. 
Plümper and Troeger (2007) present a fixed effects vector decomposition model 
(FEVD), which is more efficient than a standard fixed effects model when the ratio of the 
                                                          
3
 If, on the other hand, these omitted time-invariant variables are uncorrelated with the policy covariates, a 
random effects model will provide a more efficient estimate than would fixed effects. Given the nature of 
these state-level data, however, I expect that a fixed effects is the most appropriate. To validate this 
assumption, I perform a series of Bruesch-Pagan and Hausman tests. For the sake of comparison, I provide 
results from a random effects and a pooled OLS model in the appendix. 
4
 The time-invariant variables are only included in the fixed effects vector decomposition model, which is 
described below. 
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between and within variance of the dependent variable is large, or when the correlation 
between the time-invariant variables and the state effects is low. Because the former is 
particularly true in this analysis, I estimate an FEVD model as well. This procedure 
additionally allows me to recover the effects of relevant time-invariant or rarely changing 
variables that would otherwise remain captured in the state fixed effects estimate. The 
FEVD technique was designed to deal with panel data variables that are rarely changing, 
in which the variance across units is greater than the variance over time and so the fixed 
effects will soak up the explanatory power of these variables. Therefore, not only does 
the FEVD technique provide a more efficient estimate when the percentage of RE varies 
only slightly in some states during the study period, but it also allows me to explicitly 
model time-invariant variables—such as natural resource endowment—that theory and 
relevant literature indicate are important. The FEVD procedure, Plümper and Troeger 
posit, yields correct standard errors for the invariant variables and reveals more accurate 
estimates of rarely changing variables’ explanatory power.  
Adhering to Plümper and Troeger’s procedures, I take the unit effects from the 
first fixed effects model, and break them down into the portion that is explained by the 
time-invariant variables and the error term. I then re-estimate the original model with a 
pooled OLS, but this time include the revealed error term from the prior step and the 
time-invariant variables, Z2.  
 
Data 
Public state-level energy data are rarely comprehensive. This study, therefore, 
compiles individual variables from a variety of public sources between 1998 and 2007 to 
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create a state-level energy database. These years span the adoption and initial phases of 
RPS implementation for a number of states. With 50 states and ten years, the resulting 
sample size begins with 500 observations. Because the wind potential variable is missing 
observations for Hawaii and Alaska the final sample has 480 observations. All summary 
statistics are presented in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics (n=480) 
Variable  Definition Mean 
(or %) 
Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
RE share Share of renewable energy electricity 
(in MWh) out of total generation 
       2.65%     0.039         0.00         0.32 
RE total Total amount of renewable energy 
electricity (in 1000 MWh) 
180.67     343.58         0.00   2480.00 
RPS  State has an operational RPS policy      23.13%    0.42         0.00          1.00 
House score LCV House of Representative pro-
environment score 
    0.43    0.29         0.00          1.00 
Per capital natural resource 
employees 
Number of state and local natural 
resource employees per 1,000 capita 
    0.84    0.52         0.18         3.16 
Petro/coal manufacturing GSP Percent of total GSP that comes from 
petroleum and coal manufacturing 
 
        0.0035       0.0092         0.00         0.13 
Gross state product per capita Annual gross state product per capita 36,485.85  7,826.93 21,802.87 70,784.18 
Growth rate of population Annual change in state population        0.90%    0.02        -0.06         0.11 
Electricity Price Average annual retail electricity price 
(in cents/kWh) 
    7.34    2.27         4.00       16.45 
Electricity use per capita Average MWh electricity used per 
person, per state 
  17.50  13.81        4.58       94.46 
Percent regional RPS Percent of regional states that have an 
RPS policy, lagged by one year 
       18.38%        0.24         0.00          1.00 
Wind potential Windy land area in 10,000 km2 as of 
1991 
         2.17        3.60         0.00        12.37 
Biomass potential Estimated cumulative biomass 
quantities as of 1998 in 10,000 
tons/year 
  1,064.28    844.73       11.55  3,335.92 
Solar potential Technical daily max in 10,000 MWh 
of total solar energy 
  7,437.54  6,013.21     156.06 3,4015.89 
Tax index Weighted index of corporate, sales, 
industrial, and property tax options 
    1.19    1.14         0.00         4.00 
Subsidy index Weighted index of grants, loans, and 
rebates 
    2.34    0.62         1.00         3.00 
Deregulation State is partially or entirely 
deregulated 
    26.4%    0.44         0.00          1.00 
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Outcome variables 
 I use two separate dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the natural 
log of RE percentage of electricity generation per year.5 This variable is computed by 
dividing each state’s annual amount of RE electricity generation, excluding 
hydroelectricity, measured in Megawatt-hours, by the total amount of electricity 
generation by all sources. I emphasize that this outcome variable is the percentage of RE 
electricity out of total state fuel blends. In the second series, the dependent variable is the 
total amount of annual RE generation, excluding hydroelectricity, measured in thousands 
of Megawatt-hours. This dependent variable is more consistent with the types of RE 
variables used in other analyses (Menz and Vachon, 2006; Bird et al., 2005; Langniss and 
Wiser, 2003). Data on electricity generation come from the EIA state electricity 
databases. 
 
Policy Variable 
The primary variable of interest is an RPS policy. I employ a dichotomous RPS 
variable, equal to one if a state has an RPS policy in a given year and equal to zero if the 
state does not have an RPS policy.6 All policy instrument data are extracted from the 
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) (North Carolina 
Solar Center, 2009). The DSIRE outlines which policy instruments are operational across 
                                                          
5
 After performing a series of functional form tests—a kurtosis test for normality, a Bera McAleer test, a 
Box Cox test, and a Wooldridge test—I determined that the dependent variable should be logged to avoid 
specification error and possible biased estimates or inconsistency as a result of this error. 
6
 I additionally operationalize the RPS variable in two separate ways: as a continuous variable that reflects 
the percentage RPS goal at the terminal year; and as an ordinal value that reflects the degree of RPS goal, 
where 0=no RPS, 1=voluntary RPS, 2= “weak” RPS (less than 12 percent RE by terminal year), 3= 
“medium” (between 12 and 24 percent RE), and 4= “strong” RPS (greater than 24 percent RE). Both 
variables generate model results that do not substantively differ from the main models. 
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the country and the date of adoption for each electricity-based policy instrument by each 
state.  
Three assumptions are made about RPS policy program implementation. First, an 
RPS policy is only considered operational according to the effective date of policy 
implementation, not the adoption date, as listed on the DSIRE website. Second, any RPS 
policy that became effective in either November or December is not coded as effective 
until the following fiscal year. For instance, if a state effectively begins a RPS program in 
November 2003, the value of their RPS variable equals zero from 1998 to 2003, and one 
thereafter. Third, I do not code any voluntary or “goal” based RPS policies as a mandated 
standard.  
 
Political and environmental institution factors 
A diverse literature, embedded within the disciplines of political science and 
public administration, argues that institutions frame the manner in which political actors 
operate, and both directly and indirectly shape the structure of policy outcomes (see 
Shepsle, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996; North, 1990; Steinmo and Tolbert, 1998; 
Weingast, 1989). Many environmental policy theorists also hypothesize that the capacity 
of political organizations, the ideological underpinnings of political actors, and inter-
party competition all affect the likelihood of environmental policy adoption and the 
degree to which outcomes conform to the policy objectives (Bennear, 2007; Mazur and 
Welsh, 1999; Ringquist, 2003; Ringquist and Clark, 2002; Sapat, 2004). In consideration 
of these theories, and countless others that may posit more intricate hypotheses of 
institutional dynamics and policy implementation, this study uses three political 
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covariates to account for the institutions that help ensure, or alternatively do not ensure, 
the success of policy incentives or directly affect RE development and deployment.7  
First, I include a variable that represents a state’s legislative commitment toward 
environmental policy. State legislators are able to affect state policy through their ability 
to pass legislation, to continually uphold the tenets upon which a policy issue rests 
through support of related future legislation, and through their control of agency budgets 
as a possible means of control over agency capacity and ability to deal with energy 
issues. The League of Conservation Voters’ (LCV) environmental scorecard documents 
the annual average pro-environmental vote for all members of the House of 
Representatives between 1971 and 2007. Following a conventional assumption, states 
with governing bodies that are oriented toward pro-environmental legislation are 
expected to demonstrate a greater commitment to green energy development and, 
consequently, have higher rates of RE deployment.8 
Second, I include the number of per capita state and local employees in natural 
resource governmental positions. This variable represents the capacity that state and local 
bureaucracies have to respond to emerging environmental challenges. I predict that states 
with larger bureaucratic natural resource workforces will have a greater ability to address 
imminent environmental issues, tackle a variety of environmental and energy-related 
problems, and allocate goods and services that aim to increase RE development. This 
                                                          
7
 I originally included a fourth political institution variable, the number of 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations 
registered with the IRS that have an environmental quality and protection purpose according to the National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities Code. After analyzing the results of our model, however, I determined that 
this variable is irrelevant and it would ultimately decrease the efficiency of our model if included. 
8
 I intend for this variable to also reflect or at least demonstrate great overlap with public awareness of 
environment or energy issues. I do not include a separate public awareness variable in this model because: 
1) such a variable is not available at the state level with variation in time; and 2) such a variable would be 
highly collinear with the LCV environmental scorecard variable. 
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variable is operationalized as the number of state and local natural resource employees 
per 1,000 people, and is extracted from U.S. Census Bureau databases.  
Third, I include the percentage of total gross state product (GSP) that is 
attributable to petroleum and coal manufacturing. This variable is intended to represent 
the strength of fossil fuel-based interest groups and will likely have a negative association 
with RE deployment. These data are extracted from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
 
State socioeconomic factors 
The model includes two state socioeconomic covariates: per capita gross state 
product and the growth rate of the population.9 Both variables are extracted from U.S. 
Census Bureau data. Consistent with other environmental policy analyses (Ringquist, 
1993; Sapat 2004), I predict that states with greater wealth, other things equal, will have a 
higher percentage of RE because they have the ability to invest more heavily in RE 
deployment or other green energy opportunities. States with larger growth rates will 
likely build more power capacity to satisfy growing state demand for electricity; 
renewable energy deployment may be a viable option for satisfying rising demand. It is 
also possible, however, that larger population growth rates will be associated with 
increases in base load fossil fuel generation, such as coal-based power.  
 
State electricity trends 
                                                          
9
 Originally, I also included household income and educational attainment in the model; after finding that 
both variables are irrelevant to the model, I removed them.  
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It would be inappropriate to estimate a model that considers the main drivers of 
renewable energy deployment without controlling for motivating trends that are specific 
to state electricity markets. I control for three such state electricity trends that, if omitted, 
would confound the policy treatment variable and bias the estimates. The first variable is 
the annual amount of total electricity generated per state divided by the associated state 
population per year. Similar to the annual population growth rate variable, it is difficult to 
predict a priori the effect of greater electricity use per capita on RE deployment. It is 
possible that greater demands for electricity could encourage RE development, yet it is 
also possible that greater rates of demand could promote larger investment in base load 
centralized power from coal or natural gas. The direction of association will likely 
depend on the type of electricity demand—base load, intermittent, or peak—and how this 
demand contributes to seasonal and daily load curves.  
The second electricity market variable, deregulation, indicates whether a state has 
restructured its electricity market. States that have either partially or fully restructured 
their electricity market are coded to equal one; states that have kept their market 
regulated or have “destructured” their market after a period of deregulation have a 
regulation variable equal to zero. The deregulation variable is time-invariant and so is 
captured by the state fixed effects in the regular fixed effects model, but is included as an 
independent variable in the FEVD model. To date, there is little consensus regarding the 
environmental and RE development effects of electricity deregulation (Palmer, 1997). 
Some argue that deregulation will help ensure consumer choice, lead to greater product 
differentiation, and encourage increases in RE-based research and development (Delmas 
et al., 2007). Counter arguments contend that deregulation will merely encourage a rise in 
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conventional, centralized fossil fuel generation due to traditional economies of scale and 
the cost advantage of fossil fuels over renewables.  
The third electricity market variable is the average annual retail price of electricity 
across all end-users, measured in cents per kilowatt-hour. Electricity price data are 
extracted from the Energy Information Administration’s Office of Coal, Nuclear, 
Electric, and Alternative Fuel’s electricity databases. Electricity price may be negatively 
associated with renewable energy deployment; the higher the price of electricity, the less 
likely state utilities will be to invest in relatively more expensive renewable energy 
sources of electricity. On the other hand, electricity price may be positively associated 
with RE deployment: a higher price of electricity has the potential to make RE more 
economically feasible. 
 
Natural resource endowment  
All resource endowment variables are time-invariant and, therefore, only included 
in the FEVD model as separate from state fixed effects. For wind power potential, I use 
Elliot and his colleagues’ 1991 estimates of the available land area in wind class three or 
higher, excluding land with zoning restrictions (Elliot et al., 1991). It is important to note 
that these data only include onshore land area, and do not include windy land that is 
located offshore but still in a state’s jurisdiction. For biomass potential, I use Walsh and 
his colleagues’ 1998 estimates of cumulative quantities of all biomass sources, recorded 
in tons/year (Walsh et al., 1998). Solar potential is recorded as the average monthly solar 
radiation over a time span of thirty years, 1961-1990, for a south-facing flat-plate 
collector tilted at zero degree tilt (measured in kWh/m2/day), multiplied by the state area 
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(measured in m2). Measured in MWh per day, this variable represents the maximum 
electricity output that is technically possible given the solar radiation and land area of 
each state. Solar data are from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s solar 
radiation databases (NREL, 1992).  
Although these data are the most extensive of all possible sources, they do have a 
few drawbacks: a few of these data sources are missing information for Hawaii and 
Alaska; these variables rely on potentially outdated estimates; and these data do not 
represent actual electricity generation potential. The first issue requires that I drop Hawaii 
and Alaska from the sample. The second problem is not much of a concern—it is fair to 
assume that natural resource endowments remain relatively steady across time and pre-
1998 resource endowment data is ultimately useful since these values are not 
contemporaneously determined with RPS implementation. The final issue requires a note 
of caution. The natural resource figures used in this analysis do not represent the amount 
or share of electricity that could come from these resource endowments; they are merely 
absolute figures that indicate resource potential. I do not convert from resource potential 
to electricity potential because this conversion would require critical assumptions about 
the overlap between technical, economic, and political feasibility, which is beyond the 
realm of this analysis. 
 
Other state energy policies 
I also control for the effects of other RE policies, including grants, loans, rebates, 
and tax incentives. Due to data limitations, I am not able to include sophisticated 
measures of annual grant or tax incentive expenditures. Working with available data from 
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DSIRE, I create two policy indexes: one represents the number of different types of 
annual operational subsidy policies and the other tax incentive policies. Grants, loans, 
and rebates are transformed into an equal-weighted subsidy index that ranges from zero 
to three. If, for instance, a state has a grant program in 2003 and both a grant and a loan 
program in 2004, then their subsidy index would equal one for 2003 and two for 2004. 
The tax incentive index is similarly constructed: all forms of tax incentives—corporate, 
personal, property, and sales—are made into an equal-weighted tax index that ranges 
from zero to four. Both variables have little variation over the study period and so I only 
include these variables in the FEVD model. I recognize that both variables are crude 
representations of supporting policy instruments, yet this method allows me to include 
these variables in the model without compromising degrees of freedom or unnecessarily 
complicating the variance-covariance matrix used for model estimation.  
The choice of whether and how much RE to deploy, as well as the choice of RPS 
adoption, is likely influenced by regional RE markets. States within the same region may 
develop and deploy RE either to comply with their own RPS requirements, or to sell the 
resulting RECs to surrounding states. I must, therefore, control for the influence of 
regional REC markets on state RE deployment. I do so by including a final variable in the 
model: the percentage of regional states that have RPS policies, lagged by one year. I 
created this variable by dividing all states into their respective regions—West, Midwest, 
Northeast, Southwest, Southeast—and documenting all regional relationships in a social 
accounting matrix, and then multiplying the resulting matrix by a lagged RPS matrix. If 
the percentage is high, I hypothesize, states will be more likely to deploy RE and sell the 
credits in the regional REC market. If only a small proportion of regional states have RPS 
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policies, a state may be less likely, if at all, to deploy RE for regional REC markets. 
Clearly, the way in which I operationalize this variable is less ideal than if I simply 
included location-specific REC prices or REC market size. Such direct variables, 
however, are not accessible for a large number of states or, in the event that it is 
accessible, consistently measured across states and time (Holt and Bird, 2005).10 
 
Empirical results 
Table 2.3 presents the results from the models with a dependent variable equal to 
the share of RE electricity. Model 1 presents the fixed effects estimates and Model 2 
presents the FEVD estimates. The results of both demonstrate that RPS policies have a 
small, positive association with RE share of electricity. This association is not statistically 
significant, however, thereby suggesting that RPS policies to date have not significantly 
affected states’ shares of RE electricity. 
                                                          
10
 RECs are most commonly traded in-state or within region. To date, RECs are rarely traded inter-
regionally (Holt and Bird, 2005).   
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Table 2.3. Regression Results with Dependent Variable: Logged Share of Renewable 
Energy Electricity 
Independent Variable         Model 1: Fixed effects           Model 2: FEVD    
 
RPS       0.126     0.142 
      (0.141)    (0.091) 
House LCV voting score     2.213     2.222 
      (0.424)***   (0.165)*** 
Natural resource employees per capita    1.540     1.498 
      (0.395)***   (0.093)*** 
Percent petro/coal manufacturing of total GSP     -13.296                 -12.837 
      (6.608)**   (3.810)*** 
Gross state product per capita    0.0001     0.0001 
      (0.00002)***   (0.0000007)*** 
Growth rate of population    -1.262    -1.611 
      (4.509)    (3.606) 
Electricity use per capita    -0.120    -0.118 
      (0.030)***   (0.004)*** 
Average retail electricity price   -0.289    -0.281 
      (0.057)***   (0.027)*** 
Percent regional RPS    -0.684    -0.622 
      (0.267)***   (0.180)*** 
Tax index        -0.004 
         (0.030) 
Subsidy index         0.369 
         (0.048)*** 
Deregulated        -0.753 
         (0.086)*** 
Wind potential        -0.119 
         (0.013)*** 
Biomass potential        -0.00008 
         (0.00005)* 
Solar potential         0.00006 
         (0.0000007)*** 
Year 1999a     -0.076    -0.065 
      (0.166)    (0.148) 
Year 2000     -0.024     0.004 
      (0.247)    (0.247) 
Year 2001      0.020     0.049 
      (0.177)    (0.152) 
Year 2002      0.126     0.169 
      (0.188)    (0.154) 
Year 2003      0.302     0.340 
      (0.206)    (0.156)** 
Year 2004      0.222     0.267 
      (0.243)    (0.161)* 
Year 2005      0.213     0.251 
      (0.282)    (0.167) 
Year 2006      0.167     0.191 
      (0.325)    (0.173) 
Year 2007      0.108     0.161 
      (0.366)    (0.187) 
FEVD Residuals         0.987 
         (0.025)*** 
Constant      -7.207    -7.905 
      (1.095)***   (0.295)*** 
Observations                 482                482 
Number of state fixed effects                  48  
R-squared                     0.40     0.87 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01.   
a. Omitted category: 1998 
 
 33 
The regression results indicate that the political institution covariates have highly 
significant associations with RE share of electricity. The LCV scorecard percentage has a 
positive, significant association with RE share of electricity, as does the number of 
natural resource state and local employees per capita. The percent of petroleum and coal 
manufacturing contributions to total GSP is negatively and statistically associated with 
RE share of electricity.  
Table 2.3, with combined results from models 1 and 2, demonstrates that 
additional variables are significant predictors of the percentage of RE generation. 
Electricity market trends and state fiscal resources are also significant predictors of RE 
percentage growth. Both electricity price and electricity use per capita have negative, 
statistically significant associations with the percentage of RE, holding all else constant. 
Gross state product per capita is positively associated with the dependent variable. The 
percent of regional states with RPS variable is also statistically significant, at the one 
percent significance level, and negative. 
The results of the FEVD regression demonstrate that additional time invariant 
factors are highly associated with RE share of electricity. An additional subsidy policy 
has a positive and significant association with RE share of electricity. All three natural 
resource endowment variables are significant, though the wind and biomass endowment 
variables are, surprisingly, negatively associated with the outcome variable. Deregulation 
has a negative and statistically significant association with RE share of electricity.  
Table 2.4 presents a second series of fixed effects models, in which the dependent 
variable is each state’s total RE generation. The fixed effects estimates presented in Table 
2.4 are noticeably different than those in Table 2.3. The RPS variable is positive and 
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statistically significant in both models. The political institution variables are not 
statistically significant at any conventional significance level, save the natural resource 
employee per capita variable. An increase in the amount of electricity used per person is 
associated with an increase in the total amount of RE, holding all else constant. Similarly 
to the RE share model results, the average retail price of electricity is negatively 
associated with total RE deployment and gross state product is positively associated. The 
percentage of regional states with an RPS variable is also still negative and significant. In 
consideration of the time invariant FEVD parameters, deregulation, biomass resources, 
and solar potential have positive associations with RE generation, and wind potential and 
tax incentives both have negative associations. All FEVD parameters are statistically 
significant.  
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Table 2.4. Regression Results with Dependent Variable: Total MWh of Renewable 
Energy Electricity 
Independent Variable            Model 1: Fixed effects             Model 2: FEVD 
    
RPS           349,858.906   347,794.512 
       (109,869.039)***    (70,843.243)*** 
House LCV voting score     -135,001.074  -117,185.289 
       (331,412.018)                 (127,412.887) 
Natural resource employees per capita    -757,086.889                 -750,926.651 
       (308,676.621)**    (72,912.117)*** 
Percent petro/coal manufacturing of total GSP         472,313.664                  563,638.852 
                   (5,166,499.483)              (2,922,219.372) 
Gross state product per capita              65.305            64.937 
                (19.253)***             (4.659)*** 
Growth rate of population                  2,295,957.491               2,520,749.922 
                   (3,525,241.033)              (2,852,383.485) 
Electricity use per capita        12,206.701     11,962.653 
         (23,287.738)      (2,348.808)*** 
Average retail electricity price      -14,945.502    -13,283.360 
         (44,542.739)    (20,300.810) 
Percent regional RPS     -757,230.118  -757,027.583 
       (208,471.136)***  (140,951.934)*** 
Tax index                      -111,710.227 
          (23,680.642)*** 
Subsidy index        909,734.328 
          (37,241.407)*** 
Deregulated        485,148.379 
          (67,397.871)*** 
Wind potential       -432,039.773 
          (10,225.410)*** 
Biomass potential               687.014 
                 (36.247)*** 
Solar potential               347.096 
                   (5.638)*** 
Year 1999        -24,599.650    -26,586.283 
       (129,623.244)  (116,818.474) 
Year 2000      -98,071.396  -104,577.874 
       (193,425.299)  (164,405.169) 
Year 2001      -112,467.797  -109,227.857 
       (138,593.232)  (119,747.861) 
Year 2002        -22,279.132    -16,892.397 
       (147,285.887)  (121,297.935) 
Year 2003        -74,748.764    -66,304.146 
       (160,993.048)  (122,244.820) 
Year 2004      -166,206.408  -156,852.153 
       (189,766.434)  (126,215.377) 
Year 2005      -194,956.479  -177,111.359 
       (220,199.723)  (130,419.071) 
Year 2006      -196,022.132  -168,726.629 
       (254,096.668)  (134,717.005) 
Year 2007      -156,664.960  -106,040.041 
       (286,100.312)  (144,308.048) 
FEVD Residuals                   0.999 
                   (0.010)*** 
Constant        157,952.138              -4,324,110.186 
       (856,118.837)  (242,842.624)*** 
Observations              480          480 
Number of state fixed effects               48  
R-squared                                                                              0.19              0.98 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01.   
a. Omitted category: 1998 
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Discussion 
The results of this analysis confirm the mixed policy effects and effectiveness 
evaluations that RPS policies have received to date. On the one hand, I find no strong 
evidence that RPS policies are, to date, obtaining their overarching objective of 
increasing the percentage of RE generation. An RPS policy is demonstrated to have an 
insignificant association with RE share of electricity; in other words, states with RPS 
policies do not have statistically higher rates of RE share deployment than states without 
RPS policies, holding all else constant. While it is documented that RPS policies have 
already demonstrated positive returns in selected states (Langniss and Wiser, 2003; 
Gouchoe et al., 2002), these results reveal that other states may struggle to invest in RE 
development to a degree that ensures substantial increases in the percentage of RE 
deployment. These results are consistent with Wiser and his colleague’s (2007) findings 
that, despite some success stories from a handful of states, other states may not be on 
track to meet their RPS targets.  
 On the other hand, Table 2.4 reveals that states that have operational RPS policies 
have significantly higher rates of total renewable energy deployment than states without 
RPS policies, holding all else constant. These results support findings made by Menz and 
Vachon (2006), as discussed above, as well as other analyses (Langniss and Wiser, 
2003). Based on the collective results of all sets of models, one could infer that RPS 
policies are to date effectively encouraging total RE investment and deployment but not 
effectively increasing the percentage of RE generation in states’ electricity portfolios.  
A lack of consistent policy successes may be attributable to poorly structured 
policy design features or weak enforceable penalty mechanisms, as Wiser and his 
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colleagues suggest (2007; 2004). It is also possible, however, that the rate of RE growth 
may simply be overwhelmed by the rate of overall electricity demand growth, both in-
state and by export sales to the national grid. From a policy evaluation standpoint, these 
findings reveal a potentially significant shortcoming of RPS policies. Weak or 
inadequately structured policy design features, a lack of enforceable penalties for 
noncompliance, or an inconsistency between demand growth and RPS implementation 
are all potentially manageable problems that could be addressed at the state level.  
From any standpoint other than those held by policy analysts, however, should 
one care if states are falling short of their percentage RE electricity goals if they are still 
increasing total RE generation? Some would argue that we ought not to care. RPS 
policies are effectively encouraging RE investment and opening electricity markets to RE 
development, thereby making renewable technologies more competitive with traditional 
systems. Furthermore, one may predict that the growth of the RE industries will 
eventually become positively self-reinforcing as these businesses acquire the lobbying 
influence to protect themselves and further enhance their growth and profits; but the 
business climate simply is not there yet.  
Others would argue differently. RPS policies are one of the strongest and only 
mechanisms that the U.S. has yet to adopt to address climate change. Twenty-seven states 
have crafted regulation in promotion of RE generation and, within the next several years, 
several more states and the federal government will consider adopting their own version 
of an RPS. Yet if forthcoming statistical applications reveal that RPS programs are either 
entirely effective or alternatively ineffective, then policymakers may respond by rushing 
similar legislation without addressing policy design problems or they may entirely 
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disregard RPS policies as a viable option, respectively. Finally, if the ultimate intent of 
RE-based legislation is to reduce emissions associated with climate change—which is the 
case for some states, though not all—then increasing RE generation without enforcing a 
decrease in fossil fuel generation will not achieve these objectives. Increases in fossil fuel 
generation, as well as some alternative energy sources, will continue to increase carbon 
emission levels in the atmosphere. One may conclude, therefore, that RPS policies may 
ultimately be more effective if implemented in conjunction with programs that target 
energy demand with efficiency and conservation measures or, alternatively, with cap-
and-trade mechanisms.  
Although this range of interpretations regarding the effects of RPS policies on RE 
development and deployment are consistent with findings made by other researchers, it is 
important to acknowledge that the interpretations made in the present analysis may be too 
speculative; and, in actuality, RPS policies are simply too new for the majority of states 
to experience significant changes in RE deployment levels. Most states are still in the 
early stages of RPS implementation and it is plausible that implementation efforts, as 
well as penalty and enforcement mechanisms, are not yet at full strength. If this is the 
case, the present results reveal that RPS policies take a long time—several years, at 
least—to achieve intended levels of implementation, enforcement, and outcome success.  
The model results reveal that an increase in the percentage of regional states with 
RPS policies is associated with a decrease in RE percentage and RE total, respectively, 
holding all else constant. These findings are counter to my original hypothesis, in which I 
predicted that a greater percentage of regional states with RPS policies would encourage 
a greater amount of RE development for the intent of REC sales. Given that this is the 
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first empirical RPS analysis that attempts to include and control for REC activities, I have 
limited relevant literature from which to pull insights on these trends.  I would, however, 
like to offer a couple of preliminary, yet largely speculative, explanations for these 
findings.  
First, the results from the third essay in this dissertation, Decarbonization: The 
case of carbon mitigation and state policy portfolios, may lend some insights on the 
negative relationship between percentage of regional RPS states and RE deployment. 
This analysis finds evidence of carbon leakage across state borders as a result of 
inconsistent renewable energy regulations. More specifically, when one state has 
renewable energy-based electricity regulations and a neighboring state does not, the state 
with regulations is likely to export its excess fossil fuel-based generation to the state 
without regulations, conditional on the need for additional generation in the neighboring, 
non-regulated state. The state without its own renewable energy regulations, therefore, 
has little incentive to build its own new generation capacity, renewable-based or 
otherwise, when it can import its neighbor’s relatively inexpensive excess power. These 
findings indicate that states with regional RPS partners are faced with somewhat 
conflicting incentives: either build new renewable energy and sell the RECs to 
neighboring states; or hold off on some or all new generation facilities and, instead, 
import neighboring states’ excess generation. In the event that the latter is more cost-
effective, the negative association between RE and regional RPS states, as discovered in 
this study, makes more sense. 
The second possible explanation for these results is that REC markets are still 
evolving. Although the first REC market for RPS compliance was established in Texas in 
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1999, by 2004 only a handful of states actively traded RECs, including: Texas, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, and, to some degree, New Jersey (Holt and Bird, 
2004). If the creation of REC markets effectively encourages regional RE development, 
one should still expect a delay before that new RE is fully running and dispatching power 
onto the electrical grid.  
The final possible explanation for these findings is that the variable of interest, 
percentage of regional RPS states, does not accurately represent REC markets. While it is 
fair to assume that a greater number of regional RPS states increases opportunities for 
renewable energy credit exchanges in that region, it may be a stretch to also assume that 
each additional regional RPS policy increases the likelihood that a state within that region 
will develop renewable energy for REC sales. As discussed above, a more accurate REC 
variable would be REC prices, by state and over time, or REC market potential, in MWh 
per year.  
Turning to other results, state-level political and environmental institutional 
factors are effective determinants of a state’s share of RE electricity. Specifically, the 
LCV estimate demonstrates that continued support for environmental legislation 
positively affects the share of RE electricity. Similarly, an increase in natural resource-
oriented state and local government employees per capita is also positively and 
significantly associated with an increase in RE share, thereby suggesting that greater 
bureaucratic capacity can significantly influence the share of RE deployment. It is 
difficult to draw policy recommendations from these parameter estimates, although some 
may suggest that these results reflect the need to better inform state legislators about the 
ramifications of disregarding environmental priorities. If policymakers and state and local 
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bureaucrats demonstrate a commitment toward environmental progress, and the capacity 
to address evolving energy challenges, a transition toward diversified and more 
sustainable state energy portfolios may be more likely.  
The FEVD coefficients in both tables reveal that there are significant time-
invariant fixed effects factors that are still captured in the residual term. Of the time-
invariant parameters that are explicitly modeled, one can gather a couple of interesting 
insights. Subsidy programs are positively associated with RE share and RE total, whereas 
tax incentives are negatively associated with both dependent variables, although only 
statistically significant in the RE total model. In other words, for each additional grant, 
loan, or rebate program, holding all else constant, a state should expect a significant 
increase in RE; yet for each additional tax incentive program, states should expect a 
decrease in RE. The reasons behind these trends are not readily apparent. It is possible 
that subsidies attract larger RE system owners, while tax incentives attract homeowners 
and other micro-generation or distributive generation owners that make up a tiny fraction 
of total RE generation. Or perhaps it is the case that having a greater number of tax 
incentive offerings merely attenuates each respective incentive, thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of any given incentive offering. Supporting RE policy instrument literature 
offers limited insights on this issue; this limitation highlights the need for future studies 
that focus on the specific and direct effects of subsidy and tax incentive policy packages 
on electricity markets.  
The results of this analysis indicate that deregulated states have lower percentages 
of RE generation than regulated states, yet have higher rates of total RE deployment. 
Competitive electricity markets, therefore, do encourage RE investment and 
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development. Conventional fossil fuel energy sources are, however, still on average 
relatively less expensive and thus the majority of new generation in deregulated markets 
is sourced from fossil fuels instead of renewables.  
The amount of windy land area in a state is negatively associated with RE share 
and RE total. These results are surprising in light of others’ findings (Menz and Vachon, 
2006; Langniss and Wiser, 2003) and conventional logic, but are supported by the 
underlying basic statistics used in this analysis. The bivariate correlation coefficients 
between windy land and the RE dependent variables are both negative, although the 
coefficient between windy land and RPS policy adoption is positive. A closer look at the 
data reveal that a number of the states with the highest windy land area—Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming—had not adopted a 
mandatory RPS policy by the end of the study period, nor did they have high rates of RE 
deployment. Furthermore, states with the lowest 25 percent of windy land area (≤ 340 
km2) have an average RE share across the study period of 1.75 percent and states with the 
highest windy land (> 26,475 km2) have an average of 1.41 percent. The states on neither 
extreme of the windy land distribution (> 340 km2 and ≤ 26,475 km2) have a significantly 
higher average RE share of 3.79 percent. The total amount of RE summarized by windy 
land area demonstrates similar trends. The least windy states had an average RE 
generation of 1.72 million MWh, the mid-level windy states had 2.29 million MWh, and 
the most windy states had .70 million MWh.  
It is evident from these statistics that mid-level windy land area states are most 
aggressively pursuing RE development through RPS policies or other initiatives. States 
with the smallest amount of windy land are understandably lagging behind the mid-level 
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states, but are still deploying RE at a faster rate that states with the greatest windy land. 
States with the greatest windy land area are evidently reluctant to adopt measures that 
promote RE deployment, perhaps assuming that development will occur without 
mandates or costly incentives. It is worth noting that these states with greater windy land 
area have low population growth rates and rely heavily on base-load coal as their primary 
source of energy. These states, therefore, have less of a need for wind development and 
deployment as a means for meeting relatively minor growth in demand. It is difficult, 
despite these cursory attempts, to accurately identify the true source of these trends. The 
empirical literature on this subject could benefit from future analyses that more 
rigorously address this issue, and include new wind data that account for offshore wind 
potential. For the purposes of this analysis, I can conclude that simply having decent 
wind energy potential across a state’s boundaries is not enough to make RE deployment 
economically viable over conventional fossil fuel sources. 
In closing, I would like to highlight the importance of a time dimension in this 
type of analysis. The present study takes an early look at the underlying causal 
associations between RE incentives and RE development. While I believe that I have 
appropriately captured early trends as a result RPS adoption and implementation, there is 
a continued need to update these and other empirical results as RPS policies mature in 
some states and are adopted in others. It will be particularly important to track associated 
effects in coming years as states’ approach their individual RPS benchmarks. 
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Appendix: Alternative estimation approaches 
 
Table 2.5. Alternative Estimation Approaches with Dependent Variable: Logged 
Share of Renewable Energy Electricity 
Independent Variable  Fixed effects   FEVD            Random effects Pooled OLS  
 
RPS      0.126    0.142   0.179   0.737 
     (0.141)   (0.091)  (0.142)  (0.191)*** 
House LCV voting score    2.213    2.222   2.026   1.011 
     (0.424)***  (0.165)*** (0.393)*** (0.347)*** 
Natural resource employees     1.540    1.498   1.555   0.470 
  per capita       (0.395)***  (0.093)*** (0.313)*** (0.191)** 
Percent petro/coal manufacturing          -13.296                -12.837               -10.235                19.514 
  of total GSP          (6.608)**  (3.810)*** (6.566)  (7.957)** 
Gross state product per capita   0.0001    0.0001   0.00008                 -0.00005 
     (0.00002)***  (0.0000007)***     (0.00002)*** (0.00001)*** 
Growth rate of population   -1.262   -1.611   0.451                11.910 
     (4.509)   (3.606)  (4.620)                 (7.670) 
Electricity use per capita   -0.120   -0.118  -0.066  -0.017 
     (0.030)***  (0.004)*** (0.015)*** (0.006)*** 
Average retail electricity price  -0.289   -0.281  -0.199   0.290 
     (0.057)***  (0.027)*** (0.054)***              (0.050)*** 
Percent regional RPS   -0.684   -0.622  -0.732  -1.498 
     (0.267)***  (0.180)*** (0.269)*** (0.381)*** 
Tax index      -0.004   0.062   0.002 
       (0.030)  (0.050)  (0.064) 
Subsidy index       0.369   0.205   0.691 
       (0.048)*** (0.085)** (0.101)*** 
Deregulated      -0.753  -0.332  -0.301 
       (0.086)*** (0.128)***  (0.182)* 
Wind potential      -0.119  -0.188  -0.137 
       (0.013)*** (0.074)** (0.028)*** 
Biomass potential      -0.00008   0.00006   0.0002 
       (0.00005)*             (0.0003)  (0.0001)** 
Solar potential       0.00006   0.000006  0.00003 
       (0.0000007)***     (0.00004)  (0.00002)*  
Year 1999    -0.076   -0.065                 -0.050                 -0.007  
     (0.166)   (0.148)  (0.169)  (0.317) 
Year 2000    -0.024    0.004   0.008  -0.217 
     (0.247)   (0.247)  (0.252)  (0.444) 
Year 2001     0.020    0.049   0.146   0.183 
     (0.177)   (0.152)  (0.179)  (0.325) 
Year 2002     0.126    0.169   0.309   0.466 
     (0.188)   (0.154)  (0.187)*  (0.329) 
Year 2003     0.302    0.340   0.523   0.787 
     (0.206)   (0.156)** (0.199)*** (0.332)** 
Year 2004     0.222    0.267   0.516   0.941 
     (0.243)   (0.161)*  (0.225)** (0.342)*** 
Year 2005     0.213    0.251   0.538   0.991 
     (0.282)   (0.167)  (0.254)** (0.354)*** 
Year 2006     0.167    0.191   0.525   1.084 
     (0.325)   (0.173)  (0.287)*  (0.367)*** 
Year 2007     0.108    0.161   0.613   1.572 
     (0.366)   (0.187)  (0.326)*  (0.392)*** 
FEVD Residuals       0.987 
       (0.025)*** 
Constant     -7.207   -7.905  -7.941  -7.581 
     (1.095)***  (0.295)***  (1.000)*** (0.630)*** 
Observations                482               482              482              482 
Number of state fixed effects                 48  
R-squared                    0.40    0.87     0.40 
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Table 2.6. Alternative Estimation Approaches with Dependent Variable: Total 
MWh of Renewable Energy Electricity 
Independent Variable  Fixed effects  FEVD  Random effects Pooled OLS 
    
RPS        349,858.906  347,794.512  352,824.145 -553,442.574 
    (109,869.039)***     (70,843.243)*** (110,650.963)*** (340,762.434)* 
House LCV voting score  -135,001.074          -117,185.289    18,624.795  301,410.106 
    (331,412.018)         (127,412.887) (328,019.413) (617,442.053) 
Natural resource employees   -757,086.889          -750,926.651 -676,241.150         1,197,678.218 
per capita     (308,676.621)**  (72,912.117)*** (293,951.872)** (340,969.012)*** 
Percent petro/coal manufacturing  472,313.664  563,638.852  536,838.333  365,776.907 
of total GSP                                     (5,166,499.483)      (2,922,219.372)       (5,178,831.823)    (14,168,521.060) 
Gross state product per capita           65.305           64.937           63.027           59.576 
             (19.253)***           (4.659)***          (18.452)***          (22.589)*** 
Growth rate of population               2,295,957.491         2,520,749.922         2,370,992.796      -42,870,000.000 
                (3,525,241.033)      (2,852,383.485)       (3,556,713.028)    (13,657,917.056)*** 
Electricity use per capita     12,206.701    11,962.653       2,495.487     -3,844.530 
      (23,287.738)     (2,348.808)***   (18,915.178)   (11,363.103) 
Average retail electricity price   -14,945.502   -13,283.360    15,025.199  841,459.043 
      (44,542.739)   (20,300.810)   (44,493.340)   (89,507.027)*** 
Percent regional RPS  -757,230.118 -757,027.583 -789,333.644       -2,329,213.271 
    (208,471.136)***   (140,951.934)*** (211,210.316)*** (679,249.013)*** 
Tax index                    -111,710.227 -102,223.649 -268,112.838 
        (23,680.642)***   (38,958.121)*** (114,571.998)** 
Subsidy index      909,734.328    23,515.330  681,729.517 
        (37,241.407)***   (66,297.066) (180,236.084)*** 
Deregulated      485,148.379    49,599.562 -380,766.990 
        (67,397.871)*** (100,452.334) (324,137.971) 
Wind potential     -432,039.773 -400,904.224 -537,488.005 
        (10,225.410)*** (139,021.466)***   (49,320.346)*** 
Biomass potential             687.014         603.707      1,128.038 
               (36.247)***        (501.485)        (174.472)*** 
Solar potential             347.096         332.928         426.696 
                 (5.638)***          (76.463)***          (27.070)*** 
Year 1999     -24,599.650   -26,586.283   -14,045.957  932,629.376 
    (129,623.244) (116,818.474) (130,256.376) (564,532.783)* 
Year 2000     -98,071.396 -104,577.874   -89,007.939         2,097,386.729 
    (193,425.299) (164,405.169) (194,562.593) (790,115.183)*** 
Year 2001   -112,467.797 -109,227.857 -104,735.740  727,162.415 
    (138,593.232)         (119,747.861) (139,668.968) (579,219.023) 
Year 2002     -22,279.132   -16,892.397      1,519.974         1,121,336.769 
    (147,285.887) (121,297.935) (148,776.805) (585,585.475)* 
Year 2003     -74,748.764   -66,304.146   -42,995.759         1,040,989.576 
    (160,993.048) (122,244.820) (161,252.548) (590,331.257)* 
Year 2004   -166,206.408 -156,852.153 -132,668.127  968,380.164 
    (189,766.434) (126,215.377) (188,321.082) (609,582.426) 
Year 2005   -194,956.479 -177,111.359 -147,433.024  802,098.595 
    (220,199.723) (130,419.071) (217,288.222) (630,600.695) 
Year 2006   -196,022.132 -168,726.629 -143,774.004  335,939.857 
    (254,096.668) (134,717.005) (249,859.874) (652,734.388) 
Year 2007   -156,664.960 -106,040.041   -54,289.282  897,989.930 
    (286,100.312) (144,308.048) (287,135.274) (698,029.276) 
FEVD Residuals                 0.999   
                 (0.010)*** 
Constant     157,952.138        -4,324,110.186        -2,167,087.644     -11,890,000.000 
    (856,118.837) (242,842.624)***(1,166,214.032)*    (1,121,539.846)*** 
Observations           480          480          480          480 
Number of state fixed effects            48  
R-squared                                                            0.19                  0.98                
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CHAPTER 3 
DECENTRALIZATION: THE CASE OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND 
METERING STANDARDS 
 
Introduction 
Dating back to Edison and his close successors, the scale of electricity operations 
in the United States over the past century has steadily risen. Whereas the U.S. started in 
the late 19th century with dispersed generation units, it eventually built larger, centralized 
generation units in conjunction with AC generation and a more dynamic and extensive 
transmission and distribution infrastructure. Exploiting economies of scale, these 
developments enabled power producers to spread higher voltages across great distances. 
By the 1920s and 1930s, centralized electricity operations became the predominant scale 
of electricity production; electricity became the biggest industry in the U.S. economy, 
while federal support for the deployment of electricity operations grew at an 
unprecedented level.  
While centralized electricity and large-scale transmission and distribution 
networks still dominate the industry, this model of electricity generation has been 
challenged in recent decades. Critics of large-scale electricity operations question their 
costs, security vulnerabilities, environmental impacts, and waste in generation and 
transmission, and advocate instead for a more decentralized industry composed of a 
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greater number of smaller-scale and more localized generating facilities. In view of these 
concerns, some industry leaders have begun to modify the scale of their electricity 
operations. Policymakers have concurrently enacted legislation that specifically focuses 
on size and alternative forms of production.  
The present study aims to empirically identify the motivating factors behind the 
trend toward a more decentralized electricity industry. Specifically, this analysis 
considers which factors lead an electric utility or a utility’s customer to deploy distributed 
generation (DG) systems. Consistent with this objective, the following research questions 
guide this analysis: do some ownership models demonstrate a greater proclivity toward 
DG deployment than others and, are distributed generation policies and regulations 
effective at removing the barriers to distributed generation adoption and deployment? 
 
Distributed generation: Moving beyond a definition 
What is Distributed Generation? 
Distributed generation is the subject of a rapidly evolving body of research. Over 
the past decade much attention has been devoted to the definition (Ackermann, et al., 
2001; El-Khattam and Salama, 2004; King, 2006; Pepermans, 2005) and classification 
(Gumerman, et al., 2003; Lopes, et al., 2007; Pepermans, 2005) of DG systems. The 
following is the author’s own working definition of distributed generation systems, 
classified according to defining characteristics that include size, location, and application.  
 
Location  
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DG systems are frequently built close to the power load to minimize electricity 
losses and inefficiencies. DG units are either connected to the electricity network 
(hereafter referred to as the “grid”) on the customer side of the meter or at the distribution 
network. Traditionally, either utilities own and operate their own DG systems or their 
customers own the systems and “borrow” or “lend” power to the electricity grid when 
needed. Net metering policies and programs—the former is mandated by the state or 
federal government and the latter is self-initiated by specific utilities—allow commercial, 
industrial, and residential customers to “hook” their DG units or other micro-generation 
units to the grid. Under a traditional net metering framework, customers are able to buy 
(or “sell”) electricity from (to) the grid when the DG capacity is short (in excess) of the 
customers’ electricity needs.  
 
Size 
DG systems generally produce between 1 kW and 5 MW of power. Medium to 
large DG systems can produce over 5 MW and up to 300 MW of power, though there is 
some dispute over whether these larger systems can truly be classified as DG units 
(Ackermann et al., 2001).  
The majority of studies that consider the role of DG power in the electricity, 
industrial, or building sectors, with the exception of those who specifically focus on the 
broader definition or classification of DG systems, tend to identify DG power only by 
location or size attributes. Some additionally classify DG power according to type of 
technology, as is typical of Energy Information Administration (EIA) studies and other 
studies that aim to model the deployment of DG power over time (see, for instance, EIA, 
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2005 or Boedecker et al., 2002). Yet a definition based solely on these attributes does not 
provide information about the application or specific use of DG systems, or about how 
these attributes vary according to different types of DG applications. A definition based 
on application, as well as size and location, therefore, can help us identify the motivating 
factors that lead to DG deployment in different circumstances. 
 
Applications  
There are a variety of DG system applications, all of which are designed to serve 
different functions and use different, yet overlapping, technology and fuel types. I 
conceptually divide these applications into six different classification categories: peaking 
plants, standby power, combined heat and power units, micro-generation systems, remote 
applications, and localized conventional plants. 
Peak load shaving plants provide supply security during times of peak electricity 
usage. These plants generally deploy natural gas, diesel, petroleum, battery, solar, or 
flywheel power. Peaking DG plants are typically owned by either a utility or a major 
industrial or commercial electricity consumer. DG technologies have the ability to shave 
peak electricity demand and concurrently reduce grid operator costs through the 
provision of ancillary services and interruptible load operations (King, 2006). 
Standby power systems are designed to provide power in times of outages or 
failures. Standby power systems are able to serve the needs of both utilities and industrial 
or commercial facilities. Utilities use standby systems for grid support to help meet short-
term power needs during scheduled shutdowns or during power feed failures. Industrial 
or commercial users deploy standby systems when facility outage costs are high or when 
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outages may potentially compromise human lives or have other severe effects. For 
instance, hospitals are likely to own standby DG systems when power is critical to life 
support. Diesel fuel is the most typical fuel source for standby power systems (EPA, 
2007).  
Combined heat and power (CHP) systems, also known as co-generation systems, 
are DG applications that generate electricity and also capture the thermal energy from the 
process’ waste heat. The thermal energy can then be used for cooling, heating, or other 
power applications, and helps increase fuel efficiencies by 80 percent or more. Internal 
combustion engines (“reciprocating engines”), external combustion engines (“Stirling 
engines”), and micro-turbines are the most common CHP units. Anaerobic digesters and 
industrial biomass operations can also be used with CHP technologies. CHP systems are 
often owned and operated by commercial or institutional organizations, metal industries, 
paper or chemical industries, or electricity providers. 
Micro-generation units are small-scale systems that are primarily powered by 
renewable or alternative sources, such as fuel cells, solar photovoltaic, micro-wind, or 
micro-hydro. These units are best catered to meet residential electricity needs and 
constraints. These units have positive environmental benefits but typically have high 
start-up and equipment costs. 
The fifth type of DG technology, a remote power system, is the most general 
classification. Anaerobic digesters or other biomass operations, micro-hydro, wind or 
solar power, or a variety of natural gas systems are capable of providing power to homes, 
communities, or other facilities that are beyond a utility’s service territory or isolated 
from the grid. When isolated from the grid, remote power systems are classified as 
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dispersed power units; when connected to the grid, they are distributed generation units. 
 The final type of DG technology resembles a conventional power plant in 
purpose—it functions as a standard utility investment in generation capacity—but differs 
in size and location. These plants tend to be smaller and more localized than 
conventional, centralized power plants. Localized conventional plants tend to burn 
natural gas and some alternatively deploy renewable fuel sources.   
 
Barriers to Adoption 
A number of economic and institutional barriers currently prevent DG 
technologies from playing a more prominent role in the U.S. electricity sector (Alderfer, 
et al., 2000; Budhraja, et al., 1999; Dondi, et al., 2002; Johnston, et al., 2005; Johnson, 
2003; King, 2006; Morgan and Zerriffi, 2002; Strachan and Dowlatabadi, 2002; Van 
Werven and Scheepers, 2005). The following is a list of the most frequently cited barriers 
that may, depending on political and economic circumstances within each state, hinder 
the adoption and deployment rate of all DG types. 
• There are no national procedures for standard interconnection of DG systems, 
insurance policies, technical standards for the necessary connecting equipment, 
standard tariff payment schemes, and power quality characteristics; 
• DG system operators must get an approval of various technical parts from either 
the local serving utility or their state’s regulatory commission, which requires 
considerable time, financial resources, and effort; 
• The U.S. does not currently have greenhouse gas emissions’ regulations; 
 57 
• Utilities have inexperience dealing with DG operators and thereby rarely have 
standard interconnection procedures of their own; 
• The approval process for DG systems can be long and require significant effort; 
• The associated fees for interconnection to the central grid may be very high; 
• Regulatory appeals may be prohibitively expensive; 
• DG systems may not recover appropriate payback due to a lack of standard tariff 
schemes. 
 
Policy Instruments 
In effort to address the barriers to DG, state governments across the country have 
introduced a variety of policies and regulations to support DG electricity market 
penetration. DG policies and regulations include interconnection standards, net metering 
programs, and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). Interconnection standards are state-
implemented standards that explicitly outline the protocols—including technical, 
contractual and procedural—that a utility must adhere to when hooking DG units up to 
the grid. Net metering programs, as defined previously, mandate that utilities must allow 
DG owners to hook their systems up to the electrical grid, conditional on specific size and 
type of generation constraints. DG owners can then give or take power from the grid. 
Renewable portfolio standards mandate that a certain share of electricity generation 
comes from renewable or alternative energy sources. RPS policies vary by state in their 
design features, benchmark goals, and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Previous Findings on DG Motivators 
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Over the past five years, the number of quantitative analyses that focus on DG has 
increased significantly. The majority of these economic analyses consider the market 
performance of different DG systems. Some analysts review the costs associated with DG 
technologies (Abu-Sharkh et al., 2004) and compare them to traditional electricity 
operations (Ackerman, 2007). Some have devised systematic methods to track the costs 
and benefits of DG systems, while others have estimated a full cost-benefit analysis 
(Costa, 2006; Gulli, 2004; Gumerman, et al., 2003; Poullikkas, 2007). A number of 
analysts have used energy and building data, and occasionally DG building performance 
software, to model either actual or hypothetical DG systems according to optimal 
technology performance, location of load, and system costs (Abu-Sharkh et al., 2004; 
Bailey et al., 2002; Poullikkas, 2007). Finally, some analysts have estimated DG 
penetration rates in traditional electricity markets under different regulatory scenarios 
(Maribu et al., 2007; Zoka et al., 2007). 
While these analyses do not necessarily share a consensus regarding which factors 
most effectively contribute to DG deployment, many of these analysts surmise that 
deployment could be accelerated with the implementation of policy incentives and 
regulatory measures that address the barriers listed above. Strachan and Dowlatabadi 
(2002) evaluated which factors have influenced the UK and the Netherlands to deploy 
high rates of DG capacity; they found that buy-back tariffs are effective motivators, 
particularly in conjunction with interconnection charges, government subsidies, and other 
performance-based regulation. Few studies, however, have empirically tested the 
association between U.S. state policy incentive adoption rates and DG deployment rates.  
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Dismukes and Kleit (1999) evaluated which factors lead industries to sell their 
DG generation to the grid or to keep their power for internal use. They found that 
increases in retail electricity prices and greater industrial output contribute to the 
likelihood of industrial DG connection to the grid.  
There are no studies that consider which motivating factors lead actors to adopt 
DG operations. With limited insights from the supporting literature and a lack of 
comprehensive data on the subject, this analysis begins to approach this issue with fairly 
general questions and simple hypotheses regarding the motivating factors for DG 
deployment. The aim of this analysis, therefore, is to provide a foundation of empirical 
findings upon which future analyses can build. I test two main hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is that state DG policies and regulations are effectively able to reduce the 
barriers to DG adoption and deployment. The second main hypothesis that this analysis 
tests is the following: private utilities are more inclined to deploy DG capacity than are 
various public utilities. This hypothesis is built on the assumption that private companies 
are more willing to make investments in relatively newer, perhaps riskier from a financial 
perspective, technologies and are more concerned with managing peak electricity loads. 
 
Empirical approach 
The econometric model used in this analysis considers utilities’ decisions of 
whether to adopt DG operations and, if so, how much capacity to deploy. Roughly 94 
percent of the utilities in this sample do not have active DG units hooked to the grid in 
their service territory. These observations, as a result, have a dependent variable—DG 
capacity—that is equal to zero. These zeros effectively represent the actual outcomes, i.e. 
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what is observed, as opposed to missing data or potential outcomes. Potential outcomes 
are latent, partially observed variables. An example of a potential outcome in the present 
context would be the amount of DG capacity that a utility would deploy if it had DG units 
hooked into their service territory, whereas the actual outcome is the observed amount of 
DG capacity among those utilities that have chosen to hook up DG units. If one is 
interested in potential capacity deployment, he or she would use a selection model. The 
present analysis, however, is interested in the actual deployment and, therefore, employs 
the more efficient two-part model. A two-part model is able to identify the large 
proportion of zeros, which are non-missing “corner solutions,” and does not lose 
efficiency from the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio, as a selection model would under 
these circumstances (Dow and Norton, 2003). The two-part model will also estimate 
lower mean squared errors than standard selection models. 
The two-part model has two equations. The first part of the two-part model is a 
standard probit estimation of the probability that the dependent variable has a positive 
outcome: 
Pr[y > 0| X] = Φ(Xβ1, ε1),    (1) 
where y is the dependent variable, utility has DG capacity, X is a vector of utility- and 
state-level parameter estimates, and ε1 is the error term, assumed to be normally 
distributed. The second part model is a simple ordinary least squares estimation, 
conducted on the subset of the sample that has a positive dependent variable: 
E[y | y > 0, X] = Xβ2 + E[ε2 | y > 0, X],   (2) 
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where y is the dependent variable, measured in MW of DG capacity, X is the same vector 
of parameters estimated in (1), and ε2 is the error term, also assumed to be normally 
distributed. 
The choice of the two-part model has important consequences for the 
interpretation and estimation of predictions and effects. When estimating marginal effects 
and significance of hypothesis tests it is important to similarly estimate the actual effects, 
and not simply the potential effects. I estimate the actual marginal effects using the 
equation presented by Dow and Norton (2003), and then bootstrap the standard errors: 
∂E[y] / ∂xk = (Pr[y > 0| X] × (∂E[y | y > 0, X] / ∂xk )) +  
(E[y | y > 0, X] × (∂Pr[y > 0| X] /  ∂xk )),   (3) 
where y and x are the same as above, Pr[y > 0 | X] is the probability of a positive 
observed outcome, and E[y | y > 0, X] is the mean outcome, conditional on that outcome 
being positive.  
The DG units in this sample are either owned by the utility or owned by a 
commercial or industrial consumer within the utility’s service territory and allowed 
access to the grid by the utility. The data used in this analysis do not explicitly distinguish 
between utility-owned and consumer-owned DG capacity. This distinction, however, has 
specific relevance to the research question and a failure to measure these differences in 
ownership-type could potentially result in misleading or incomplete information. In effort 
to capture the differences between utility-ownership and consumer-ownership of the DG 
units in this sample, I draw inferences from supporting data to obtain a rough estimate of 
the breakdown in ownership type across all units in the sample; the details of this process 
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are outlined below. I then run separate probit models11 on the two sample subsets; the 
first model tests which factors are related to consumer-owned DG adoption and the 
second model tests which factors are related to utility-owned DG adoption. This exercise 
provides a few additional insights regarding DG ownership and the relationship between 
utilities and their customers in the presence of DG operations. 
I additionally test for heteroskedasticity with a White test (White, 1980) and 
multicollinearity by checking the variables’ variance inflation factors and bivariate 
correlations. I also test the functional form of important independent variables to ensure 
that we operationalize these variables appropriately.12  
 
Data 
This analysis considers which types of utilities are more likely to adopt DG power 
generation and, additionally, which factors motivate these utilities to include DG in their 
total electricity generation mix. In this vein of inquiry, I employ a variety of data sources 
that include information on utility characteristics, state policies, electricity trends, and 
socio-economic factors. The data are primarily extracted from Energy Information 
Administration 2005 data. As part of EIA’s “Annual Electric Power Industry Report,” 
utility-level data are gathered via Form EIA-861. There are both advantages and 
disadvantages to using these data as our primary source of information. The advantage is 
                                                          
11
 I only run the first part of the two-part model, the probit model, because the second part, the ordinary 
least squares, would have incorrect standard errors from a sample size that is too small.  
12
 It is not apparent, on either a theoretical basis or after looking over the data, whether utility-level 
variables should be combined to represent a public versus private utility construct, or left to represent 
entirely different utility structures. If I were to combine utility types, we would clump state, federal, 
municipal, political subdivision, and municipal marketing authorities (MMA) together as “public,” but 
leave private and cooperatively owned facilities as they are. I estimate a series of specification tests—a 
Wald test and a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test—to determine whether I should combine all public utility 
models or keep them separate; the results are presented below. 
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that Form 861 has a wealth of utility-specific data on firm revenues, total dispatched 
power, retail sales, number of customers by sector, and, crucial to this analysis, 
distributed generation figures. The disadvantage to using these data is that they do not 
contain plant-specific details. Although it would be informative to include data on plant 
capacities, the break down of plant types by utility, or fuel expenditures, this information 
is not available in Form 861. A second disadvantage is that the type of DG capacity 
included in the database is not clearly defined or classified. In effort to classify the DG 
capacity considered in this analysis according to the defining characteristics discussed 
above, I use supporting information in the EIA-861 database about the fuel source and 
technology, as discussed below. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, I compile aggregate operational data 
from file 1, net metering data from file 5, and distributed generation data from file 6 of 
EIA-861. Additional variables—most of which are measured at the state level—are 
collected from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). These data are limited to observations from the 48 
contiguous U.S. states and exclude information on D.C., Hawaii, Alaska, American 
Samoa, and Puerto Rico. The resulting database is aggregated at the utility level with a 
sample size of 3,277 for the first-part model and 194 for the second part model. The 
sample size drops to 3,226 in the customer-owned DG probit model due to a few 
independent variables that perfectly predict the outcome variable. All data are in 2005 
values, the most recent figures available at the time in which this analysis was conducted. 
 
Dependent Variable 
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The dependent variable is the total amount of distributed generation capacity per 
utility, measured in megawatts (MW). This variable is extracted from EIA-861. As 
explained above, the DG units in this sample are either owned by the utility itself or 
owned by a commercial or industrial customer within the utility’s service territory. This 
analysis does not include dispersed generation—grid-isolated small-scale electricity 
units—in the DG capacity estimates. This means that all DG systems included in this 
sample are connected to the grid at the customer or utility side of the meter, and are all 
subject to utility oversight.  
Two forms of the dependent variable are needed for a two-part model: the first 
part of the two-part model uses a dichotomous transformation of the variable, equal to 
one if the utility has DG capacity and equal to zero otherwise; the second part uses the 
subset of the variable that is continuous, contingent on the DG capacity being positive.  
The two probit models that check the differences between customer-owned and 
utility-owned DG capacity use the dichotomous version of the DG variable. I distinguish 
between customer-owned and utility-owned DG capacity based on whether the utilities 
have net metering customers. If a utility reports under file 5 of Form EIA-861 that they 
have net metering customers and they also report under file 6 that they have DG capacity, 
then we assume that this capacity is consumer-owned. If, on the other hand, the utility 
does not participate in net metering protocols, then we assume that all the DG capacity is 
solely owned by the utility.  
I provide a visual representation of the sample to help guide the reader through 
the discussion of each model’s results (see Figure 3.1). The two-part model employs the 
dependent variable labeled “A” in the diagram, which encompasses both “B” and “C”. 
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The consumer-owned and utility-owned probit models use “B” and “C” as the dependent 
variables, respectively.  
 
Figure 3.1. Visual of Sample Distribution 
* Diagram is not drawn to scale. 
 
 
Independent Variables 
The primary variables of interest include utility ownership types and state policies 
and regulations. Beginning with the former, Form EIA-861 includes seven utility 
ownership models: private, cooperative, municipal, Federal Power Marketing 
Administration, state power authority or organization, municipal marketing authority 
(MMA), and county-level subdivision, irrigation district, or utility district. Each of these 
variables is transformed into a dichotomous variable, equal to one if it appropriately 
represents the utility’s ownership model and equal to zero otherwise. Throughout the 
remainder of this study, I refer to all utilities that are independently owned as “private” 
and all government- or cooperative-owned utilities as “public”.  
Electricity Market: the total sample (n=3277) 
Utilities and their 
customers that do not 
have DG capacity 
(n=3083) 
C. Utilities with 
utility-owned DG 
capacity (n=153) 
B. Utilities 
with consumer-
owned DG 
capacity (n=41) 
A. Utilities with DG capacity (n=194)* 
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The policy instrument variables include net metering standards, RPS policies, and 
interconnection standards. I include a binary net metering variable in the two-part model, 
equal to one if the utility has net metering customers and equal to zero otherwise. This 
variable is not included in the consumer-owned versus utility-owned probit models. 
Instead, as explained above, this variable is used to help distinguish between the two 
ownership types. The RPS policy and interconnection standard variables are both 
dichotomous, coded as a one if the policy is active in 2005. Both variables are compiled 
from the DSIRE database. Any state that enacted a policy during or after November, 
2005 is considered to have an inactive policy during the period of analysis and is coded to 
equal zero. 
Additional utility-level characteristics are included as covariates. We control for 
summer peak power output, measured in megawatts. Since peak load shaving plants are 
one of the primary DG units included in this analysis, we assume that higher peak 
capacity will be associated with greater DG deployment. Peak power is the maximum 
amount of power that was sold in the summer of 2005 during the month and the specific 
day of highest electricity demand. Total sources of power, another utility-level variable, 
is the total megawatt-hours of power sold in retail markets over all of 2005. This variable 
is re-scaled by a factor of 10,000 MW. Therefore each 1 MW of total sources in the 
summary statistics and regression outputs represents 10,000 MW.  
State-level electricity characteristics include the price of electricity and the state’s 
status of electricity market restructuring. The price of electricity, extracted from EIA 
electricity data, is the average of electricity prices from all electricity sources per state in 
2005. The deregulation variable indicates whether a state has restructured its electricity 
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market. States that have either partially or fully restructured their electricity market are 
coded to equal one; states that have kept their market regulated or have “destructured” 
their market after a period of deregulation have a regulation variable equal to zero.  
Finally, I control for the following state demographics: average household 
income, measured in $1,000 of U.S. dollars; population, measured in 100,000 citizens; 
and binary regional dummy variables. We include the region variables to control for 
location-specific dynamics that may affect DG deployment rates. Population and 
household income data come from U.S. Census Bureau data. 
 
Results 
Results of the collinearity diagnostics revealed that multicollinearity between 
variables did not exist; variance inflation factors were all small and below standard 
threshold levels and all bivariate correlations were well below .8. The White test did 
detect heteroskedasticity, however, and so we estimated robust standard errors in the final 
version of our two-part model to correct this problem.13 
Before turning to the empirical results, it is informative to consider dependent 
variable, and note how well it conforms to the working definition of DG systems, as 
defined above. Beginning with a discussion of DG applications, Form EIA-861 does not 
                                                          
13
 Additional specification tests revealed somewhat conflicting information about the most appropriate form 
of the utility-type variable. I first conducted a Wald test on both parts of the two-part model to test whether 
the public utility parameters were equal to each other. The resulting chi-squared test statistics, with four 
degrees of freedom, were .77 for the first part model and 159.62 for the second part model. I therefore 
could not reject the null hypothesis of equality in the first part, which estimates likelihood of adoption, but 
could reject the null hypothesis in the second part, which estimates total capacity conditional on having any 
at all. A two-part model, however, should ideally include the same set of parameters in both parts of the 
model. I similarly conducted an LM test on both parts of the model to further explore this issue of 
specification. The NR2 from the second part equation, with five degrees of freedom, was 60.16 and thereby 
significant at all conventional significance levels. For the LM calculation in the first part equation, I 
adjusted for non-linearities and heteroskedasticity as part of the NR2 calculation. The resulting NR2 
estimate was 12.62, which was significant at the 10 percent significance level. I concluded that the utility 
parameters should not be clumped into one public utility variable but should remain separate variables. 
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explicitly distinguish between different applications of DG power—for instance, between 
peak load shaving and micro-generation—with one exception: CHP units are excluded 
from the DG classification. I can draw additional conclusions about the DG system 
attributes from EIA-861 supporting data. Figure 3.2 presents the percentage distribution 
of DG units by fuel type. Distillate fuel and natural gas are the most common types of 
fuel, which collectively contribute 72.6 percent of the total units. Water and other 
renewables provide fuel for 8.5 percent of the DG units in the sample. Figure 3.3 presents 
the percentage distribution by technology type. The majority of the DG units are internal 
combustion engines or combustion turbines. Roughly 11 percent of the DG units in the 
sample come from wind or hydroelectric power. Although it is not demonstrated in either 
graph, roughly 32 percent on average of the DG capacity is used for back-up power, the 
majority of which comes from internal combustion engines using distillate fuel. This 
information does not allow one to fully classify the technology distribution of DG units in 
this sample according to the above definition, although it does provide a rough picture of 
DG type and fuel source.14 Based on these attributes, I conclude that the DG variable in 
this sample primarily represents peak load shaving and backup power, some localized 
conventional DG plants, as well as an occasional remote power system that is connected 
to the grid. CHP is not included and micro-generation is hardly included, if at all. 15 
                                                          
14
 DG capacity size is discussed below in the Results section. 
15
 These conclusions regarding the DG variable have been confirmed by the Department of Energy’s Form 
EIA-861 contact in a personal phone meeting. 
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Figure 3.2. Percent Distributed Generation by Fuel Type 
 
Figure 3.3. Percent Distributed Generation by Technology Type 
 
 
 
I further divide DG fuel types according to whether the system is owned by a 
utility or a customer. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 reveal that utility DG systems are primarily 
fossil fuel-based, with roughly 78 percent of the systems powered by distillate oil or 
natural gas. The customer-owned DG systems, on the other hand, include a greater share 
of renewable fuel types. Customers appear more inclined to adopt renewable-based DG 
systems than utilities. 
Distributed Generation by Technology Type
63.7%
11.3%
7.9%
8.1%
2.9%
4.6%
Internal
Combustion
Combustion
Turbine
Steam Turbin
Hydroelectric
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Figure 3.4. Utility-owned Distributed Generation by Fuel Type 
 
Figure 3.5. Customer-owned Distributed Generation by Fuel Type 
 
Because I employ a two-part model, separate summary statistics are presented for 
the entire sample, where the dependent variable is dichotomous (see Table 3.1), and for 
the sub-sample of utilities that had positive DG capacity (see Table 3.2). The maximum 
DG capacity owned by one utility was 1,391 MW. As explained above, 3,083 utilities, or 
94 percent of the sample, did not have any DG capacity. Of the remaining 194 utilities 
that did have DG capacity, they averaged roughly 53 MW of capacity per utility. 
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Table 3.1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Entire Sample 
(n=3,277) 
Variable Description Mean (or %) Std. Dev. Min Max 
DG capacity Utility has distributed generation 
capacity 
 5.94% 0.236 0        1 
Utility Ownership      
Private Utility is a private company 
 6.67%         0.250 0                1 
Co-op Utility is a cooperative 26.91% 0.444 0                1 
Muni  Utility is a municipal 56.17% 0.496 0                1 
Federal Utility is a Federal power marketing 
administration 
 0.27% 0.052 0                1 
State Utility is a state organization 
 0.76% 0.087 0                1 
MMA Utility is an Municipal Marketing 
Authority 
 0.61% 0.078 0                1 
Pol-sub Utility is a county-level subdivision, 
utility-district, or irrigation district  
 3.87% 0.193 0                1 
      
Utility-level characteristics 
    
Summer peak Megawatts (MW) of maximum power 
sold during peak summer month 
    290.38 1,472.11 0      31,924 
Total sources Total sources of power (MW) 
    265.64 1,569.38 0      42,689 
Net metering Utility has net metering customers 
        5.71%        0.232 0               1 
      
State-level characteristics     
RPS policy State has a renewable portfolio standard 32.53% 0.469 0               1 
Interconnection 
standards 
State has distributed generation 
interconnection standards 55.93% 0.497 0               1 
Access laws State has renewable energy access laws 71.90% 0.450 0               1 
Deregulated State is fully or partially deregulated 29.29% 0.455 0               1 
Household income Average state household income 
      45.21        5.56   32             63 
Population Total state population 
      75.19      71.37     5           361 
Price of electricity State’s average price of electricity, 
averaged across end-use consumers 
        7.52         1.97     5             18 
Northeast State is in the Northeast region 
 9.86% 0.298 0               1 
Southeast State is in the Southeast region 
 21.06% 0.408 0               1 
Southwest State is in the Southwest region 
 11.57% 0.320 0               1 
Midwest  State is in the Midwest region 
 43.91% 0.496 0               1 
West State is in the West region 
 13.61% 0.343 0               1 
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Table 3.2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Subset of the Sample 
with Distributed Generation Capacity (n=194) 
Variable Description Mean (or %) Std. Dev. Min Max 
DG capacity Total Megawatts of distributed 
generation capacity 3.15     40.19 0      1391 
      
Utility Ownership      
Private Utility is a private company 30.26%          0.461 0 1 
Co-op Utility is a cooperative 10.26%          0.304 0 1 
Muni  Utility is a municipal 52.31%          0.501 0 1 
Federal Utility is a Federal power marketing 
administration 
  0.51%          0.072 0 1 
State Utility is a state organization 
  1.03%          0.101 0 1 
MMA Utility is an Municipal Marketing 
Authority 
  1.03%          0.101 0 1 
Pol-sub Utility is a county-level subdivision, 
utility-district, or irrigation district  
  3.87%          0.193 0 1 
      
Utility-level characteristics     
Summer peak Megawatts (MW) of maximum power 
sold during peak summer month 
  1411.98  3419.06 0    22,361 
Total sources Total sources of power (MW) 
    911.8  2652.67      0.04    28,611 
Net metering Utility has net metering customers 
      21.1%             0.409 0             1 
      
State-level characteristics 
    
RPS policy State has a renewable portfolio standard 33.00%          0.471 0 1 
Interconnection 
standards 
State has distributed generation 
interconnection standards 62.56%          0.485 0 1 
Deregulated State is fully or partially deregulated 32.82%          0.471 0 1 
Household income Average state household income 
      46.84             5.41        33           61 
Population Total state population 
      71.15           70.74 6         362 
Price of electricity State’s average price of electricity, 
averaged across end-use consumers 
        7.9             2.28 5           18 
Northeast State is in the Northeast region 
  9.79%          0.298 0 1 
Southeast State is in the Southeast region 
  7.73%          0.268 0 1 
Southwest State is in the Southwest region 
  7.73%          0.268 0 1 
Midwest  State is in the Midwest region 
      46.39%             0.5 0 1 
West State is in the West region 
      18.56%             0.39 0 1 
  
 
Of the 194 utilities that had adopted DG units by 2005 (area “A” in Figure 3.1), 
59 of them were private utilities (26.9% of all private utilities in sample), 102 were 
municipals (5.5% of all municipals in sample), 20 were cooperatives (2.3%), nine were 
political subdivisions (7.1%), two were MMAs (10%), one was state (4.8%), and one was 
federal (11%). The distribution of DG ownership between utilities and customers is 
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discussed below. Additionally, of the total amount of DG capacity, roughly 71 percent 
was present in states with RPS policies and 66 percent of the capacity was in states with 
interconnection standards. 
Results of the two-part model are presented in Table 3.3. All ownership 
parameters are in reference to private utility, which was selected as the omitted category 
to make the interpretation of coefficient estimates—private versus various forms of 
public utilities—more logical. Beginning with the first part equation, which can be 
interpreted as a standard probit model, one should note that all utility-type coefficient 
estimates are negative; this implies that all utility ownership models were less likely to 
deploy DG units than private companies. Cooperatives and municipals are particularly 
less likely to deploy DG than private utilities; these estimates are statistically significant 
at the 1% and the 5% levels, respectively. Other utility- and state-level characteristics are 
also found to be statistically significant:  higher summer peak levels, electricity price, and 
household income are found to make DG adoption more likely;  utilities that operate 
under deregulated markets are also more likely to adopt DG capacity;  and utilities that 
follow net metering protocols and have net metering customers are significantly more 
likely to deploy DG capacity. A larger population in the state in which a given utility’s 
service territory is located, on the other hand, appears to make DG adoption less likely. 
Finally, relative to the Midwest, the Northeast is found to be less likely to adopt DG 
capacity. 
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Table 3.3. Two-Part Model Results with Dependent Variable: Distributed 
Generation Capacity in MW 
 
Independent Variable First Part Equation: Probit          Second Part Equation: OLS 
 
Utility Type 
Cooperative a    -.807***    -22.73     
     (.144)    (23.03) 
Muni      -.284**    -11.65 
     (.120)    (26.31)  
Federal     -.439     21.11 
     (.607)    (55.21)  
State     -.434                1257.61*** 
     (.485)    (42.39) 
MMA     -.030   131.58 
     (.402)                 (121.73) 
Pol-sub     -.262      18.10 
     (.206)    (50.81) 
 
Utility-level Characteristics 
Summer Peak     .000086***        .016* 
     (.000021)                      (.0087) 
Total Sources    -.0000054        .0031** 
     (.000025)       (.0013) 
Net metering     .715***     26.20 
     (.130)    (33.70) 
 
State-level Characteristics 
RPS      .012    -35.82** 
                    (.106)    (16.16) 
Interconnection Standards                   .042    -33.79 
                    (.101)                   (25.10) 
Deregulation                    .216 *    -19.09 
                    (.116)    (15.25) 
HH income                    .017 *       1.61 
                    (.0099)      (1.38) 
Population                   -.0025***        .411 
                    (.00076)        (.258) 
Price electricity                    .090 ***     -2.94 
                    (.030)      (4.62) 
Northeast regionb                   -.906***     54.36 
                    (.216)    (46.88)   
Southwest region                   -.266     43.72 
                    (.172)    (37.02) 
Southeast region                    .025     23.66   
                    (.122)    (21.92) 
West region                   -.177       2.49  
                    (.132)    (21.37) 
Constant                  -2.56 ***    -35.94 
                    (.446)    (78.13) 
 
Observations            3277                        194 
R2                          0.6539 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01.   
a. Omitted category: private utility  b. Omitted category: Midwest 
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The second stage of the two-part model can be interpreted as an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression output. Of this sub-sample of utilities that have positive DG 
capacity (only area “A” of Figure 3.1), state utilities are estimated to have 1,258 MW 
more DG capacity than private utilities. Increases in summer peak load and total sources 
are associated with a 16 and a 3-kilowatt increase in DG capacity, respectively, and are 
both statistically significant. Holding all else constant, states with active RPS policies are 
estimated to have significantly less DG capacity than states without RPS policies. The R-
squared in this second stage equation is .65, from which one can infer that this model 
explains a decent degree of the variation in DG capacity. It is also possible, however, that 
such a high R-squared reveals a possible over-fitting of the model since we have included 
19 variables for 194 observations.  
Actual marginal effects from the combined model—with bootstrapped standard 
errors—reveal that cooperatives are estimated to have, on average, 4.4 less MW of DG 
capacity than private utilities, while state utilities are estimated to have 73.4 more MW 
than private utilities (see Table 3.4). Additionally, utilities that have active net metering 
programs with enrolled participants are estimated to have 4.8 more MW than utilities 
without net metering programs.  
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Table 3.4. Bootstrapped Marginal Effects from the Two-Part Model with Dependent 
Variable: Distributed Generation Capacity in MW 
Variable First Part Model  Second Part Model  Combined Model 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
Standard 
Error   
Marginal 
Effect 
Standard 
Error   
Marginal 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
Utility Ownership         
Co-op -0.064*** 0.011     -22.73 25.02  -4.42* 2.58 
Muni  -0.031** 0.015     -11.65 27.13  -2.20 2.87 
Federal -0.033 0.081      21.11 46.06  -0.058 3.97 
State -0.033 0.024  1257.61**    623.26  73.35*** 6.01 
MMA -0.003 0.036    131.58    130.55  7.63 7.85 
Pol-sub -0.023 0.016      18.10 51.07     0.234      3.24 
         
Utility-level characteristics 
       
Summer peak 0.0016 0.0013     0.016     0.014  0.00094 0.00071 
Total sources 0.00032 0.0018       0.0031     0.022  0.00018 0.0011 
Net metering 0.115*** 0.029      26.20 33.77     4.78***      1.71 
         
State-level characteristics 
       
RPS policy 0.0013 0.249    -30.853** 16.05  -2.02 1.25 
Interconnection 
standards 0.0044 0.0095     -33.79 25.56  -1.65 1.71 
Deregulated 0.024* 0.014     -19.09   19.061  -0.048 0.960 
Household income 0.168 0.154   1.61   1.44  0.096 0.086 
Population 0.043 0.027     0.411     0.272  0.024 0.016 
Price of electricity -0.306 0.557       -2.94   5.22  -0.163 0.311 
Northeast 
-0.060 0.426      54.36 47.96  2.35 4.11 
Southwest  
-0.024 0.187      43.72 40.61  1.87 2.52 
Southeast 0.0027 0.014      23.66 22.84  1.47 1.36 
West 
-0.017 0.065    2.49 22.08   -0.469 1.53 
  Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are run with 500 repetitions  
 
 
When I divided the subset of the utilities that have DG capacity according to 
whether they have active net metering programs or not, I found that 41 of the 194 
observations have net metering customers (see area “B” in Figure 3.1). I infer, therefore, 
that 21 percent of all utilities that report DG ownership are actually consumer-owned DG 
operations. The average total DG capacity reported by this sub-sample of consumer-
owned operations is 91 MW; the average DG capacity reported by the remaining 153 
cases (see area “C” in Figure 3.1), those that are utility-owned and operated, is 43 MW. 
As explained above, I ran two separate probit models on the consumer-owned and the 
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utility-owned DG capacity, respectively. Standard probit results are presented in Table 
3.5 and bootstrapped marginal effects are presented in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.5. Probit Model Results with Dependent Variable: Distributed Generation 
Capacity in MW 
Independent Variable Model 1: Customer-Owned DG         Model 2: Utility-Owned DG 
 
Utility Type 
Cooperative a    -.838***    -.711***     
     (.221)    (.161) 
Muni                   -1.18***    -.165 
     (.226)    (.129)  
Federal       †    -.037 
        (.587)  
State       †                   -.215 
        (.485) 
MMA       †     .128 
        (.404) 
Pol-sub     -.704**    -.154 
     (.355)    (.222) 
 
Utility-level Characteristics 
Summer Peak     .00011***    .000056 *** 
    (.000031)   (.000022) 
Total Sources   -.000025           .0000046 
    (.000051)   (.000024) 
 
State-level Characteristics 
RPS      .454**    -.079 
                    (.222)    (.115) 
Interconnection Standards                 1.03***    -.130 
                    (.260)                   (.110) 
Deregulation                   -.241     .281** 
                    (.199)    (.128) 
HH income                    .027     .022** 
                    (.019)    (.011) 
Population                   -.0035***   -.0017* 
                    (.0011)    (.00087) 
Price electricity                    .003      .084*** 
                    (.050)    (.033) 
Northeast regionb                   -.419    -.873*** 
                    (.362)    (.236)   
Southwest region                    .207    -.322* 
                    (.303)    (.189) 
Southeast region                    .020     .051   
                    (.309)    (.126) 
West region                    .480**    -.293  
                    (.214)    (.152) 
Constant                  -3.64***                 -2.88*** 
                    (.859)    (.494) 
Observations             3226                   3277 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis; * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01.   
a. Omitted category: private utility  b. Omitted category: Midwest 
† dropped due to perfect prediction 
 
 78 
Table 3.6. Bootstrapped Marginal Effects from the Probit Models with Dependent 
Variable: Distributed Generation Capacity in MW 
Variable Model 1: Customer-Owned DG  Model 2: Utility-Owned DG 
 
Marginal 
Effect Standard Error   
Marginal 
Effect Standard Error 
Utility Ownership      
Co-op -.019** 0.0078   -0.048*** 0.010 
Muni  -.032*** 0.011   -0.016 0.014 
Federal      †    -0.0033 0.091 
State      †    -0.017 0.029 
MMA      †     0.013 0.044 
Pol-sub -.011*** 0.0041   -0.013 0.019 
      
Utility-level characteristics 
    
Summer peak 0.0000026*** 0.00000088    0.0000051 0.0000040 
Total sources 0.00000058 0.0000011    0.0000043 0.0000084 
      
State-level characteristics 
    
RPS policy 0.012* 0.0071   -0.0071 0.010 
Interconnection standards 0.018*** 0.0044   -0.012 0.010 
Deregulated -0.0056 0.0059    0.029** 0.014 
Household income 0.00063 0.00054    0.0021** 0.00093 
Population -0.000081* 0.000042   -0.00015** 0.000069 
Price of electricity 0.000061 0.0015    0.0077** 0.0031 
Northeast 
-0.0079 0.0077   -0.051*** 0.010 
Southeast 0.00047 0.019    0.0048 0.012 
Southwest 0.0055 0.011   -0.024** 0.012 
West 0.014 0.0093    -0.023** 0.0093 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are run with 500 repetitions 
† dropped due to perfect prediction 
 
 
 Statistical predictors of utility-owned DG capacity resemble those that were found 
in the first part of the two-part model:  cooperatives are less likely than private utilities to 
deploy DG capacity;  greater peak loads, a deregulated electricity market, household 
income, and the price of electricity are all positively related to DG deployment;  and 
larger populations make DG deployment less likely. In the case of the customer-owned 
DG capacity, I call attention to the probit estimates and marginal effects for RPS and 
interconnection standards. Both variables are positively and significantly associated with 
customer DG adoption. Additionally, cooperatives, municipals, and political subdivisions 
are significantly less likely to have customers that own their own DG capacity than 
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private utilities. Summer peak levels are also positive and significant predictors of 
customer-owned DG deployment. 
 
Discussion 
 The two-part model and the probit models collectively reveal a puzzle of 
overlapping and complementary results, some of which confirm my hypotheses and 
others suggest deeper insights into the growing trend toward a more decentralized 
electricity market. I focus my discussion below first on DG ownership type, then on state 
policies and utility programs. Whenever possible, I draw distinctions between the factors 
that motivate customer-owners and utility-owners. 
The results from the two-part model and the utility-owned DG probit model 
indicate that private utilities are more likely to adopt DG capacity than other utility types, 
particularly cooperatives. The reasons for these findings, I believe, is directly related to 
the primary benefits of DG systems, as discussed in supporting literature (El-Khattam 
and Salama, 2004; Costa, 2006; and Pepermans et al., 2005; Zerriffi, 2004), including the 
following: 
• DG systems offer cost savings due to large efficiency gains and reduced or no 
transmission and distribution costs; 
• DG systems can potentially provide security, reliability, and availability 
improvements over conventional systems; 
• DG technologies have the ability to reduce peak electricity demand and 
concurrently reduce grid operator costs through the provision of ancillary services 
and interruptible load operations;  
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• DG deployment could potentially defer transmission and distribution 
infrastructure investments and also reduce the vulnerability of an over-stressed 
transmission system. 
Evidence suggests that private utilities are most able to take advantage of these 
benefits. Kwoka (2005), for instance, has demonstrated that private utilities provide on 
average lower power reliability than public utilities; Kwoka finds that investor owned 
utilities have annual service interruption values that are roughly two times greater than 
municipal values. In this same analysis, Kwoka also finds evidence that private utilities 
have higher transmission and distribution costs than public utilities but lower generation 
costs, and vice versa. A source of power, therefore, that is able to increase system 
reliability and decrease transmission and distribution costs could theoretically be more 
valuable to private utilities. The additional benefits associated with DG power, such as its 
ability to reduce or shave peak power and the opportunity it offers to delay transmission 
and distribution infrastructure improvements, can also work, although not exclusively, in 
the private utility’s favor.  
Results of the customer-owned DG probit model demonstrate that, relative to all 
other ownership types, private utilities are more likely to have customers that own DG 
systems. I attribute this finding to three factors. First, private utilities provide the lion’s 
share of U.S. generating capacity. They serve a disproportionately greater number of 
customers and it is not surprising, therefore, that a larger total number of private utility 
customers own DG systems than total public utility customers. Second, as explained 
above, private utilities have been found to provide lower system reliability than public 
utilities. Private utility customers that cannot risk losing power during power outages, 
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therefore, can purchase DG units to function as stand-by power. Third, state regulations 
that either directly or indirectly encourage DG adoption are not always made mandatory 
for public utilities, as they are for private utilities. Net metering laws, for instance, are 
only binding in some states for investor owned utilities. The difference between how state 
regulations affect customers versus utilities is further discussed below. Before proceeding 
to further discussion, however, I would like to take a moment to emphasize the inherent 
limitations that I faced in splitting the sample between customer and utility DG 
ownership. I address these limitations again below, in the limitations section, yet it is 
important to bear in mind while discussing results that we have no verifiably accurate 
way to split the sample and, therefore, results can only indicate potential direction and 
strength of relationships. 
Private utilities may be more likely to adopt DG units, yet out of those utilities 
that have adopted DG, these model results predict that state utilities deploy a greater 
amount of actual DG capacity than do private utilities. There is only one state utility, the 
Long Island Power Authority, that deploys DG capacity in this sample; and it is the same 
state that deploys the greatest total DG capacity of the entire sample. The state utility 
coefficient estimate in the second part and combined models, therefore, comes as no 
surprise and does not necessarily lend itself to any deeper insights. 
One of the most frequently cited barriers to DG deployment is a lack of regulatory 
procedures or interconnection rules that standardize DG installation and technical 
requirements (Alderfer, et al., 2000; Morgan and Zerriffi, 2002; Zerriffi, 2004). The 
results of this analysis demonstrate that state policies that aim to reduce these barriers are 
effectively obtaining their policy objectives. As found in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, 
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interconnection standards and RPS policies significantly increase the likelihood that a 
customer will adopt DG capacity. It can be inferred that a trend toward more integrated 
and standard protocols for electricity interconnection—including connecting equipment, 
standard tariff payment schemes, and power quality characteristics—reduces costs and 
bureaucratic hassles associated with customer DG hook-ups. In the case of RPS policies, 
it appears as though utilities that face RPS mandates are more inclined to accept, or 
perhaps even support, their customers’ adoption of alternative energy-based DG capacity 
so that utilities can obtain credit for these units. Utilities can support customer-owned DG 
by reducing administrative hurdles, decreasing connection fees or processing time, or 
making the hook-up process more understandable and transparent.   
Utility DG adoption is not enhanced by technical and technological standards, as 
are customer DG operations, but is instead strongly related to standard market forces. 
Specifically, deregulation, electricity price, and household income are all positively and 
significantly associated with utility DG adoption (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6).  
To date, there is little consensus regarding the effect of deregulation on the 
diversification of electric fuel sources. Some argue that, in the short term, deregulation 
will increase the amount of fossil fuel generation because large power plants are less 
expensive than smaller, more decentralized sources. Others argue that deregulation will 
lead to greater consumer choice, enhanced product differentiation, and higher levels of 
research and development funding (Delmas et al., 2007). These results, in part, confirm 
the latter. The results of the two probit models demonstrate that deregulation has a 
positive and significant marginal effect on utility-owned DG adoption but has no effect 
on customer-owned DG adoption (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6). Electricity deregulation, in 
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other words, is more likely to motivate utilities to adopt DG power than it is to motivate 
customers. It may be inferred from the first part model that deregulation increases 
competition in the industry and allows power producers to adopt new and innovative 
sources of electricity, perhaps as a response to consumer demand for more diverse and 
alternative fuel sources (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). However, the total marginal effect of 
deregulation, as obtained by combining the first and second parts of the two-part model, 
is not statistically significant at any conventional significance level. Further research on 
these dynamics could contribute insights into more urgent questions about the evolving 
structure of the U.S. electricity market and the potential long-term effects of deregulation 
on the scale and scope of electricity operations. 
When the customer-ownership and utility-ownership types are combined to 
represent overall DG ownership, as is the case in the two-part model, most policy and 
utility program variables lose significance. This is because, as discussed above, these 
policies and programs have different effects on different owners and, when combined, 
these potential effects are attenuated toward zero. There are, however, two policy and 
program variables that are significant and noteworthy in the two-part model: net metering 
and RPS policies. 
Table 3.4 demonstrates that net metering protocols are one of the only factors that 
has a positive and statistically significant marginal effect on overall DG adoption (part 
one of the two-part model) and actual DG deployment (combined two-part model 
results). Net metering protocols reduce the technical barriers to DG deployment and 
make DG adoption on the customer side of the meter more feasible. Not only do these 
estimates confirm that net metering protocols are effective, they also demonstrate that 
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there is a significant difference between customer-owned DG and utility-owned DG, 
which I attempted to highlight in my discussions above.  
The various effects of RPS policies are not entirely realized to date given the short 
duration in which most state RPS programs have been in effect. One potential effect, as 
discussed above, is that RPS policies encourage utilities to remove barriers to customer-
owned alternatives-based DG deployment. A second effect not yet discussed is evident in 
the second part of the two-part model (Tables 3.3 and 3.4): out of all utilities that have 
DG capacity in their service territories, those who operate under RPS mandates have 
significantly less DG capacity than those without RPS mandates. Utilities that are 
mandated to comply with an RPS policy appear to have to prioritize their investments in 
renewables over their investment in DG. After all, it would take a large number of 
renewable DG units to produce an equivalent amount of power to that which a wind farm 
can produce. These findings suggest that utilities may invest in DG capacity but, when 
faced with RPS mandates, the investment will be small. In short, RPS programs may lead 
to direct competition between large-scale renewable energy and small-scale distributed 
resources.  
The connection between DG systems and renewable energy could benefit from 
further consideration and analysis. Many tout the environmental attributes of DG systems 
and encourage DG adoption based on the potential for low to no emissions and high 
levels of efficiency. Yet the present analysis has identified several sources of information 
that challenge this claim, at least in part. First, when one classifies distributed generation 
according to application, and possibly further into technology type, it becomes evident 
that not all DG systems use renewable energy, nor do they all emit fewer emissions per 
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kWh of power than some conventional sources. Second, micro-generation, combined heat 
and power, and renewables-based remote power or localized conventional power, can all 
employ renewable or relatively efficient and low-emitting energy sources; yet the actual 
distribution of DG sources in 2005 was heavily dominated by distillate fuel. Third, 
empirical results reveal that there may be conflict between large-scale renewable energy 
deployment and DG deployment. While the emissions’ potential of various DG systems 
has already been the source of considerable debate, (see, for instance, Allison and Lents, 
2002; Bluestein, 2000; Greene and Hammerschlag, 2000; Heath, et al., 2005; Strachan 
and Farrell, 2006) supporting literature has, to date, given little consideration to the 
connections between renewable energy and distributed generation development and 
deployment.  
 
Limitations 
This analysis likely suffers from a few limitations. First, if there are any omitted 
variables that I excluded from the probit models, even if they are not correlated with the 
other independent variables, then these estimates may be biased. Omitted variables that 
are captured in the error term of probit models increase the size of the standard error and, 
therefore, decrease coefficient estimates. This is because all coefficients are the beta-
estimates divided by the standard error. A likely omitted variable is a utility or state buy-
back rate. While other countries such as the Netherlands have standard buy-back rates, 
the U.S. has a patchwork of different rates that target different technologies across 
various states. Because there is no consistent type or regulatory body for buy-backs in the 
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U.S., I was not able to include this variable in the model. Future studies ought to find a 
way to operationalize this variable and include it in similar models. 
Another potentially important omitted variable is the cost of a utility’s primary 
sources of fuel, particularly fuel used for peaking loads. If a utility mainly supplies a 
particular resource during peak hours, for instance, and the price of that resource rises, 
the utility may be more likely to invest in DG capacity as a backstop technology. The 
utility could then deploy the DG before the more expensive, alternative resource when it 
is economically efficient to do so. I was not able to include these data, however, due to 
aforementioned limitations of the EIA-861 database—the data used in this analysis are 
utility-specific but not plant-specific. I use peak power output and electricity price 
variables in attempt to control for fuel prices, assuming that electricity prices generally 
track fuel prices, both peaking and non-peaking, within a given service territory. 
Second, my estimates for customer-owned versus utility-owned DG capacity may 
not be perfectly accurate due to our assumption regarding the connection between net 
metering and customer-owned DG capacity. I acknowledge that my inference method 
may overestimate the number of customer-owned operations and underestimate the 
number of utility-owned operations. I have no verifiable method for testing this key 
assumption.16 Although these estimates may not be exact, the results of these models do 
                                                          
16
 I do, however, run a back-of-the-envelope sensitivity analysis on these results. Since my concern is that 
too many DG systems are classified as customer-owned that are truly utility-owned, I randomly select 
customer-owned observations and reclassify them as utility-owned, re-estimate the model, return the 
observations to their original classification, then repeat. I estimate the sensitivity analysis model twenty 
times, ten times with 25 percent of the original customer-owned sample randomly reclassified as utility-
owned, and ten times with 40 percent of the sample randomly reclassified. Given an original count of 41 
customer-owned systems and 154 utility-owned systems, a 25 percent sensitivity analysis changes the 
count to 31 and 164, respectively, and a 40 percent changes it to 25 and 170. The results of the sensitivity 
analysis models demonstrate small changes in sign and significance for some variables, though no changes 
in both sign and significance simultaneously. The 25 percent models reveal only one notable source of 
instability: the RPS variable is no longer significant for customer ownership in three out of ten runs. The 40 
percent models reveal a bit more instability. The following variables vary in significance but not sign in 
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not indicate potential measurement error or other error due to misspecification of the 
dependent variable. Nonetheless, I urge readers to consider the results of the customer-
owned versus utility-owned probit models as representing a solution space of possible 
effects. The probit results from the two-part model, in which all DG owners are 
combined, represents one boundary of the solution space. The probit results from the split 
sample represents the opposite boundary, in which we have accounted for all potential 
customer-owned DG applications.  
Furthermore, an alternative method of generating these data does not exist; these 
limitations highlight the lack of data and, consequently, the lack of empirical analyses on 
this subject. When DG data are available, as is the case with EIA-861, the definitional 
attributes of the DG capacity are often lacking or entirely missing. For instance, as 
discussed above, Form EIA-861 does not specify which types of power applications can 
be considered DG capacity and so the utilities that fill out this form must make 
assumptions about what classifies as distributed generation. Hence, many DG analyses 
continue to focus on the definition and application of DG systems with an inability to 
translate findings into results. Without rigorous empirical research and testable results on 
this subject, as well as other intricately related topics, future attempts to contribute to 
public policy debates or inform the general public will only perpetuate an incomplete 
understanding of how DG operations can be integrated into our current electricity system.  
 
Conclusions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
roughly half of the ten runs: political subdivision customer ownership; municipal utility ownership; RPS 
under customer-ownership; and Western utility and customer ownership.   
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This analysis sought to test the hypotheses that private utilities are more inclined 
to deploy DG capacity than are various public utilities; and DG policies and regulations 
are effective at removing the barriers to DG adoption and deployment. The empirical 
results indicated that private utilities are, in fact, more likely to adopt and deploy greater 
amounts of DG capacity than are public utilities, particularly cooperatives. Additionally, 
state policies that aim to reduce economic barriers, standardize interconnection 
procedures, and increase competition in the electricity sector have thus far been rather 
effective at obtaining their policy objectives. My estimates indicate, however, that there 
may be conflicts between concurrent movements or transitions within the electric 
industry, specifically between a move toward greater reliance on renewable energy versus 
distributed generation. These findings also reveal that policies and regulations affect 
utility and customer DG owners differently. Customer owners are more inclined to adopt 
DG power with the passage of technical and technological standards; utility owners are 
more motivated by market forces that introduce competition and price signals into a 
historically heavily regulated market. 
The present analysis has contributed to the DG literature by helping move the 
focus beyond a mere classification and typology of DG operations and toward an 
empirical understanding of the main motivations behind DG adoption and deployment, 
and ultimately behind the evolving market transition toward increased reliance on 
decentralized power. As the electricity industry continues to evolve, the need for analyses 
that build on the basic premise of this study will increase. Analyses that explore the 
potential conflict between large-scale renewable energy development and small-scale DG 
development, for instance, or that consider the effects of deregulation and increased 
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competition on customer DG ownership behavior will inevitably help inform public and 
private debates regarding the future of our electricity sector.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DECARBONIZATION: THE CASE OF CARBON MITIGATION AND ENERGY 
PORTFOLIOS 
 
Introduction 
Motivated by Pacala and Socolow’s “stabilization wedge” concept (2004), as well 
as similar ideas presented by the Electric Power Research Institute—the “prism” 
(2007)—and others, an increasing number of states have adopted energy policy portfolios 
(or packages) since the early 2000s in effort to reduce carbon emissions. The rationale for 
portfolios, as opposed to singular policies, is appropriately captured in a common energy 
policy saying: “there is no silver bullet.” Indeed, by the very nature of their construction, 
portfolio strategies allow states to assemble complimentary clusters of instruments, which 
may not produce significant effects individually but, when combined, have the potential 
to provide synergistic carbon mitigation effects (Gunningham and Gabrosky, 1998). 
Furthermore, state portfolios tend to include a combination of policies from a variety of 
sectors, including electricity supply, transportation, agriculture, forestry, land-use, and 
residential, commercial, and industrial. A multi-sector strategy allows states to spread the 
costs and responsibility of carbon mitigation among various industries. Portfolio 
strategies can also be more effective than singular instruments because they have the 
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potential to target multiple externalities at once and achieve carbon reductions at a lower 
overall cost than a singular policy (Fisher and Newell, 2008). 
There is a great need—in both the policy realm and the energy policy literature—
for information on how well state portfolios perform in the electricity sector. Most 
immediately, empirical evidence on the carbon mitigation, or “decarbonization,” effects 
of state level energy policy portfolios could help states draft future legislation, reevaluate 
and amend past legislation when appropriate, and form more complete perceptions about 
the actual effects of these policies on carbon mitigation and other energy sector trends. 
Empirical evidence could also lend insights into questions about the effects of 
“progressive federalism” or “collaborative federalism” (Rabe, 2008) on energy and the 
environment. For instance, is it effective for states to implement climate action plans on a 
state-by-state basis rather then pursue a regional or national level effort? Or, alternatively 
conceptualized, is there value in tailoring specific portfolios to specific states or would 
regional or national standards ultimately be more effective? Should states continue to 
implement energy policy portfolios even if a national level carbon tax or permit 
legislation is passed? This type of analysis potentially could provide broader conclusions 
about the overlap between energy policy and climate policy, and suggest ways in which 
these two policy foci can merge in future state or national legislation. 
The present analysis seeks to address this need in the policy realm and contribute 
further empirical insights into the energy policy literature. The guiding research question 
is as follows: is a state energy policy portfolio an effective decarbonization strategy? This 
analysis is an exercise of explanation and prediction based on scenario-based electricity 
sector modeling. An energy modeling exercise allows one to track multiple, current 
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trends within the electricity sector as a result of various policy scenarios, and also 
consider firm decision-making procedures as a result of these same scenarios. The intend 
of the present analysis is to compare potential policy effects in the electricity sector, 
primarily on carbon emissions, and secondarily on electricity price and electric 
generation portfolios, and to draw inferences regarding the overall effectiveness of state-
level policy portfolios. In this vein of inquiry, I build a series of policy portfolio 
scenarios, and apply them at first to the state level and second to the regional level. Next, 
I run the same scenarios with the inclusion of a carbon tax, and compare results. 
 
Background 
Although the approach varies a bit from state to state, states generally assemble 
and prioritize different combinations of energy policies via an interactive planning 
process. This process is typically guided by a policymaker-appointed working group of 
stakeholders and members with state-specific technical knowledge (Center for Climate 
Strategies, 2008). Outside consultants may provide technical and analytic assistance to 
the working group. The working group and consultants collectively generate a climate 
action plan, or climate change mitigation plan, which outlines all possible multi-sector 
policy options, the carbon mitigation potential of each, and the cost per ton of avoided 
carbon. Some plans also provide suggestions for policymakers on which policies most 
effectively reduce the state’s greenhouse gas emissions below a certain threshold. To 
date, twenty states have undergone this type of process, several more are currently in the 
middle of similar processes, and roughly ten states have established policy portfolios 
through different means (Center for Climate Strategies, 2008; see the Center for Climate 
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Strategy’s website for an interactive map of different state actions). In total, 37 states 
have drafted some version of a climate action plan (Energy Information Administration, 
2009). Often as a result of this type of taskforce, specific policies are identified as the 
most promising options, and further analyses are performed on the cost-effectiveness or 
overall costs of these policies.  
The majority of climate action plans, state level carbon inventories, and specific-
policy cost estimates are performed using complex spreadsheet analyses (see, for 
instance, New Mexico Climate Change Advisory Group, 2006; North Carolina Climate 
Action Plan Advisory Group, 2008; Montana Climate Change Advisory Committee, 
2007). These analyses include information on historic energy data and Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) projected growth rates. In a review of all state-level 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) cost analyses performed before March 2007, Chen 
and his colleagues found that 16 out of 26 studies used spreadsheet analyses (Chen et al., 
2007). Spreadsheet analyses may be appropriate for estimating carbon emissions from 
state forestry or land-use policies, for instance, in which linear projections of policy 
effects may be fairly straightforward. It is immensely difficult, however, to capture the 
dynamics of an electricity sector in a linear spreadsheet projection. Spreadsheets cannot 
capture fluctuations in state exports and imports as a result of a new policy, transmission 
constraints, electricity system operating characteristics, wholesale power prices, or 
utility-level decisions that are made about which resources to develop and deploy in 
response to new regulatory circumstances. 
The supporting peer-reviewed energy policy literature contains a number of 
analyses that employ dynamic models to estimate potential national electricity policy 
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effects on carbon emissions. Kydes (2006) and Palmer and Burtraw (2005) recently 
modeled RPS policies using bottom-up energy models. Kydes analyzed the potential 
effect of a 20 percent federal non-hydro based RPS on energy markets in the U.S. using 
the EIA’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). He concluded that RPS policies 
effectively increase renewable energy adoption, reduce emissions, and increase the cost 
of electricity by three percent. Palmer and Burtraw modeled variations of federal RPS 
policies and tracked policy effects on electricity prices, utility investment levels, resource 
deployment portfolios, and carbon emissions. They used Resources for the Future’s 
Haiku model and the EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2003 data to model the RPS policies. 
They concluded that RPS costs are low for goals of 15 percent or less but rise 
significantly with goals of 20 percent or higher. Palmer and Burtraw also compared the 
effects of an RPS policy with those resulting from an expanded renewable energy 
production tax credit. They concluded that RPS policies are more cost-effective than a tax 
credit at decreasing total carbon emissions and increasing renewable energy deployment. 
They found that a cap-and-trade system, however, is more cost-effective than either an 
RPS or a renewable energy production tax credit.  
A number of analysts modeled the clean energy technology policies (Brown et al, 
2001, Gumerman et al., 2001; Hadley and Short, 2001) proposed in Scenarios for a Clean 
Energy Future (Interlaboratory Working Group, 2001), a Department of Energy 
document that lists and discusses the highest priority energy technologies. These analyses 
clustered policy instruments into a moderate policy scenario and an advanced policy 
scenario, respectively, and then sought to measure the economic and environmental 
effects of these scenarios using NEMS software. Results from these analyses indicate that 
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national-level energy policy portfolios have the potential to significantly reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions by 2020. 
In a recent study, Fisher and Newell (2008) built a simplified two-period 
electricity model, which they used to estimate the effects of various energy and climate 
policies on carbon mitigation and renewable energy development and deployment. Fisher 
and Newell’s analysis has three defining characteristics that set it apart from previous 
studies. First, their two-period model allows for the endogeneity of technological 
innovation. Second, their analysis includes both energy and climate policies. They test 
the effects of these policies on energy and climate outcomes, i.e. renewable energy 
development and carbon reduction, respectively. As a result, the authors are able to draw 
conclusions about the relative effectiveness of energy policies for climate policy 
objectives and of climate policies for energy policy objectives. Third, Fisher and Newell 
compare the relative effectiveness of policy portfolios to singular policy outcomes. They 
find that an emissions price is the least costly option for emissions reductions, followed 
by an emissions performance standard, a fossil fuel power tax, a renewable share 
requirement, a renewable power subsidy, and a research and development subsidy, 
respectively. The authors also find that an optimal policy portfolio is associated with a 
significantly lower cost of emissions reduction than any single policy option.  
Despite the insightful contributions that these analyses provide to the literature, 
not a single study models energy policy instruments or portfolios at the state level. Yet, to 
date, the majority of U.S. decarbonization efforts are concentrated in the states.17 
National policy modeling, as is the norm in the literature, allows for a general comparison 
                                                          
17
 More recently, regional level action is on the rise as well; although regional level efforts tend to use 
carbon policies, such as cap-and-trade initiatives, whereas state level efforts use energy policy portfolios. 
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of policy effects or costs, but one cannot be sure that these results translate into state-
relevant lessons. National level models do not capture the interaction between 
neighboring states, for instance, when one state has a policy and a second state does not. 
National modeling exercises also do not contribute insights on energy federalism, such as 
the relative effects of state versus regional or national level policy efforts. Given the 
current trends of state level leadership in the energy-climate policy realm, and the 
possibility of national legislation that may alter these trends in still unforeseen ways, the 
need for state-specific analyses is great. 
 
Modeling framework 
Following the precedent set by these national-level energy modeling analyses, the 
present study tests various energy portfolio scenarios in a dynamic modeling 
environment. This exercise has three characteristics that distinguish it from the literature. 
First, this modeling analysis specifically focuses on state level portfolios, which are, as 
just described, currently overlooked in the supporting literature. Second, building on the 
efforts of Fisher and Newell (2008) and others (Brown et al, 1991, Gumerman et al., 
2001; Hadley and Short, 2001), this analysis focuses on policy portfolios, not just 
singular policies in isolation. Finally, the present analysis models policy portfolio effects 
that are specific to the electricity sector.  
This analysis employs an electricity dispatch optimization model, AURORAxmp, 
to test various policy scenarios. AURORAxmp is used, as opposed to an integrated 
energy model such as NEMS, because it is exceedingly difficult to isolate states, the 
focus of this analysis, in an integrated model. As Chen and his colleagues explain, “an 
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integrated energy model such as NEMS is designed to analyze the national energy sector 
and may require substantial modification to obtain the specificity and detail that is 
necessary to accurately model state-level policies” (Chen et al., 2007, 37). AURORAxmp 
is frequently used by state utility commissions and electric utilities to simulate short-term 
resource dispatch based on competitive electricity market forces. AURORAxmp also has 
the capability to perform long-term capacity expansion modeling, which is used for the 
purposes of this analysis, based on hourly forecasts of fuel prices and electricity demand. 
AURORAxmp’s optimization model maximizes the real levelized net present 
value (in $/MW) of all available resources with realistic transmission capacity constraints 
in order to meet instantaneous electricity demand. This calculation is performed using a 
chronological dispatch algorithm. Resources with optimum net benefits—on a pure cost 
minus benefit basis—are selected for deployment in a given zone in a given hour. 
Resources that are not cost-competitive are retired. The resulting balance of resources 
determines the market-clearing price for each zone in each hour. These hourly dispatch 
decisions are combined in an iterative process until the model is able to extract the 
resource mix that is most cost-effective over the life of the analysis. As part of the 
resource optimization logic, AURORAxmp tracks capacity expansion and facility 
retirements, performs lifecycle analyses, considers a range of new supply resources, 
selects resources for deployment based on hourly market values, and tracks transmission 
exchanges between states and regions.  
AURORAxmp’s long-term optimization model requires the following inputs: 
• electricity demand growth rates; 
• annual load growth; 
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• generation capacity characteristics, such as fixed and variable costs, start-up 
times, capacity factors, and efficiency factors; 
• a list of existing resources or forced builds; 
• emissions prices and emissions rates for each fuel type; 
• transmission links between zones and regions; 
• new resource options. 
Aurora generates outputs on an hourly, daily, monthly, and annual basis. For a 
long-term study, I am interested in the annual estimates. Standard annual outputs include 
total generation by fuel type, electricity price by area, inter-area and inter-regional 
transactions, emissions estimates, and imports and exports figures. The model provides 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but does not break them down by type of greenhouse 
gas. Therefore, it is necessary to use the GHG output as an indication of the carbon 
mitigation potential of policy portfolios. 
The data used in this analysis come from a variety of sources. Retail and 
wholesale electricity cost figures are compiled from EIA data, and represent those figures 
reported in the 2009 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO2009). Other sources of cost estimates 
include Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) data, Electric Power Monthly, 
and Natural Gas Week. Locational data of power plants come from EIA-860 database. 
Demand data come from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Form 714, which 
contains data on historical annual load-shapes for selected utilities. Emissions rates come 
from the Environmental Protection Agency’s “Clean Air Markets” database (EPA, 2009). 
Resource information is primarily taken from the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation’s (NERC) Electric Supply & Demand database (NERC, 2009). The state 
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policy data that inform the various policy scenarios come from each state’s enabling 
legislation, the Database for State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE, 
2009), and supporting literature. 
AURORAxmp databases are divided according to NERC regional boundaries, 
which necessitates that I draw a research sample at the region level. However, the 
research intent is to draw results that can be generalized to the national level. As a result, 
research efforts are focused on the Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC), 
which is the largest and most diverse of all NERC electric regions, and has the greatest 
generalizability potential. Much of the WECC is also actively involved in planning for 
future climate change policy at the regional level via the Western Climate Initiative; and 
multiple WECC states recently passed state-level legislation for climate action plan 
policies. The WECC includes 14 U.S. states, as well as Baja, Mexico, and Alberta and 
British Columbia, Canada. While the analysis is focused on the WECC, the electricity 
dispatch model still tracks transmission and distribution links between WECC and other 
NERC regions and, thereby, still captures all retail and wholesale electricity trades among 
regions. With an objective to track policy effects from state-specific policy portfolios, it 
is necessary to select states from within the WECC on which to model policy scenarios. I 
select two states for this purpose, Utah and Arizona. 
Using these data, I build various policy scenarios in AURORAxmp. I begin with a 
business as usual case, which represents electricity dispatch decisions given current 
energy trends and in absence of any state policy legislation. The output of this case is 
hereafter referred to as the “baseline”. Next, I model a series of policy portfolio scenarios 
in Utah and Arizona, respectively, then across the entire WECC, and compare model 
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results. Finally, I run the same policy portfolio scenarios first at the state level and then at 
the regional level, but this time include a national carbon price. Policy portfolios are 
assumed to become effective on January 1st, 2010, and run through December 31st, 2030. 
All scenarios are run between 2006 and 2035; but only data from 2010 and 2030 are 
extracted and reported. This step is generally recommended for long-term electricity 
dispatch modeling, because it removes any “kinks” that might occur in early or late years 
of the iterative, dynamic optimization procedure. All cost and price data are in 2006-
dollar values. 
Similar to other electricity dispatch models (Chen et al., 2007), AURORAxmp 
calculates electricity prices based on short-term supply curves that reflect marginal costs 
of operations. When one models a policy by forcing a resource online at a certain time 
(for instance, if one forces 100 MW of wind power online in 2010 as a result of an RPS 
policy), the overnight capital costs of that resource are not included in the electricity 
price. Yet it is unrealistic to believe that utilities will not have to pay these fixed costs and 
recover their investments over time via rate increases. To deal with this issue, I calculate 
the additional annual cost associated with all forced resources outside of the model, and 
then factor this additional cost into the retail price of electricity. For all new supply-side 
resources, I calculate the additional annual cost with the following equation: 
Costt = CCrt * CRRr,  
where CC is the total capital cost of the resource, r is the type of resource in year t, and 
CRR is the capital cost of recovery. The CRR is calculated with the following equation: 
CRRr = d/1-(1+d)-n, 
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in which d is the discount rate and n is the number of years over which the investment is 
amortized.  
 
Modeling Parameters 
Baseline 
All generation capacity in the model is categorized as either existing capacity or a 
“new resource,” available for deployment if it is economically efficient to do so. Existing 
capacity is documented at the power plant level, and includes all generation facilities that 
are currently in operation or planned for deployment in future years. The new resource 
types and generating characteristics that are included in the model are listed in Table 4.1. 
All generation characteristics are extracted from the AEO2009, and represent the average 
cost estimates to build a power plant in a typical region of the country. Because there is 
some variation in the manner in which different electric providers count expenses as 
either fixed or variable operations and maintenance (O&M), I apply an adjustment factor 
to these two variables. I take 20 percent of the fixed O&M, spread over the assumed 
lifetime of the power plant, and add this value to the variable O&M. The remaining 80 
percent is classified as fixed O&M.18 
 
                                                          
18
 This assumption is made per advice from AURORAxmp’s management team. Without this adjustment, 
AURORAxmp dispatches plants too often.  
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Table 4.1. New Resource Option Parameters included in Baseline Scenario 
New Resource Type Heat rate 
(BTU/kWh) 
Capacity 
(kW) 
Variable 
O&M 
($/MWh) 
Fixed 
O&M 
($/MW/wk) 
Forced 
outage 
(%) 
Annual 
Max per 
State  
(# units) 
Total Max 
per State 
(# units) 
Leadtime 
(years) 
Fuel Price 
($/mmBTU) 
Geothermal 33,729 50,000 3.66 4,599 5 10 50 4 1.74 
Solar Photovoltaic 10,022 5,000 0.27 11,047 45 5 100 2 0.00 
Biomass 9,646 80,000 7.96 6,721 5 1 2 4 0.05 
Municipal Solid 
Waste/Landfill 
13,648 30,000 2.55 5,346 5 1 3 3 1.16 
Wind 0 50,000 0.65 3,298 60 2(UT), 
0(AZ) 
10(UT), 
0(AZ) 
3 0.02 
Scrubbed Sub-Critical 
Pulverized Coal 
8844-8600* 600,000 5.03 3977-
3784* 
7.5 1 2 (AZ), 0 
(UT) 
4 1.45-1.66* 
Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle 
8309-7200* 550,000 3.68 4702-
4343* 
7.5 0(UT), 
1(AZ) 
0(UT), 
1(AZ) 
4 1.45-1.66* 
Advanced Gas-Oil 
Combined Cycle 
Combustion Turbine 
6682-6333* 400,000 2.57 1869-
1738* 
4 10 100 3 0.17 
Advanced Simple Cycle 
Combustion Turbine  
9043-8550* 230,000 4.6 1270-
1159* 
6.5 5(UT), 
10(AZ) 
50(UT), 
150(AZ) 
3 0.00 
* indicates that variable ranged in the model over time. The number on the left is the 2008 value and the number on the right is the 
2050 value. 
 
Demand projections are exogenously determined, and manually entered into 
AURORAxmp. I use the default demand growth projections for Utah, Arizona, and all 
other states within the WECC. Utah’s annual demand growth rate is 1.8 percent and 
Arizona’s is 2.5 percent between 2010 and 2030. Both of these growth rates represent 
actual demand growth over the past five years, as documented by the EIA. The average 
annual growth rate in demand across the WECC is 2.0 percent.  
The baseline contains a number of additional assumptions as well. First, the price 
of GHG emissions is set to zero, which indicates that there are no restrictions on GHG 
emissions, and reflects current conditions. Second, I assume that SO2 emissions are 
regulated and capped, according to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Third, I assume 
that NOx is regulated according to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments as well. Fourth, 
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technologies. Finally, all states are modeled as energy-policy free; that is, no state has a 
pre-existing energy policy that could potentially increase renewable energy or energy 
efficiency, or decrease fossil fuels. 
 
Baseline Sensitivity Analysis 
I additionally run five-baseline sensitivity analyses. The first two represent 
scenarios in which the prices of both natural gas and coal in the WECC region are higher; 
the first scenario assumes a 15 percent increase in natural gas and coal resource prices 
across the study period and the second scenario assumes a 25 percent increase. These 
scenarios attempt to account for the fact that many long-run electricity forecasts tend to 
underestimate the cost of natural gas, (Palmer and Burtraw, 2005) as well as coal.  
The third baseline sensitivity analysis represents cost improvements of renewable 
resources due to technological innovation. Given the nature of AURORAxmp’s linear 
optimization logic, the model cannot endogenously determine the cost of technologies 
that experience improvements due to learning and experience. In order to capture these 
improvements, I apply “learning parameters” to the fixed operations and maintenance 
costs of wind, solar photovoltaic, landfill, and geothermal systems, and enter the new cost 
streams into the model as exogenous parameters. The learning parameters are extracted 
from the AEO2009 and include a one percent improvement in the cost of wind by 2025, 
twenty percent in solar, five percent in landfill, and ten percent in geothermal. Each 
percentage improvement parameter is a conservative figure, designated by the AEO2009 
as the minimum total learning by 2025 (EIA, 2009).  
 
 108 
The final two sensitivity analyses adjust demand growth rates for Utah and 
Arizona, respectively. Demand assumptions can have significant consequences on the 
performance of energy models. Because it is possible that the growth rate for Utah in the 
AEO2009 is too low and Arizona’s is too high, the final two sensitivity analyses adjust 
each state’s demand growth rates. The first of these scenarios increases Utah’s demand 
growth rate from 1.8 to 2.1 percent; and the second decreases Arizona’s growth rate from 
2.5 to 2.2 percent. 
 
Policy Portfolios 
As discussed above, each state traditionally chooses unique combinations of 
different policy instruments to include in their portfolios. For the purposes of this 
analysis, I build a portfolio that includes policies that: 1) are found in most states’ climate 
action plans; 2) represent a range of different energy policy instruments; and 3) are 
modeled at the national level in supporting literature. Guided by these criteria, I include 
renewable portfolio standards, demand-side measures, tax incentives, and carbon capture 
and sequestration in the state portfolio scenarios. A description of each policy instrument, 
and a discussion of the parameters used to operationalize these instruments, is outlined 
below.  
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requires that a minimum level of a state’s 
overall electricity generating capacity must come from renewable energy. Typically, 
states mandate that a specific percentage of renewable energy must be deployed by a 
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terminal year, e.g., 25 percent by 2025.19 States tend to select low renewable energy 
percentage benchmarks for the first few years of RPS operations, which allows utilities 
and private energy organizations to make initial investments and the long-term renewable 
energy credit market to develop. The standards then rise by a few percentage points each 
year until they hit their goal. Common eligible energy resources under RPS legislation 
include wind, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wave, tidal, ocean thermal, biomass, 
hydroelectric, geothermal, and waste recovery or waste heat capture energy. Some states 
allow all of these renewable energy sources, while others allow only a few.20 Non-
voluntary RPS programs are currently active in 27 states and the District of Columbia. 
Nine of these states implemented their RPS program in 2007 (DSIRE, 2007). 
The RPS policy scenario in the present study is operationalizated as a 20 percent 
renewable energy mandate by 2025. I assume that this percentage requirement will grow 
at a constant rate from zero percent on the eve of policy adoption, in year 2009, to 20 
percent by 2025, and then remain constant at 20 percent from 2025 to 2030. The 
benchmarks for each five-year increment are as follows: 
• 1.25% by 2010 
• 7.50% by 2015 
• 13.75% by 2020 
• 20% by 2025 
                                                          
19
 Under the majority of state RPS programs, each utility’s obligation is tradable in the form of Renewable 
Energy Credits (RECs). Each credit of which a utility falls short is subject to charge. This analysis does not 
explicitly model REC transactions because renewable energy certificates do not exist in AURORAxmp’s 
dispatch logic. 
20
 Some states also allow energy efficiency or advanced coal generation to count toward their RPS 
requirements. 
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To determine the total amount of Megawatt-hours of renewable energy needed on 
an annual basis, I take the baseline total generation for each year, multiply it by the 
percentage benchmark, and then subtract out existing renewable capacity from all 
baseline and previous year-RPS renewable energy sources. I then calculate the total 
system capacity needed for each renewable resource by taking the total renewable MWh 
needed from the previous step and dividing it by the product of the resources’ capacity 
factor and the total number of hours in a year. These steps are combined, and expressed 
with the following equation: 
[(Gn * RPSn)-Σ REn]/(CFi* 8760), 
where n is the year, G is the total Megawatt-hours of generation in year n, RPS is the 
percentage benchmark, RE is the total renewable energy that is deployed in the baseline, i 
is the fuel type, 8760 is the number of days in a year, and CF is the capacity factor for 
each fuel type. I assume a capacity factor of 36 percent for wind energy. 
The present study assumes that 100 percent of all new generating capacity 
intended to meet RPS requirements—i.e., the renewable capacity needed beyond that 
which already exists in the baseline—will be met with wind energy. I consider the 
following energy sources from the baseline as RPS-eligible: wind, solar, geothermal, 
biomass, hydroelectric, and municipal solid waste. In addition to these assumptions, it is 
also the case that no renewable energy credits are traded among states; each state must 
satisfy their own RPS mandates and cannot purchase them from neighboring states. 
After I calculate the total annual capacity of wind energy needed to satisfy the 
RPS requirements, I force this amount of capacity online throughout the study period. 
Because a RPS is a mandatory regulation, it is fair to assume that utilities will not decide 
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whether or not they want to deploy new renewable energy units, they will instead be 
mandated to do so. As a result, the utilities will need to decide how to redistribute 
resources to comply with demand, availability, and fiscal constraints. I therefore force the 
renewable energy capacity online, as opposed to allow the optimization logic to choose 
renewable energy when it is cost-efficient. In calculating the annualized capital cost of 
RPS wind power, I assume a discount rate of 10 percent, which is appropriate for a 
private sector investment, and an investment payback period of 30 years. 
One would expect an RPS policy to increase the retail price of electricity, reduce 
total carbon dioxide emissions, force the retirement of some natural gas plants and 
displace new natural gas capacity, since both natural gas and wind serve intermediate 
loads. 
 
Demand Side Management 
Demand side management (DSM) refers to any program or policy that alters 
electricity demand, either via changes in the pattern of electricity use or in the total 
quantity. A variety of policy instruments can be considered under the umbrella of DSM, 
including but not limited to the following: lighting standards, building codes and 
standards, energy efficiency portfolio standards, public benefit funds, weatherization 
programs, and loans, grants, and rebates for energy efficiency. States have adopted 
different combinations of these DSM instruments over the years. 
In the present study, I conceptualize a DSM policy as a gradual increase in the 
percentage of energy savings over time. I assume that the percentage of savings starts at 
one percent in 2010 and rises by one percentage point each year, until it hits 20 percent in 
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2029. To operationalize this policy scenario, I convert these savings into changes in 
demand escalation. For instance, instead of a 1.8 percent growth in demand between year 
t and year t+1, as is the case for Utah’s baseline, Utah instead experiences a 0.7 percent 
demand growth in the DSM scenario.  
Similarly to all forced supply-side resources, AURORAxmp does not include the 
cost of demand-side programs in the model. The annual cost of DSM programs, 
therefore, must be calculated outside of the model, and then factored into the retail cost of 
electricity. To perform this calculation, I assume that the cost of a DSM program is 3.4 
cents/kWh, a cost-effectiveness figure estimated by a Resources for the Future study 
(Gillingham et al., 2004) for DSM programs. I additionally assume that all DSM program 
costs are paid in full during the year in which the DSM savings are realized. 
A DSM program will likely decrease total carbon emissions, and prolong the need 
for new power plant builds. 
 
Tax Incentives 
There are a variety of tax incentive mechanisms among which states can choose 
that alter the cost of alternative energy and, as a result, make alternatives more cost-
competitive with conventional energy sources. Tax incentives generally reduce the initial, 
or overnight, cost of an alternative energy system by a specific percentage. The most 
common tax incentive mechanisms include the personal income, sales, corporate income, 
and property tax incentives. Most states have at least one of these incentives currently in 
place. 
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I build a tax incentive scenario in which a reduction of 35 percent of the overnight 
capital costs is applied to the following new renewable energy deployment options: wind, 
solar, geothermal, biomass, and municipal solid waste/landfill. The new overnight capital 
cost is then added to the other fixed 0&M costs, and the resulting estimate, the total fixed 
O&M, is entered into the model. Table 4.2 summarizes the changes in fixed cost 
parameters between the baseline and the tax incentive scenarios. 
 
Table 4.2. Fixed Operations and Maintenance Costs for Baseline and Tax Incentive 
Scenarios 
New Resource Baseline Fixed O&M  
($/MW-wk) 
Tax Incentive Scenario Fixed O&M 
($/MW-wk) 
Wind 2,837 2,025 
Geothermal 4,599 3,852 
Solar Photovoltaic 11,047 7,244 
Biomass   6,721 4,706 
MSW/Landfill   5,346 4,074 
 
Tax incentives will reduce the cost of renewable energy and, thereby, make 
renewable resources more cost-competitive with conventional fossil fuel resources. As a 
result of lower prices, one can predict that more renewable energy systems will be 
constructed and dispatched throughout the study period, which will displace, at least in 
part, the construction of new coal and natural gas systems, and reduce the total 
greenhouse gas emissions throughout the study period. 
 
Carbon Capture and Storage 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is the process of collecting carbon dioxide that 
is produced at power plants or during fossil fuel processing, compressing it for storage 
and transportation, and injecting it into deep underground geological layers. Carbon 
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capture technologies are commercially viable in the petroleum processing industry and 
technologically proven for small-scale gas-fired and coal-fired boilers. Capture 
technologies are not yet demonstrated, however, for large-scale power plant applications 
(Rubin et al., 2007). The sequestration and storage aspect of CCS is demonstrated on a 
large-scale in three separate counties (IPCC, 2005; Rubin et al., 2007). Despite the recent 
advances made in CCS technological development, a variety of regulatory and legal 
barriers continue to prohibit wide-scale deployment of CCS technologies. 
CCS policies are not typically formed at the state level, but are more conducive to 
regional or national level policymaking. Yet a variety of states have included CCS 
policies in their climate action plans. Utah, for instance, has identified CCS policies as a 
top priority option, which they describe as the following: 
 
Some of the key questions to be addressed in the development of a consistent 
regulatory framework for carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) are: immunity 
from potentially applicable criminal and civil environmental penalties; property 
rights, including the passage of title to CO2 (including to the government) during 
transportation, injection and storage; government-mandated caps on long-term 
CO2 liability; the licensing of CO2 transportation and storage operators, 
intellectual property rights related to CCS, and monitoring of CO2 storage 
facilities. Regulatory barriers may include revisiting the traditional least-cost/least 
risk regulatory standard or mitigating added risks and financing challenges of 
CCS projects with assured, timely cost-recovery (Utah Governor’s Blue Ribbon 
Advisory Report, 2007).  
  
For the purposes of the present analysis, a CCS policy is defined as that which 
removes the regulatory barriers to CCS deployment and defines a legal framework that 
monitors and regulates CCS developments. I assume that these efforts will eventually 
render CCS as technologically viable and available for widespread commercialization. I 
additionally assume that CCS will be deployed in conjunction with advanced, efficient 
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fossil fuel operations, such as integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC-CCS) or 
natural gas combined cycle plants (NGCC-CCS), with cost and performance 
characteristics outlined in the AEO2009, and an 86 percent improvement in carbon 
emissions’ rate over conventional, non-CCS plants. I assume that both plants experience 
technological improvements throughout the study period, as is typical of most new 
generation technologies. To represent technological improvement, I reduce the overnight 
capital costs and heat rate of IGCC-CCS and NGCC-CCS plants, respectively, 
throughout the study period. Table 4.3 displays these assumptions.  
 
Table 4.3. Carbon Capture and Storage Technological Improvement Model 
Assumptions 
 IGCC-CCS NGCC-CCS 
Year Heat rate  
(BTU/kWh) 
Fixed O&M 
($/MW/wk) 
Heat rate 
(BTU/kWh) 
Fixed O&M  
($/MW/wk) 
2007 10781 8612 8613 4594 
2010 10074 8532 8226 4550 
2015 9191 8373 7951 4464 
2020 8307 8142 7652 4339 
2025 8307 7920 7652 4219 
2030 8307 7702 7652 4101 
 
 
This CCS “policy,” therefore, is modeled as an electric generation resource 
option, which a utility in a CCS policy state can choose, among other resource options, to 
build and deploy. According to these assumptions, I build the CCS policy scenario by 
including IGCC-CCS and NGCC-CCS as new resource options. Beginning in 2012, these 
technologies become available—deployable on a commercial scale—but require eight 
years of permitting and construction time before the plant is up and running. Thus, the 
first year in which a CCS plant can dispatch power online is 2020. Table 4.4 shows the 
CCS plant characteristics, as entered in AURORAxmp. 
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Table 4.4. Carbon Capture and Storage Policy Scenario Parameters  
New 
Resource 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Variable 
O&M 
($/MWh) 
Year 
available 
Construction 
time (years) 
GHG rate 
(lb/mmBTU) 
Forced 
outage (%) 
Annual 
Max per 
State 
(# units) 
Total Max 
per State 
(# units) 
IGCC-CCS 380 7.09 2012 8 28.7 7.5 1 2 
NGCC-CCS 400 3.62 2012 8 16.7 4 2 5 
 
Assuming that the cost and performance parameters render CCS technologies 
cost-competitive with other sources of electricity generation, one should expect CCS 
technologies to displace new coal and natural gas power plant builds, resulting in a 
reduction of total GHG emissions over the course of the study period. 
 
Policy Portfolios 
I combine these four policy instruments into two policy portfolio scenarios. The 
first scenario is a strong portfolio, in which I do not adjust for any overlap in policy 
objectives and merely combine and run all four instruments as-is. Under this scenario, 
one should expect more renewable energy deployment than that which is mandated by 
the RPS, since the tax incentive will encourage additional renewable energy dispatch. In 
the second scenario, the moderate portfolio scenario, I adjust for overlap in renewable 
energy deployment. Under this moderate portfolio scenario, I subtract the renewable 
energy that is dispatched as a result of the tax incentives from the total amount of energy 
that I force online as a result of the RPS policy. The difference between the strong and 
weak scenarios, therefore, is the amount of total wind energy that is forced online: the 
strong scenario has more wind energy and the weak scenario has less. As explained 
above, I first model these two policy portfolio scenarios in isolated states, Utah and 
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Arizona, respectively, and then model the portfolio scenarios across the entire WECC 
region.  
 
Carbon Price Scenarios 
In the last series of runs, I add national carbon prices of $25/metric ton CO2e and 
$50/metric ton CO2e, respectively, and compare the results to the non-carbon price 
scenarios. As described above, due to limitations in the modeling software, it is not 
actually possible to model a price on CO2 exclusively; instead, the price must be placed 
on all greenhouse gases.21 It is fair to assume that a state would respond to a GHG price 
in the same manner in which it would respond to an exclusively CO2 price. I hereafter 
refer to the GHG price as the “carbon price,” although all tables and graphs present GHG 
emissions and savings. 
Pre-carbon price policy adoption, I assume that the cost of carbon is zero dollars. 
Beginning in 2012, for the $25 carbon cost run I assume that the cost of carbon rises 
steadily from $1 to $15/metric ton CO2e in the first year, and $15 to $25/metric ton CO2e 
in the second year. Similarly, the $50 carbon cost run has an increase in the cost of 
carbon from $1 to $25/metric ton CO2e in the first year, and from $25 to $50/metric ton 
CO2e in the second year. Once the cost hits its maximum value, at $25/ metric ton CO2e 
and $50/ metric ton CO2e, respectively, it remains steady at that value throughout the 
duration of the study period. 
I additionally run two carbon price sensitivity analyses that allow for the more 
realistic assumption that demand is elastic and will decrease in response to a rise in the 
                                                          
21
 Carbon dioxide is the second most abundant gas, behind water vapor, in the composition of greenhouse 
gas. 
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price of electricity from a carbon price. In effort to capture these effects, I decrease 
demand growth rates across the entire WECC region. In the $25/metric ton CO2e case, I 
cut demand growth rates by one-sixth, beginning in the first year in which a carbon price 
is imposed. In the $50/metric ton CO2e case, I cut demand growth rates by one-fourth. 
The average growth rate across the WECC is 0.9 in the baseline scenario, and ranges 
from 0.77 and 0.55 in the $25/metric ton CO2e sensitivity scenario and 0.7 to 0.61 in the 
$50/metric ton CO2e sensitivity scenario. 
When emission costs are included in dispatch decisions, AURORAxmp adjusts 
variable costs for each energy resource according to the following equation: 
VOM = R * HR * P / 2x106,  
where VOM is variable operations and maintenance costs for the energy resource 
(measured in $/MWh), R is the unit emissions rate (measured in lb/mmBtu), HR is the 
unit heat rate (measured in Btu/kWh), and P is the emission price (measured in $/Ton). 
 
Results of Scenario Analysis 
Baseline 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below display the mix of total generation resources in Utah 
and Arizona, respectively, between 2010 and 2030. Utah’s generation mix is heavily 
concentrated with coal, and grows increasing more so throughout the study period, from 
85.9 percent in 2010 to 90.5 percent in 2030. Utah also generates natural gas, 
hydroelectricity, and biomass. Natural gas generation declines throughout the study 
period, while the generation of hydroelectricity and biomass remain relatively steady. 
Although it is not visible in figure 4.1 below, Utah also has 23 MW of geothermal 
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capacity, which it dispatches in 2010 and 2011, but retires by 2012. Utah has no nuclear 
energy. Utah adds no new generation between 2010 and 2030 and, instead, slightly 
decreases generation, almost entirely via natural gas plant retirements. In order to satisfy 
in-state electricity demand, Utah decreases exports and slightly increases imports 
throughout the study period.  
Arizona’s generation mix is a bit more varied, with roughly one-third coal, one-
third natural gas, and one-third a combination of nuclear and hydroelectricity. Arizona 
also has solar photovoltaic and landfill in its generation mix, although in such minor 
concentrations that it is not visible in Figure 4.2. Arizona adds new generation from coal 
and natural gas early in the study period, beginning around 2016. By 2021, Arizona 
maintains a steady generation of coal but continues to increase natural gas generation to 
satisfy its rising electricity demand. Eventually, Arizona generates more natural gas than 
coal. Arizona also adds new biomass generation, although a relatively minor amount 
compared to the other energy resources. Both nuclear and hydroelectric generation 
remain steady throughout the study period. 
 
Figure 4.1. Utah Baseline Generation   Figure 4.2. Arizona Baseline Generation 
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Arizona generates significantly more electricity than Utah. In 2020, Arizona 
generates roughly 37 percent more electricity than Utah. By 2030, Arizona generates 28 
percent more electricity. In the beginning of the study period, Arizona and Utah generate 
roughly the same total amount of coal, although the percentage of coal out of the total 
respective generation mix is not even.  
Table 4.5 presents additional model results. Total GHG emissions remain 
relatively steady in Utah, around 41 million metric tons. Arizona’s emissions rise 
throughout the study period, from roughly 59 million metric tons in 2010, to 69 in 2020, 
and to 80 in 2030. The average electricity price is roughly equivalent across the two 
states, both of which rise by over 150 percent between 2010 and 2030. Both Arizona and 
Utah are net electricity exporters. As mentioned above, Utah’s exports drop significantly 
over the course of the study period and its imports rise slowly; by 2030, Utah’s exports 
and imports nearly converge. Arizona also demonstrates decreasing exports and 
increasing imports, albeit to a lesser degree than Utah. 
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Table 4.5. Baseline Scenario Summary Results for Utah and Arizona, 2020 and 2030 
 Utah Baseline Arizona Baseline 
Year 2020 2030 2020 2030 
GHG emissions (tons) 42,817,980 42,330,430   68,982,250   79,998,250 
Average electricity price (2006$/MWh)       $59.69        $94.74          $60.58          $94.73 
Total generation (MWh) 45,677,199 44,626,119 132,678,868 161,227,928 
      Coal 40,420,559 40,370,177   51,091,534   55,276,935 
      Natural gas  3,620,296   2,623,095   42,723,130   65,847,285 
      Nuclear                0                 0   28,005,315   28,005,315 
      Hydroelectric     964,879      963,217   10,334,871   10,310,864 
      Wind                0                 0                   0                   0 
      Solar PV                0                 0         40,437          40,327 
      Geothermal                0                 0                  0                   0 
      Biomass    671,464      669,630       245,754     1,510,027 
      Landfill/MSW                0                 0       237,827        237,177 
Total New Generation (MWh)                0                 0   12,096,511   59,193,580 
      Coal                0                 0     9,343,980   13,587,788 
      Natural gas                0                 0     2,752,531   44,103,671 
      Wind                0                 0                   0                   0 
      Solar PV                0                 0                   0                   0 
      Geothermal                0                 0                   0                   0 
      Biomass                0                 0                   0     1,264,944 
      Landfill/MSW                0                 0        237,827         237,177 
Electricity demand (MW)         4134            4931          12634           16164 
Exports (MW)         1,781           1,037            2,927             2,762 
Imports (MW)            748             923               491                577 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Cost Parameters 
The results of the five baseline sensitivity analyses are presented in Table 4.6 and 
Table 4.7. Beginning with the first sensitivity analysis, the increase in the price of coal 
makes both states produce slightly less of it; although neither state retires any coal plants. 
As a result of a 15 percent increase in natural gas and coal, respectively, both states 
generate more natural gas power and less coal, and increase both exports and imports, 
albeit only slightly. These results reveal that the increase in the cost of coal offsets the 
effect of an increase in natural gas and so, despite the higher cost of natural gas, these 
states replace some coal generation with natural gas. The retail price of electricity rises 
accordingly. Neither state, however, replaces coal or natural gas with renewable energy; 
 122 
therefore, the increase in fossil fuel price was not enough to make renewable energy cost-
competitive across comparable load level, i.e. base load, intermediate, or peak. 
Utah responds to a 25 percent cost increase in natural gas and coal with a 
reduction of both sources of fossil fuel, and a resulting overall decrease in total 
generation and GHG emissions. Utah also reduces both exports and imports, and 
experiences an increase in the retail price of electricity. With an effect similar to the 15 
percent cost increase scenario, Arizona decreases coal generation, slightly increases 
natural gas generation, decreases both exports and imports, and experiences a rise in the 
price of electricity. 
 
Table 4.6. Utah Baseline Sensitivity Analysis Summary Results, 2030  
 Baseline 15% Cost 
Increase 
25% Cost 
Increase 
Technological 
Innovation 
Demand 
Growth 
Adjustment 
GHG emissions (tons) 42,330,430 42,437,190 42,243,450 42,422,220 42,717,550 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
$94.74 $96.62 $95.68 $96.28 $97.00 
Total generation (MWh) 44,626,119 44,893,176 44,486,517 44,826,394 45,515,386 
      Coal 40,370,177 40,353,105 40,324,914 40,368,471 40,380,297 
      Natural gas 2,623,095 2,907,224 2,528,755 2,825,076 3,502,241 
      Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
      Hydroelectric 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 
      Wind 0 0 0 0 0 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 669,630 669,630 669,630 669,630 669,630 
      Landfill/MSW 0 0 0 0 0 
Total New Generation (MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 
      Coal 0 0 0 0 0 
      Natural gas 0 0 0 0 0 
      Wind 0 0 0 0 0 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 
      Landfill/MSW 0 0 0 0 0 
Demand 4,941 4,941 4,941 4,941 5,241 
Exports 1,037 1,106 928 929 847 
Imports 923 963 827 787 931 
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Table 4.7. Arizona Baseline Sensitivity Analysis Summary Results, 2030  
 Baseline 15% Cost 
Increase 
25% Cost 
Increase 
Technological 
Innovation 
Demand 
Growth 
Adjustment 
GHG emissions (tons) 79,998,250 80,223,270 80,160,130 79,155,510 79,776,490 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
$94.73 $95.02 $95.14 $95.65 $94.20 
Total generation (MWh) 161,227,92
8 
161,825,800 161,695,971 159,311,296 160,701,503 
      Coal 55,276,935 55,275,848 55,276,152 55,268,571 55,270,228 
      Natural gas 65,847,285 66,446,243 66,316,109 63,464,662 65,485,684 
      Nuclear 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 
      Hydroelectric 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 
      Wind 0 0 0 0 0 
      Solar PV 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 1,510,027 1,510,027 1,510,027 1,510,027 877,555 
      Landfill/MSW 237,177 237,177 237,177 711,531 711,531 
Total New Generation (MWh) 59,193,580 59,318,188 59,762,314 57,255,392 61,013,478 
      Coal 13,587,788 13,587,788 13,587,788 13,587,788 13,587,788 
      Natural gas 44,103,671 44,228,279 44,672,406 41,691,130 46,081,687 
      Wind 0 0 0 0 0 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 1,264,944 1,264,944 1,264,944 1,264,944 632,472 
      Landfill/MSW 237,177 237,177 237,177 711,531 711,531 
Demand 16,163.68 16,163.68 16,163.68 16,164 15,243 
Exports 2,762 3,214 2,544 2,177 3,248 
Imports 577 978 287 220 211 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Technological Innovation Parameters 
In the technological innovation sensitivity analysis, Utah and Arizona 
demonstrate consistent, albeit complex trends. In the case of Utah, the innovation-based 
renewable energy cost parameters are not significant enough to induce the state to build 
new renewable capacity, which is not surprising given that Utah does not build any new 
capacity in the baseline scenario either. The technological innovation parameters do, 
however, cause surrounding WECC states to increase landfill/MSW and wind energy, 
and retire some older coal and natural gas plants. These resource changes result in a 
decrease of surrounding states’ exports, which, in turn, affects Utah’s imports and causes 
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Utah to retain some of the generation that it would otherwise export. Utah also responds 
to these changes in imported supply by ramping up its natural gas generation by roughly 
200,000 MWh. In the case of Arizona, the technological innovation cost adjustments 
make landfill energy more cost-competitive with natural gas; as a result, Arizona builds 
more landfill/MSW and less natural gas in the technological innovation scenario, relative 
to the baseline scenario. Arizona does not replace natural gas with landfill/MSW on a 
one-for-one basis and so it does not have as much excess capacity to export to 
surrounding states, including Utah. In summary, both states decrease inter-state 
electricity trades as a result of the technological innovation sensitivity analysis. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Demand Parameters 
A higher rate of demand growth causes Utah to increase coal and natural gas 
generation, which results in an increase of GHG emissions and an increase in the price of 
electricity. Utah does not, however, build any new power plants to provide for this 
greater demand; besides ramping up coal and natural gas plants, Utah reduces its exports 
and increases its imports. By 2030, Utah is a net importer of electricity in the demand 
growth adjustment sensitivity scenario. 
As a result of a lower rate of demand growth, Arizona builds and deploys half as 
much biomass generation and slightly decreases coal generation. Arizona’s exports rise 
and its imports fall. Both GHG emissions and the price of electricity decrease as a result 
of Arizona’s demand growth adjustment sensitivity scenario. 
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Policy Portfolio Scenarios 
As discussed above, each state’s policy portfolio includes an RPS, a DSM 
program, renewable energy tax incentives, and a CCS policy. Portfolio policies were 
modeled as “isolated state” scenarios and as “regional coordination” scenarios, with two 
variants of policy strength. The results of these portfolio analyses in year 2030 are 
summarized in the tables below.22 In effort to focus the conversation on broader trends, I 
only present results from the strong policy portfolios in the corresponding graphs. I do, 
however, present the moderate portfolio results in the summary tables for the sake of 
comparison. Overall, moderate and strong portfolios produced similar results. 
 
Policy Portfolio Scenarios: Utah 
Beginning with Utah’s results in Table 4.8, the top two rows reveal that each 
portfolio scenario reduces GHG emissions and increases the retail price of electricity in 
Utah relative to baseline projections. The two isolated state scenarios have slightly lower 
emissions than the baseline. The regional coordination scenarios have lower GHG 
emissions than both the isolated state scenarios and the baseline. The lowest retail price 
in 2030 is in the strong regional coordination portfolio scenario. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 
present these two variables, Utah’s GHG emissions and retail electricity price, over time.  
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 I also modeled each individual policy in isolated states and across the region. Results of the individual 
policy scenarios are not presented in this analysis but can be obtained via personal request. 
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Table 4.8. Utah Portfolio Scenario Results in 2030 
 Baseline Moderate 
Isolated State 
Portfolio 
Strong 
Isolated State 
Portfolio 
Moderate 
Regional 
Coordination 
Portfolio 
Strong 
Regional 
Coordination 
Portfolio 
GHG emissions (tons) 42,330,430 42,012,020 42,020,000 41,138,700 40,224,960 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
       $94.74      $121.92     $123.80     $112.36      $111.46 
Total generation (MWh) 44,626,119 49,284,319 50,212,348 48,462,353 48,177,891 
   All Coal 40,370,177 40,314,138 40,319,958 39,453,392 38,619,945 
      IGCC CCS                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   All Natural gas   2,623,095   2,018,306   2,034,780   1,967,137    1,700,337 
      NGCC CCS                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   Nuclear                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   All renewables   1,632,847   6,951,874   7,857,609   7,041,823    7,857,609 
      Hydroelectric      963,217       963,217      963,217      963,217       963,217 
      Wind                 0   5,319,027   6,224,762   5,408,976    6,224,762 
      Solar PV                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
      Geothermal                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
      Biomass      669,630      669,630      669,630      669,630       669,630 
      Landfill/MSW                 0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
Total New Generation (MWh)                   0   5,319,027   6,224,762   5,408,976    6,224,762 
   All Coal                   0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
      IGCC CCS                   0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   All Natural gas                   0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
      NGCC CCS                   0                 0                 0                 0                  0 
   All renewables                   0   5,319,027   6,224,762   5,408,976    6,224,762 
      Wind                   0   5,319,027   6,224,762   5,408,976    6,224,762 
      Solar PV                   0                 0                0                 0                  0 
      Geothermal                   0                 0                0                 0                  0 
      Biomass                   0                 0                0                 0                  0 
      Landfill/MSW                 0                 0                0                 0                  0 
Electricity demand (MW)            4931          3,953         3,953          3,953           3,953 
Exports           1,037          2,283         2,254          2,227           2,273 
Imports             923              637             496            682             763 
 
Figure 4.3. Utah GHG Emissions  Figure 4.4. Utah Retail Price of Electricity 
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 These graphs reveal that the Utah-only policy portfolio has minor carbon 
mitigation effects. Regional policy portfolio coordination, however, has a relatively 
substantial effect on carbon mitigation. The isolated state scenario requires the same total 
Utah investment as the regional coordination scenario—both the state and regional 
scenarios have the same new RPS wind resources, demand curtailment, policy incentives, 
and CCS technology options—yet the total GHG savings of the two scenarios 
significantly differ. The greater “bang-for-your-buck” of the regional coordination 
scenario is evident in Figure 4.4, which demonstrates that both portfolio scenarios will 
increase the total retail price of electricity in Utah, but the isolated state portfolio will 
increase retail prices more than $10/MWh over the regional coordination portfolio by 
2030. Table 4.9 below shows the difference between GHG emissions in the baseline 
scenario and GHG emissions in the state and regional scenarios, respectively. These 
estimates reveal that, for the same investment from the state of Utah, a regional portfolio 
has 2.7 times the decarbonization potential than a state portfolio in 2020, and up to 6.8 
times by 2030. If one considers cumulative GHG emissions over the entire study period, 
the regional coordination portfolio has roughly 5.1 times greater decarbonization 
potential as the isolated state portfolio.23 
 
Table 4.9. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline and Portfolio Scenarios, 
Utah 
 State Portfolio Regional Portfolio Factor of Difference 
Year 2020    424,250   1,155,650 2.7 
Year 2030    310,430   2,105,470 6.8 
Cumulative 2010-2030 3,967,960 20,325,700 5.1 
 
                                                          
23
 It is worth noting that a regional scenario will result in a greater bang for Utah’s buck but will also 
require surrounding states to make policy investments as well.  
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Which factors contribute to the greater decarbonization potential of regional 
portfolios for the case of Utah? Returning to Table 4.7, other model results lend insights 
on this issue. As a result of all portfolio scenarios, Utah experiences a reduction in total 
in-state electricity demand, as one would expect given its DSM efforts. Utah also uses 
less natural gas, and even retires a few natural gas plants, as a result of the new wind 
generation. Hydroelectricity and biomass remain unaffected, relative to the baseline 
scenario. Yet total generation rises in all four scenarios. In the case of the isolated state 
scenarios, coal generation rises rather substantially; the combination of new wind power 
and increased coal generation—note that Utah does not actually build new coal plants, it 
simply ramps up generation at existing plants—causes total generation to rise. It is only 
the retirement of natural gas plants that causes the isolated state portfolio scenarios to 
experience a reduction—albeit, recall, minor—in GHG emissions vis-à-vis the baseline 
scenario.  
If electricity demand in Utah, however, is 20 percent below a business as usual 
case, why would Utah generate more coal power than it would in the absence of a policy 
portfolio? The reason is that Utah can export its relatively inexpensive coal-based 
electricity to neighboring states, a phenomenon referred to as “carbon leakage” in the 
literature. In the absence of their own renewable energy, energy efficiency, or carbon 
dioxide legislation, neighboring states will take advantage of the opportunity to purchase 
Utah’s excess coal. In the case of the regional coordination scenario, however, 
neighboring states also have to meet demand-side and supply-side regulations of their 
own and, therefore, purchase less of Utah’s excess fossil fuel generation. These trends are 
evident in Figure 4.5, which displays net exports minus imports over time. The baseline 
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scenario experiences converging values for exports and imports. Both the state and 
regional scenarios experience an increase in exports and a decrease in imports, relative to 
the baseline. The isolated state scenario has the largest net export-import difference, 
which indicates that Utah is the biggest exporter of electricity when it is the only state 
with a policy portfolio. 
 
Figure 4.5. Utah Net Exports-Imports 
 
 
Policy Portfolio Scenarios: Arizona 
Arizona’s results are summarized in Table 4.10. As this table reveals, all four 
policy scenarios reduce GHG emissions significantly below baseline projections. 
Similarly to Utah, the regional coordination scenarios result in the lowest total GHG 
emissions. There are, however, only minor differences between GHG emission savings in 
the isolated state portfolios and the regional coordination portfolios. The retail price of 
electricity also rises in all four cases but the strong regional coordination scenario has the 
lowest price by 2030. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 display Arizona’s GHG emissions and retail 
price over time, respectively, as a result of the portfolio scenarios.  
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Table 4.10. Arizona Portfolio Scenario Results in 2030 
 Baseline Moderate  
Isolated State 
Portfolio 
Strong  
Isolated State 
Portfolio 
Moderate 
Regional 
Coordination 
Portfolio 
Strong 
Regional 
Coordination 
Portfolio 
GHG emissions (tons)   79,998,250   67,111,291   66,415,066   66,467,080   64,743,290 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
         $94.73       $118.64        $121.35        $110.59        $108.09 
Total generation (MWh) 161,227,928 139,614,563 139,977,049 140,997,418 141,001,189 
   All Coal   55,276,935   58,182,910   58,161,484   54,558,253   53,248,062 
      IGCC CCS                   0     2,950,491      2,950,491                   0                   0 
   All Natural gas   65,847,285   25,353,731   24,236,932   30,393,390   29,606,316 
      NGCC CCS                   0                   0                   0                   0                   0 
   Nuclear   28,005,315   28,005,315   28,005,315   28,005,315   28,005,315 
   All renewables    12,098,395   28,072,607   29,573,318   28,040,460   30,141,496 
      Hydroelectric   10,310,864   10,310,864   10,310,864   10,310,864   10,310,864 
      Wind                   0   15,737,036   17,870,219   15,467,712   17,331,571 
      Solar PV          40,327          40,327          40,327          40,327          40,327 
      Geothermal                   0                   0                    0                   0                    0 
      Biomass     1,510,027     1,510,027        877,555     1,510,027     1,510,027 
      Landfill/MSW        237,177        474,354        474,354         711,531        948,708 
Total New Generation (MWh)   59,193,580   36,965,103   38,465,814   31,057,574   33,117,805 
   All Coal   13,587,788   16,538,279   16,538,279   13,587,788   13,470,185 
      IGCC CCS                   0     2,950,491     2,950,491                   0                   0 
   All Natural gas   44,103,671                   0                   0          25,600        102,398 
      NGCC CCS                   0                   0                   0                   0                   0 
 All renewables      1,502,121             17,476,334   18,977,045   17,444,187   19,545,223 
      Wind                   0   15,737,036   17,870,219   15,467,712   17,331,571 
      Solar PV                   0                   0                   0                   0                   0 
      Geothermal                   0                   0                   0                   0                   0 
      Biomass     1,264,944     1,264,944        632,472     1,264,944    1,264,944 
      Landfill/MSW         237,177        474,354       474,354         711,531        948,708 
Demand           16164           12,873         12,873          12,873          12,873 
Exports             2,762            3,267           3,301            3,625            3,620 
Imports                577              264             254               466               570 
 
 
   Figure 4.7. Arizona Retail Price of  
Figure 4.6. Arizona GHG Emissions    Electricity 
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Figure 4.6 demonstrates that the regional portfolio has slightly lower GHG 
emissions throughout the study period, with the exception of the years between 2026 and 
2028. The retail price of electricity in the regional scenario is, however, consistently 
lower than it is in the state scenario, as displayed in Figure 4.7. Table 4.11 provides 
Arizona’s decarbonization potential factors. The regional coordination policy is 1.1 times 
more effective at reducing GHG emissions—per Arizona dollar spent on policy 
portfolios—than the state portfolio, which is the case at 2020, 2030, and cumulatively 
across the entire study period.  
 
Table 4.11. GHG Emissions Difference between Baseline and Portfolio Scenarios, 
Arizona 
 State Portfolio Regional Portfolio Factor of Difference 
Year 2020   10,819,110   11,622,010 1.1 
Year 2030   13,583,184   15,254,960 1.1 
Cumulative 2010-2030 185,011,874 195,898,470 1.1 
 
 These factors of difference are based on the premise that both the state and 
regional scenarios will require the same policy expenditures made by the state of Arizona 
but will have different effects on total GHG emissions. The policy costs are factored into 
the retail price of electricity; but the retail price also includes other investment decisions 
made throughout the study period. It is instructive to consider, therefore, why the isolated 
state scenario results in a higher electricity price than the regional coordination scenario, 
despite the small difference in total GHG emissions. It is additionally important to 
consider why Utah has such a significant difference between regional and state scenarios 
yet Arizona’s difference is minor. 
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 Returning to Table 4.10, it is evident that Arizona is forced to make more 
complex resource decisions than Utah as a result of the policy scenarios. Whereas Utah 
has relatively steady demand and ample coal resources to satisfy its base load, Arizona 
has an increasing demand growth rate and needs to build new power plants throughout 
the study period to satisfy this demand. In the baseline scenario, Arizona primarily builds 
new natural gas plants to satisfy increasing demand, but also builds coal, biomass, and 
landfill generating units. In the policy scenarios, Arizona is forced to make new 
investment decisions regarding which resources to build. Figures 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 
display which decisions Arizona makes.  
 
Figure 4.8. Arizona New Generation  
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Figure 4.9. Arizona Generation, State     Figure 4.10. Arizona Generation, Regional 
 
 
 Collectively, these graphs reveal that Arizona reduces total generation as a result 
of the policy scenarios. This reduction in generation is a significant factor in Arizona’s 
large GHG emissions savings across all policy scenarios. Arizona still has to build new 
generation to satisfy rising demand, which it does with new coal and RPS wind. The new 
wind generation entirely displaces the new natural gas builds that occur in the baseline 
scenario. Arizona still needs to satisfy growing base load demand, however, which it 
cannot do exclusively with wind power, since wind is a better intermittent load resource 
than a base load resource. The wind that Arizona deploys allows the state to postpone the 
construction of new coal plants in both the state and regional scenarios, until it eventually 
needs to build the additional base load coal generation. Once Arizona builds these coal 
plants, it has excess coal-based energy, which it can then export to surrounding states 
until Arizona requires the entire load for itself.  
 Arizona has to build new coal power plants earlier in the isolated state scenario 
because it cannot import as much base load generation from other states. Once 
surrounding states have their own portfolio policies, as is the case with the regional 
coordination scenarios, they have excess base load coal generation—a small amount of 
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which is from IGCC-CCS24—to sell to Arizona, which allows Arizona to further 
postpone the construction of new coal plants until 2025. Beginning in 2026, Arizona has 
excess coal power, generated with the most advanced and efficient coal technologies, 
which it sells to surrounding states. 
These trends are evident in the export-import graph below. Both policy scenarios 
cause Arizona to export more power, relative to the baseline, over the course of the study 
period. Imports rise in the regional coordination scenario, beginning around 2016, exactly 
when Arizona postpones its first coal plant build. Imports fall again and exports rise 
when Arizona builds its regional coordination scenario coal plant in 2025. Between 2026 
and 2028, Arizona exports more coal power in the regional scenario than in the state 
scenario. Save these years, Arizona has a higher net export-import value in the isolated 
state portfolio scenarios, which are the only years in which the regional portfolio is more 
cost-effective than the state portfolio. 
Figure 4.11. Arizona Net Exports-Imports 
 
 
Carbon Price Scenarios 
                                                          
24
 Arizona builds an IGCC-CCS plant only after it exhausts its IGCC with no CCS limit of one power plant 
and its scrubbed sub-critical pulverized coal limit of two power plants. These trends indicate that IGCC 
with no CCS and sub-critical pulverized coal power plants are preferred to IGCC-CCS in the absence of a 
carbon price. 
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 The final set of models combine portfolio with carbon price scenarios. The results 
from the strong regional portfolios combined with the carbon price scenarios are 
presented in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13. These tables also include the demand growth 
sensitivity scenarios. 
 
 
Table 4.12. Utah Carbon Price Portfolio Results, 2030 
 Baseline Regional 
Portfolio & 
$25 GHG 
Regional 
Portfolio & 
$50 GHG 
Regional 
Portfolio & $25 
GHG with 
Demand 
Sensitivity 
Regional 
Portfolio & $50 
GHG with 
Demand 
Sensitivity 
GHG emissions (tons) 42,330,430 37,548,740 25,710,150 38,636,930 25,958,750 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
$94.74 $129.25 $164.86 $132.19 $167.61 
Total generation (MWh) 44,626,119 45,785,514 37,490,244 47,134,922 36,533,035 
   All Coal 40,370,177 36,134,930 23,336,549 37,002,228 23,508,173 
      IGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 
   All Natural gas 2,623,095 1,614,157 4,616,155 2,094,504 4,988,047 
      NGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 
   Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 
   All renewables 1,632,847 8,036,426 9,537,540 8,038,190 8,036,815 
      Hydroelectric 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 963,217 
      Wind 0 6,224,762 6,224,762 6,224,762 6,224,762 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 180,426 181,058 181,477 181,237 
      Biomass 669,630 668,021 1,931,325 668,733 667,599 
      Landfill/MSW 0 0 237,177 0 0 
Total New Generation 
(MWh) 
0 6,405,188 7,907,942 6,224,762 6,224,762 
   All Coal 0 0 0 0 0 
      IGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 
   All Natural gas 0 0 0 0 0 
      NGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 
   All renewables 0 6,405,188 7,907,942 6,224,762 6,224,762 
      Wind 0 6,224,762 6,224,762 6,224,762 6,224,762 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 0 0 1,264,944 0 0 
      Landfill/MSW 0 0 237,177 0 0 
Demand (MW) 4,931 3,953 3,953 3,863 3,822 
Exports 1,037 1,840 1,022 2,086 845 
Imports 923 595 725 596 518 
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Table 4.13. Arizona Carbon Price Portfolio Results, 2030 
 Baseline Regional 
Portfolio & $25 
GHG 
Regional 
Portfolio & 
$50 GHG 
Regional 
Portfolio & $25 
GHG with 
Demand 
Sensitivity 
Regional 
Portfolio & $50 
GHG with 
Demand 
Sensitivity 
GHG emissions (tons) 79,998,250 55,974,080 41,122,600 53,720,590 40,693,920 
Average electricity price 
(2006$/MWh) 
$94.73 $125.40 $151.16 $128.36 $155.41 
Total generation (MWh) 161,227,928 134,433,978 130,982,117 130,308,993 123,473,138 
   All Coal 55,276,935 48,807,496 28,316,060 45,344,357 25,959,029 
      IGCC CCS 0 2,950,373 5,891,468 2,946,480 2,943,482 
   All Natural gas 65,847,285 25,741,120 42,786,073 27,292,553 40,475,608 
      NGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 
   Nuclear 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 28,005,315 
   All renewables 12,098,395 31,880,046 31,874,669 29,666,768 29,033,186 
      Hydroelectric 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 10,310,864 
      Wind 0 17,331,571 17,331,571 17,331,571 17,331,571 
      Solar PV 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 40,327 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 1,510,027 2,774,223 2,768,846 1,509,653 876,072 
      Landfill/MSW 237,177 1,423,062 1,423,062 474,354 474,354 
Total New Generation 
(MWh) 
59,193,580 33,028,352 32,311,089 26,277,061 21,381,878 
   All Coal 13,587,788 11,743,832 5,891,468 7,206,193 2,943,482 
      IGCC CCS 0 2,950,373 5,891,468 2,946,625 2,941,125 
   All Natural gas 44,103,671 0 5,135,100 0 0 
      NGCC CCS 0 0 0 0 0 
   All renewables 1,502,121 21,284,521 21,284,521 19,070,869 18,438,397 
      Wind 0 17,331,571 17,331,571 17,331,571 17,331,571 
      Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 
      Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 
      Biomass 1,264,944 2,529,888 2,529,888 1,264,944 632,472 
      Landfill/MSW 237,177 1,423,062 1,423,062 474,354 474,354 
Demand (MW) 16,164 12,873 12,873 12,328 12,058 
Exports 2,762 2,624 2,618 2,905 2,345 
Imports 577 201 582 415 343 
 
  
 The carbon price scenarios produce predictable results: the price of electricity 
rises; GHG emissions fall; total generation decreases in all cases, save the Utah $25 GHG 
scenario; and renewable energy deployment increases and displaces carbon-intensive 
fossil fuels. A carbon price of $25/metric ton CO2e causes both states to make relatively 
small reductions in coal generation and large reductions in natural gas. A carbon price of 
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$50/metric ton CO2e has the opposite effect: major coal reductions and minor natural gas 
reductions, as is the case for Arizona, or natural gas additions, as is the case for Utah.  
 In the low carbon price scenario, Utah increases total generation; this increase is 
due to new RPS wind and the ramping up of Utah’s geothermal operations. Utah also 
reduces coal generation, although not substantially, as well as natural gas, and increases 
exports and decreases imports. The price of carbon is significant enough in the high price 
scenario to cause Utah to deploy new biomass and landfill energy, and cut total coal 
generation nearly in half. Given that natural gas is the least carbon intensive fossil fuel, 
and also has the ability to serve as base load power, Utah builds new natural gas plants in 
the high carbon price scenario to replace a portion of its coal-generated base load. In 
total, Utah generation decreases, imports increase, and exports decrease in order for Utah 
to provide enough electricity to meet its consumers’ electricity demands at minimal cost. 
These conditions make the retail cost of electricity rise. 
 In Arizona’s low carbon price scenario, the state retires a substantial amount of 
coal generation, but replaces much of it with new IGCC-CCS and sub-critical scrubbed 
pulverized coal units. Arizona also retires more than half of its natural gas plants and 
replaces them with new renewable energy systems, including biomass, landfill, and RPS 
wind. The high carbon price causes Arizona to take more drastic measures: it retires over 
half of its coal plants; replaces a fraction of the coal with IGCC-CCS; decreases natural 
gas and replaces a portion of that power with renewable energy generation; and increases 
imports.  
 Figures 4.12 and 4.13 display each state’s total GHG emission savings, relative to 
baseline values, as a result of the portfolio and carbon price scenarios. These graphs 
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demonstrate that carbon prices, coupled with portfolio policies, have significant potential 
to reduce GHG emissions over the long run. Beginning around 2015, a carbon price of 
$50/metric ton CO2e and a regional coordination portfolio cuts Utah’s emissions by 
almost one-half, and Arizona’s emissions by one-third.  
 
Figure 4.12. Utah Carbon Price   Figure 4.13. Arizona Carbon Price  
Scenarios        Scenarios 
 
 
 
Carbon Price Sensitivity Analyses 
The demand sensitivity scenarios represent a decrease in the rate of demand 
growth across all WECC states that more realistically captures the elasticity of demand 
that accompanies a carbon price. The sensitivity results once again highlight the 
intricacies of state level electricity dynamics, in which states make different dispatch 
decisions based on each state’s mix of generation resources, its export and import 
constraints, and the activities made in surrounding states. Vis-à-vis the baseline scenarios, 
both Utah’s and Arizona’s outputs from the sensitivity scenarios are consistent with those 
from the carbon price scenarios, as outlined above. When one instead compares the 
sensitivity scenarios with the carbon price scenarios, a couple of differences are worth 
noting. First, a lower rate of demand growth leads both states to cut back on the amount 
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of new renewable generation, particularly biomass and landfill, that each needs to build. 
Arizona also cuts back on new coal power plant builds. Second, given that there is less 
new generation in WECC states but there is still a need for electric supply that can match 
demand in these states, both Utah and Arizona ramp up generation from their natural gas 
plants. Utah also increases coal and geothermal generation, although not significantly. 
Both states find it advantageous to increase their already existing capacity—primarily 
from less carbon-intensive fuel sources—instead of building new generation. Third, some 
of this increase in already-existing generation is to satisfy in-state demand and the rest is 
for out-of-state demand. In states with relatively low demand and high capacity, such as 
Utah, net exports are the greatest. Utah is able to significantly increase exports and 
decrease imports in the $25 carbon price with demand sensitivity scenario. Utah’s total 
generation is actually higher in the demand sensitivity scenarios than it is in the carbon 
price scenarios because it is able to deploy this already-existing generation and sell it to 
surrounding states; although this results in a greater amount of GHG emissions and a 
higher retail price of electricity in Utah. Given that Arizona has less existing capacity to 
ramp up, and also cuts back on the new capacity that it builds, Arizona needs to import a 
greater amount of generation in the $25 carbon price with demand sensitivity scenario. 
Finally, both states cut back on new power plant builds, and decrease both imports and 
exports, as a result of the $50 carbon price with demand sensitivity scenario. 
 
Regional Models 
I additionally modeled a series of carbon price and portfolio scenarios at the 
regional level to track the differences in carbon mitigation effects of various energy and 
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climate policies. Figure 4.14 presents the summary findings. WECC greenhouse gas 
emissions increase throughout the study period in the baseline scenario. The $50/metric 
ton CO2e scenario causes the WECC to experience two years of rapid transition, or a 
tighten-the-belt period, in which it must quickly shift from carbon intensive fuels to more 
efficient and less carbon-intensive sources. After those two years, emissions continue to 
rise at a rate that is similar to, if not slightly smaller, than the baseline scenario. In the 
presence of a coordinated regional or national energy policy portfolio, but without a price 
on carbon, the WECC is able to roughly stabilize emissions at 2010 levels and generate a 
“stabilization triangle” (refer to the area above the red line in figure 4.14; Pacala and 
Socolow, 2004). The combination of the energy policy and the climate policy—the 
regional portfolio and the carbon price—causes the WECC to once again tighten its belt 
for a few years, but also has the combined effect of a change in the overall rate of GHG 
emissions growth. The new rate of growth is close to zero and, at times, slightly negative. 
These results confirm that both energy portfolio policies and climate policies have the 
potential to reduce GHG emissions significantly; but neither is as effective in isolation as 
they are when combined. 
 
 Figure 4.14. WECC GHG Emissions 
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Discussion 
  Results from the combined set of analyses confirm that: 1) spreadsheet 
projections of the climate mitigation effects of state energy policy efforts are not 
adequate; and 2) national level policy analyses—focused on both singular and portfolio 
policies—cannot be generalized to the state level. Regarding the former, the present 
results reveal that the electricity sector cannot be captured easily in a linear spreadsheet 
projection, in which tracking state-by-state electricity trade exchanges, transmission 
constraints, and utility cost minimization decisions is immensely difficult. Regarding the 
latter, all national level modeling analyses reviewed above demonstrate the potential cost-
effectiveness of policy efforts that are heterogeneous and continuous across states. 
Previous national level findings are akin to the regional level results generated in the 
present study, which conclude that a coordinated policy strategy has significant carbon 
mitigation potential. In short, both state level spreadsheets and national modeling 
projections overestimate the effectiveness of state energy policy portfolios on carbon 
mitigation because they do not account for—or have the resolution to identify—changes 
in inter-state exporting behavior, the potential for carbon leakage, the retirement and 
building of new power plants, or changes in the relative price of electricity between states 
as a result of policy variation across state borders. 
 A summary of the model results is as follows. State energy policy portfolios have 
the potential to reduce GHG emissions over the long run. Coordinated energy policy 
portfolio efforts, as facilitated across multiple states, a region, or the nation, can produce 
minor (e.g. Arizona) to significant (e.g. Utah) improvements in the decarbonization 
potential of policy actions. The difference in decarbonization potential between isolated 
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state policies and larger, more coordinated policy efforts is due to in large part to carbon 
leakage, which is the export of carbon intensive fossil fuel-based electricity across state 
lines. 
 The difference between the GHG mitigation potential of state efforts versus 
larger, coordinated efforts depends on the individual circumstances of each state. The 
present study considered two states, Utah and Arizona, and identified which factors 
contributed to the states’ GHG savings over time. In the case of Utah, which has a low 
demand growth rate and an abundance of coal generation, an isolated state policy 
portfolio causes Utah to decrease natural gas generation and export all excess coal 
generation to neighboring states. A regional coordination portfolio, on the other hand, 
reduces the neighboring states’ demand for inexpensive base load power, and Utah is 
forced to retire some of its older, less efficient coal power plants. The difference in 
decarbonization-effectiveness between the two scenarios, therefore, is large. In the case 
of Arizona, which has a high rate of electricity demand growth and a variety of different 
electricity resources, both an isolated state and a regional coordination portfolio cause 
Arizona to make significant changes to its resource portfolio mix. Both portfolio 
scenarios force Arizona to reduce total generation and delay new fossil fuel power plant 
builds. The regional coordination portfolio has greater decarbonization potential because 
Arizona builds less new coal generation, and thereby has lower carbon leakage, relative 
to the isolated state scenario. 
 It is additionally instructive to consider the behavior of the individual policy 
instruments that are included in the energy portfolios. First, the RPS policy increased 
wind generation, which tended to displace new or replace existing natural gas generation. 
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The scenarios in this analysis confirm that an RPS policy can effectively increase 
renewable energy deployment, but it has limited ability to control fossil fuel generation, 
reduce demand, or control GHG emissions, as the literature has recently discussed (Rabe, 
2008; Carley, 2009). Second, DSM policies were found to decrease in-state electricity 
demand, but, as was the case with Utah, not necessarily cause total in-state production to 
decrease accordingly.  
 Third, tax incentives of a 35 percent capital cost reduction had minimal effects on 
total renewable energy generation in all non-carbon-price policy scenarios. Tax 
incentives did not affect Utah’s dispatch behavior, but they did cause Arizona to deploy 
extra landfill instead of new fossil fuel generation. These results reveal that a 35 percent 
capital cost tax incentive is not enough to make most renewable resources cost-
competitive with conventional energy sources. With an incentive, landfill energy is able 
to compete with other new resources, but not existing resources. In the combined carbon 
price and portfolio scenarios, the tax incentive helps improve the cost-competitiveness of 
landfill, geothermal, and biomass resources.  
 Finally, the CCS policy had noteworthy results. No state in the WECC built 
NGCC-CCS technologies in any of the policy scenarios. Utah did not deploy a power 
plant with CCS technology; but this is not surprising, given that Utah had no need to add 
extra base load generation at any time during the study period. Arizona deployed IGCC-
CCS generation in the isolated state scenarios, beginning in 2030, after the state 
exhausted its IGCC with no CCS and scrubbed sub-critical pulverized coal power plant 
builds. Arizona did not deploy any IGCC-CCS in the regional coordination policies, 
although surrounding states did. This result is due to the timing of Arizona’s power plant 
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construction needs, and the lack of overlap between its needs and the availability of CCS 
technologies. In the high carbon price and regional coordination portfolio scenario, 100 
percent of Arizona’s new generation capacity was supplied by IGCC-CCS. These 
collective results reveal that, given current EIA cost and performance characteristics, 
IGCC-CCS technologies have the potential to be cost-competitive and more than carbon-
competitive with other coal generating units, but only in the presence of carbon 
restrictions. Scenario results indicate that IGCC-CCS will not realize this potential, 
however, until 2027 or beyond. 
 The final results of this analysis revealed that energy policy portfolios have 
carbon mitigation potential, and that larger, coordinated policy efforts have enhanced 
potential. Results also confirmed that a carbon price of $50/metric ton CO2e can generate 
substantial carbon savings. Although both policy options—energy policy or climate 
policy—are effective, neither is as effective alone as when the two strategies are 
combined. 
Returning to the discussion of carbon leakage, this analysis is by no means the 
first to document this phenomenon. Many studies have used this term to classify the 
migration of carbon-intensive firms or industries from regions of carbon regulation to 
those without regulation. In other words, as a result of a climate policy, emissions 
increase outside of the policy-enforcing region. Numerous examples of international 
emissions leakages associated with cap-and-trade policies have emerged in recent years. 
Rabe (2008) has identified the problem of carbon leakages in the U.S. as well, which 
accompany the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Rabe and Bushnell and his 
colleagues (Bushnell et al., 2007) extend the notion of carbon leakages, or “reshuffling” 
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as Bushnell et al. refer to it, to include the transfer of relatively inexpensive electricity 
from a regulated area to a non-regulated area. The consequences of this type of carbon 
leakage is that it increases the price of electricity—the incidence of which is more often 
than not passed along to the consumer—and costs the government financial resources that 
could be used for other public purposes, all for minor or potentially negligible savings of 
global greenhouse gas emissions. As Rabe (2008) explains, “the impact of significant 
leakage could be to neutralize any potential carbon reduction of RGGI and even create 
substantial sinks that could accentuate the attractiveness of electricity produced in 
nonregulated states and provinces.” In keeping with these observations, both the 
European Union and RGGI have recently raised this concern, and facilitated working 
groups to study the extent of the problem and ways in which it can be addressed (RGGI, 
2007; EU, 2009).  
The supporting literature to date has focused exclusively on the climate policy-
carbon leakage connection. The present study additionally identifies the connection 
between energy policies and carbon leakages. These findings are pertinent because U.S. 
climate change efforts are, to date, primarily state-run energy policy efforts, and the 
likelihood that leakage is already present is high. It is possible that states that appear to be 
U.S., and even global, leaders in climate change efforts may have a minimal, if not a 
negligible, effect on global greenhouse gas emissions.  
In the continued absence of national climate change legislation, the cost-
effectiveness of state decarbonization policies can be improved with efforts to coordinate 
energy and climate policy action across state borders, via either state partnership 
agreements or regional policy coordination. Assuming that the primary objective of a 
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climate action plan, or energy policy portfolio, is to reduce GHG emissions over the long 
run, individual states can also make concerted efforts to align the policy objectives, and 
therefore the policy design features, of the various policy instruments in their climate 
action plans. Several studies have also confirmed that policy instrument coordination can 
increase the effectiveness of energy and climate policy efforts (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; 
Gonzalez, 2007). Furthermore, individual states can add stipulations to their renewable 
energy and energy efficiency legislation that additionally regulates the amount or 
percentage of fossil fuel generation that can be produced and consumed in-state. Or, 
alternatively constructed, states can mandate that new RPS renewable energy capacity or 
DSM “negawatts” must be matched one-for-one across comparable load levels with 
carbon-intensive fossil fuel plant retirements.  
It is worth noting, however, that each energy policy instrument that is included in 
a state portfolio is designed to address a fundamentally different market failure than just 
GHG emissions. For instance, RPS policies address the market failures associated with 
renewable energy market penetration. It is important to note that energy policy 
instruments can have some effect on GHG mitigation—and they can be optimally 
designed and coordinated so as to maximize total GHG mitigation potential, as argued 
above—however, energy policy instruments are not the same thing as climate policy 
instruments; and each type of instrument is associated with a different set of objectives, 
market failures, and mechanisms for policy action. 
 This analysis raises issues regarding the potential effectiveness of a “progressive 
federalism” approach. It is not yet clear how much authority the national government will 
grant states to maintain their own energy and climate policies, in the event that national 
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climate change legislation is passed in coming years. The proposed Waxman-Markey 
bill, “H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,” provides some 
insights on the possibility of federal preemption. The bill mandates that all states must 
comply and cannot interfere with the federal cap-and-trade during the first five years of 
operation, 2012-2017. After 2017, the bill allows states to set their own cap limits, so 
long as the state caps are more stringent than the federal caps. The bill offers few 
additional details regarding the authority of state governments, which suggests that the 
bill will likely preserve states’ authority to enact and maintain state level energy policy 
portfolios. However, many of the major policies that are currently found in state climate 
action plans are proposed as national regulations in the Waxman-Markey bill. For 
instance, the bill proposes a national RPS as well as an efficiency portfolio standard. 
Therefore, if the bill is enacted as proposed, any state with energy policies that match or 
are less strict than the national policy will be forced to abandon previous state regulations 
and instead comply with national standards. 
 While some states, such as many in the Southeast, object on economic grounds to 
the national government setting energy policy regulations in addition to carbon 
regulations, this analysis finds evidence that a national policy portfolio could have a 
larger effect on global greenhouse gas emissions than state-led efforts. A combined 
federal cap-and-trade and national policy portfolio has the potential to produce the 
greatest carbon savings. 
 
Limitations 
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 There are a number of limitations to this type of modeling analysis. The first set 
of limitations is associated with the choice of model, and with modeling analyses more 
generally. The second set of limitations includes those that are due to the methodological 
approach of the present study. 
 
Modeling Limitations 
 AURORAxmp is a bottom-up electricity model and, similar to other bottom-up 
models, it tends to demonstrate overly optimistic technology diffusion behavior. This is 
because a model such as AURORAxmp neglects to account for non-standard economic 
conditions in its optimization equation, such as transition costs, market uncertainties, and 
market imperfections. As a counter-balance to this trend, however, AURORAxmp bases 
its optimization logic purely on a cost-minimization equation, and thereby neglects to 
consider that some market actors deploy new energy systems due to non-cost factors. For 
instance, homeowners may install solar photovoltaic panels on their roofs because they 
believe that it is worth spending extra money on electricity in order to have minimal 
impact on their environment.  
 Another counter-balance to the overactive diffusion behavior is AURORAxmp’s 
failure to retire coal power plants at a specified terminal year. AURORAxmp does retire 
some coal power plants, but only those plants that the electric industry has already 
publicly designated for retirement. The remainder of the coal power plants are already 
over 30 years old. Yet the only way that these plants will be retired is if they cannot 
compete with the real annualized net present value of alternative resources. If these plants 
are already paid off, the chances of retirement are small. By the end of the study period, 
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many of the WECC’s coal power plants are well over 60 years old, and some up to 80 
years of age. In reality, one should assume that a portion of these coal plants will need to 
be replaced between 2010 and 2030, which will increase electricity costs and potentially 
decrease GHG emissions. Considering the case of Utah, it is possible that Utah would 
make different construction and dispatch decisions if it had to replace a major coal power 
plant during the study period. Instead of constructing a new coal power plant, for 
instance, Utah may consider a biomass co-combustion plant. 
 Non-linear bottom-up models also fail to consider technological change. More 
advanced, non-linear models make energy resource costs endogenous, which provides 
more realistic projections of future circumstances. This omission likely affects renewable 
and alternative energy options the most, since these resources are still experiencing 
downward trends on their respective marginal cost curves. 
 Finally, AURORAxmp is an electricity dispatch model, not an integrated micro-
economic model such as NEMS or a macro-economic model such as the Applied 
Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy model (ADAGE).  Therefore, Aurora does not 
have the ability to find the lowest cost energy solutions across the entire economy; it is 
merely able to find the lowest cost electricity source given constraints on capacity, 
transmission and distribution capacities, and costs. 
 
Methodological Approach Limitations 
 This type of analysis is not rooted in causal inference. It is merely a modeling 
exercise based on electricity dispatch optimization logic. Model results are predictions 
based specifically on hypothetical scenarios, and dependent on variables that may be 
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inaccurate projections of future circumstances. Furthermore, some scenarios relied on 
simplified assumptions; for instance, I assumed that 100 percent of all new RPS 
renewable energy would come from wind power with no trading of renewable energy 
certificates (RECs). In reality, an RPS policy will encourage the deployment of a variety 
of different renewable energy resources, including resources that were not included in 
these scenario models, such as distributed renewable generation. The trading of RECs 
across a region will also facilitate a more cost-effective renewable energy deployment 
pattern. The inability to model these options in the present analysis has likely resulted in 
cost estimates that are too high. 
 In recognition of the inherent limitations of modeling analyses, however, I ran a 
series of sensitivity analyses on the baseline scenario, and modeled variations in policy 
portfolio strength and carbon price levels. Results across the model variations were fairly 
consistent, and demonstrated mild sensitivity to model parameters, such as primary 
resource costs. Variation in carbon price was found to be one of the most sensitive policy 
parameters. 
 It was necessary to make additional assumptions concerning the study sample. I 
selected the WECC region for this sample, and Utah and Arizona as representative states 
within this region. The intent was to generate descriptive results that have 
generalizability; that is, the Utah and Arizona results could indicate broader state 
experiences, the WECC results could suggest national level trends, and the combination 
could lend insights into the dynamics of electricity sector interactions among states and 
across regional boundaries. It is possible that Utah and Arizona are poor representations 
of the average state’s characteristics. What is more likely, however, is that there are a few 
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states that have extreme characteristics—for instance, Maine, which shares only one state 
border and generates 29 percent of its total electricity from hydroelectricity—and simply 
cannot be represented by any other state. This study does not presume that all states will 
respond to policy portfolios or carbon prices in exactly the same fashion as either Utah or 
Arizona. Nor does it presume that a national level coordinated policy portfolio will have 
the exact same effect as a regional coordination policy. Fortunately, these strong 
assumptions are unnecessary. Future analyses may choose to improve the generalizability 
of the present results via a modeling exercise that includes the entire population sample, 
all 50 U.S. states. Future studies could additionally seek to empirically identify which 
factors are associated with improved or reduced cost-effectiveness of carbon mitigation 
policy portfolios.  
 
Conclusions 
 This study sought to explore whether state policy portfolios are effective 
decarbonization strategies. The results of a scenario-based electric dispatch modeling 
exercise revealed the following descriptive trends: 
• Regional coordination policy portfolios demonstrate greater potential for 
decarbonization than do isolated state policy portfolios; 
• Some states benefit more from regional policy coordination than others, 
depending on the state’s demand growth, resource mix, and export-import 
strategy, among other unaccounted for factors; 
• Emissions leakage attenuates the effect of isolated state policy portfolios; 
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• A carbon price coupled with regionally or nationally coordinated policy portfolios 
is the most effective carbon mitigation option. 
  The need for further investigation of the effects of state level policy performance, 
and the federalist implications of state energy and climate policy leadership is immense. 
As our global society progresses with international climate change agreements, lessons 
from the U.S. states can provide valuable insights on the performance of energy 
portfolios, the occurrence of carbon leakage, and the interaction between climate policy 
and energy policy. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE ERA OF STATE ENERGY POLICY 
INNOVATION 
 
U.S. energy and climate change policy has evolved from the bottom up, led by 
state governments and internationally recognized for the use of unconventional and 
innovative policy instruments. After roughly a decade and a half of state leadership in 
energy and climate policy, what have we learned about the effects and effectiveness of 
state policy tools as they relate to the diversification, decentralization, and 
decarbonization of the U.S. electricity sector? What lessons can be extracted about the 
use of policies that have shaped the era of state energy policy innovation and what do 
these lessons suggest about the role of state energy policy in the U.S. electricity sector? 
This three-essay dissertation sought to address these questions and, in doing so, 
empirically evaluate some of the leading policy instruments that states have deployed 
throughout this era. I first evaluated the effects of RPS policies on states’ percentages and 
total amount of renewable electricity generation. In the second essay, I tested whether 
policies and regulations that aim to reduce barriers to distributed generation are effective 
at motivating utilities or utility customers to adopt and deploy distributed generation 
units. In the final essay, I explored the decarbonization effects, among other effects, of 
state level policy portfolios. These essays do not provide exhaustive answers to the 
questions that they seek to answer but they do collectively provide a detailed assessment 
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of various state level policy instrument effects. They provide some insights on which 
instruments function as intended and which do not, how well various instruments work 
together, and which policy design features may require further examination. 
Each of the three essays provides three contributions to the energy policy 
literature. First, each essay reveals that previously employed methods used to address 
related research questions suffer from statistical biases or methodological imprecision 
that affect the validity of empirical results. Second, each essay extends the current 
understanding of its respective topic in new directions: the diversification essay advances 
the RPS literature beyond a discussion of RPS-driven total renewable energy deployment, 
toward a more accurate consideration of RPS effects on the percentage of renewable 
energy; the decentralization essay moves the literature beyond a mere definitional 
consideration of DG, and provides a first attempt to identify the main drivers behind DG 
trends; and the decarbonization essay introduces the need for state level modeling 
analyses, and identifies the phenomena of carbon leakage as a result of state energy 
policies. Finally, each essay provides new conclusions and associated policy implications 
on the effects and effectiveness of state energy policy instruments. 
In this final, concluding chapter, I seek to synthesize the findings from these three 
essays and, in conjunction with findings from the literature, provide a summary of the 
current state of understanding of state energy policy instruments and their role within the 
era of state energy policy innovation. The narrative begins with a narrowly focused 
discussion on individual policy instruments, including the renewable portfolio standard, 
net metering policies, interconnection standards, and tax incentives.25 The discussion in 
                                                          
25
 States use a variety of other policy instruments as well, including demand side management and energy 
efficiency instruments, various types of subsidies, public benefit funds, and production incentives, among 
 158 
this section aims to balance a micro and a macro perspective on each of these 
instruments, without delving too deeply into the intricacies of each instruments’ design or 
assuming a one-thousand-foot aerial view. In order to keep this balance, the discussion 
focuses on general lessons about how these instruments work and whether they achieve 
the objectives for which they are intended, and identifies possible policy measures that 
may improve the efficacy of these instruments in operation. Next, I discuss the potential 
for complementary use of a variety of these instruments. I conclude with a discussion of 
broader trends that have emerged in the state energy policy innovation era, and suggest 
avenues of future research. Before proceeding, it is important to note that this conclusion 
is by no means a comprehensive review of all policy instruments and policy interactions 
that have shaped the era of state energy policy innovation. This conclusion, instead, 
draws heavily on the lessons learned in the present dissertation, with assistance from the 
supporting literature. 
 
Policy Instruments 
Renewable Portfolio Standard  
I begin with a discussion of renewable portfolio standards because they are one of 
the most popular state policy instruments, and they epitomize the complexity and 
innovativeness that is indicative of modern state energy policy instruments. Additionally, 
the lessons about the effects and effectiveness of RPS policies lend a great number of 
insights on the role of public policy in state electricity markets. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
others. The discussion in this conclusion chapter is focused narrowly on the policy instruments that were 
covered most thoroughly, if at all, in this dissertation. Future iterations of this paper will include a more 
extensive review of these remaining policy instruments. 
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The literature to date has documented a variety of RPS effects. Palmer and 
Burtraw (2005) and Kydes (2006) found that RPS policies effectively increase renewable 
energy generation and primarily offsets or displaces natural gas generation, for a net total 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. Kydes also found that a national 20 percent RPS 
mandate raises electricity prices by three percent. RPS effectiveness studies have 
established that some states are experiencing great success with their RPS mandates 
(Langniss and Wiser, 2003). Studies that consider the varied experiences of all states 
conclude that RPS policies are effective drivers of RE development and generation 
(Menz and Vachon, 2006; Bird et al., 2005) but that not all states are on the path toward 
meeting their RPS benchmarks (Wiser, 2004; Rabe, 2008). 
RPS policies may increase renewable energy generation, but they have been 
identified by some (Rabe, 2008; Bushnell et al., 2007) as being inefficient in the 
achievement of other outcomes, such as a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, a 
switch from conventional fossil fuels to less carbon-intensive fossil fuel generation 
sources, or a reduction in energy demand. These findings reveal that RPS policies may 
not be well suited to achieve multiple policy objectives simultaneously, such as the 
diversification, decentralization, and decarbonization of the electricity sector. Yet RPS 
policies are currently used by many states as a policy tool to achieve all three of these 
objectives.  
All three essays in this dissertation explored RPS policy effects and effectiveness. 
The first essay found that RPS policies effectively increase in-state renewable energy 
generation, but have yet to significantly increase in-state percentages of renewable energy 
electricity out of total state generation portfolios. These results confirmed others’ 
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findings: RPS policies are effective at encouraging RE development, but not all states are 
able to translate RPS mandates into renewable energy percentage growth. Reasons for 
these shortcomings include several possibilities: enforcement mechanisms and penalties 
for noncompliance are too weak; states are not making efforts to decrease or hold steady 
fossil fuel generation; or states are not making efforts to decrease or hold steady total 
demand for electric generation. Results reveal that states can improve RPS policies by 
strengthening enforcement mechanisms, or implementing RPS policies in conjunction 
with a carbon price or cap-and-trade policy, fossil fuel mandates, or efficiency standards.  
It is possible that the inability of RPS policies to increase the share of renewable 
energy is due to poorly structured design features. It is also possible, however, to 
interpret the results of the first essay as an indication that, although RPS policies are one 
of the main drivers of renewable energy generation and consequently electricity 
diversification, additional factors are needed to actually increase the share of renewable 
energy generation. Some of the most significant factors in this development involve 
political capacity and support of energy and environmental policy efforts. Legislative 
support for environmental policies and bureaucratic capacity in natural resource 
management both assist in the growth of the percentage of renewable energy. 
Additionally, strong coal and petroleum interests diminish the pace of renewable energy 
development.  
The second essay found that RPS policies have mixed effects on distributed 
generation adoption and deployment. The first finding in this essay was that individuals 
in states with an RPS policy are more likely to adopt distributed generation than 
individuals in states without an RPS policy, all things equal. The second finding was that, 
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out of all utilities with some distributed generation, those in states with RPS policies 
deploy less distributed generation than those in states without RPS policies. The latter 
finding reveals that small-scale energy systems may compete with large-scale renewable 
energy facilities for utility attention and resources. When a utility is mandated to meet 
renewable energy benchmarks, it will likely prioritize large-scale renewable energy 
development over distributed generation development.  
The third essay confirmed Palmer and Burtraw’s (2005) and Kydes’ (2006) 
findings that RPS policies increase total renewable energy, decrease carbon dioxide 
emissions, and increase the retail price of electricity. This essay also found, however, that 
an increase in renewable energy generation does not necessarily translate into a 
significant decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. I found evidence that, when 
surrounding states do not have RPS regulations, a state with an RPS may continue to 
generate its excess, more carbon-intensive fossil fuel power and sell it to neighboring 
states. In one scenario, the state of Utah actually ramped up its coal generation despite its 
RPS policy in order to export the excess power to its neighboring, non-regulated states. 
RPS benchmarks are not designed to perfectly match demand projections. That is, states 
do not calculate the amount of additional capacity they will need by a certain year, and 
then mandate that all of that capacity be met by renewable energy. As a result, renewable 
sources of energy do not simply replace any new capacity that would otherwise have to 
be built. Nor does it reduce demand for energy. Instead, new renewable energy capacity 
is intended to replace a portion of fossil fuel capacity that already exists. But are states 
actually replacing this capacity? Results indicate that, so long as surrounding states do 
not have similar regulations, retirement of older, less efficient, and more carbon-intensive 
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power plants may not occur. As Bushnell and his colleagues (2007) explain, “although 
the regulator can force its local firms to buy ‘clean’ products, it can’t keep firms in other 
states from buying the ‘dirty’ products that the firms in the regulated states used to buy.” 
These findings reaffirm those made by Rabe (2008), which is that RPS policies may 
effectively increase total renewable energy generation but are inefficient policy tools for 
decarbonization objectives.  
An RPS is an appealing state policy instrument for a number of reasons. Of 
notable importance, RPS policies demonstrate great political feasibility (Rabe, 2008): 
they come with no explicit price tag26; the benchmarks start off mild and ramp up over 
the course of one or two decades; they aim to incentivize renewable energy, not tax the 
use of fossil fuels; and they are a popular “symbol” (Bushnell et al., 2007) to indicate a 
concern about business as usual energy and climate trends. RPS policies are often 
presented as a cost-effective option to help the renewable energy industry grow and help 
individual technologies become cost-competitive with conventional sources of fossil fuel 
energy. The essays contained in this dissertation, as well as other studies reviewed above, 
however, reveal that RPS policies also have several disadvantages. First, having an RPS 
policy is not enough to significantly increase the percentage of renewable energy 
generation across states, at least given current RPS designs. Second, an RPS policy that is 
designed to increase the share of renewable energy generation will have limited ability to 
achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. Third, and closely related to the last point, 
RPS policies, as implemented on the state level, are also unable to prevent carbon leakage 
across state borders. 
                                                          
26
 This is not to say that RPS policies do not incur costs. The actual costs of an RPS are borne by electric 
utilities, and eventually passed down to consumers. The costs are not, however, the most obvious design 
feature of an RPS, as they are, for instance, with a carbon tax. 
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In light of these findings, how could one improve the functionality and efficacy of 
an RPS policy? Given that an RPS is designed, by its very nature, to increase renewable 
energy, as well as the percentage of renewable energy out of the total generation mix, it is 
most constructive to first consider how to improve an RPS policy’s ability to affect 
renewable energy deployment. As the first essay suggests, and as is reaffirmed by Wiser 
and his colleagues (2004; 2007), possible strategies for improvement include a redesign 
of the following design features: enforcement mechanisms; the degree of flexibility and 
number of exemptions granted to utilities; and the ambitiousness of RPS benchmarks.  
In the event that a state, or the national government, decides to pursue multiple 
electricity market objectives simultaneously, one may secondarily consider how to 
construct “carve-out” provisions in RPS policy design that further incentivize or, more 
accurately, mandate additional types of resources, such as certain distributed generation 
units, energy efficiency, or less carbon-intensive fossil fuels.27 Indeed, many states have 
done this, including Pennsylvania, which includes waste coal, coal mine methane, and 
coal gasification in its list of eligible RPS renewable energy sources. Some states have 
altered their RPS legislation after a couple of years with carve-out provisions, which 
allows for greater flexibility and an enhanced scope of RPS objectives. However, the 
more carve-out provisions made to specifically isolate and incentivize other technologies 
(e.g., poultry waste in North Carolina) or pursue other objectives entirely (e.g., energy 
efficiency provisions for the sake of decarbonization), the more expensive and less cost-
effective—and potentially inefficient—this policy option becomes (Rabe, 2008). 
Therefore, instead of asking how one can improve the functionality and efficacy of an 
                                                          
27
 States may also consider carve-out provisions as a means to help them comply with RPS benchmarks in 
the event that they are not as well endowed with renewable energy resource potential. 
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RPS policy to serve multiple objectives, perhaps one should ask whether there are more 
efficient policy tools that can compliment an RPS policy, but specifically target a 
different objective(s), such as decentralization or decarbonization. In this line of 
reasoning, chapter 4 demonstrates that RPS policies are more effective when 
implemented in conjunction with a carbon price and other supporting instruments. 
It is highly probable that, even despite the use of multiple policy instruments, 
each of which is focused on a different market failure, RPS policies will continue to 
encourage emission leakages across state or regional borders. The cause of leakage is 
attributable to the scale on which the policy instruments are applied (Bushnell et al., 
2007). Electricity transactions—or “power flows”—are not limited to state borders, nor 
are the effects of greenhouse gas emissions. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that 
policy instruments that are implemented on the state scale but inconsistent across state 
borders, no matter how innovative or flexible the instruments, cannot control the leakage 
of electricity or emissions across state lines. Until states adopt consistent and coordinated 
regulations, or the national government adopts a federal RPS, state level free-riding will 
likely continue. A national RPS policy, however, could have the combined benefits of 
correcting the market distortions associated with carbon leakage and state free-riding, and 
create uniformity and, in turn, predictability in renewable energy markets across the 
entire country (Cooper, 2008).28 
 
Net metering and Interconnection Standards 
                                                          
28
 While some advocate for a national RPS policy on the grounds just defined, others object to the adoption 
of a single and uniformly applied RPS. These critics emphasize that natural resource endowments are not 
consistent across regions. A national RPS may, therefore, result in a net transfer of fiscal resources from the 
Eastern to the Western hemisphere (Casten, 2009) or, more specifically, from the Southeast and parts of the 
Northwest to the Midwest, West, and Southwest. 
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The second essay in this dissertation, chapter 3, considered the role of net 
metering and interconnection standards in motivating the decision to adopt and deploy 
distributed generation. The empirical results demonstrated that net metering standards 
reduce the technical barriers to DG deployment and make DG adoption on the customer 
side of the meter more likely. Interconnection standards were also found to be a primary 
motivating factor behind customer DG adoption. These results demonstrate that 
integrated and consistent protocols for electricity interconnection—including connecting 
equipment, standard tariff payment schemes, and power quality characteristics—reduce 
costs and bureaucratic hassles associated with customer DG hook-ups.29 
The second essay also found that customers that are interconnected to the electric 
grid via net metering use a greater proportion of renewable energy-based DG than do 
utilities. Slightly less than half of the customer owners used renewable DG, whereas less 
than 25 percent of utility owners used renewable DG. These findings indicate that, 
although both utilities and their customers are involved in the movement toward more 
decentralized electricity, customer owners play a more prominent role in renewable DG 
development.  
It is clear that state level net metering and interconnection standards are effective 
decentralization policy instruments. Are these DG policy instruments also able to serve 
diversification and decarbonization objectives? Both standards effectively help shift the 
                                                          
29
 Net metering and interconnection standards have grown in popularity over the past five years. During the 
year in which the second essay drew its data, 2005, 39 states had net metering standards and 28 states had 
interconnection standards. As of January, 2010, all but five states have state-mandated net metering 
policies, and one of the remaining five has a utility-selected net metering program (North Carolina Solar 
Center, 2010); 40 states have interconnection standards. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has 
also adopted interconnection standards for DG units that connect at the transmission level. State standards 
regulate the interconnection of DG units with the distribution level and the FERC regulates the 
transmission level. 
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balance of resources—albeit slight in magnitude—toward more decentralized and less 
centralized sources. Thus, DG policy instruments do perpetuate a diversity of energy 
technologies and resources. However, when a utility is faced with both an RPS and DG 
standards, the RPS mandate has the potential to “trump” the DG instruments and reduce 
their effects on distributed generation adoption. In this case, RPS policies are the main 
drivers of diversification, and net metering and interconnection standards play a less 
prominent role in the diversification of the electricity sector. In consideration of the DG 
instruments’ decarbonization potential, it is important to bear in mind which types of fuel 
DG systems tend to use— distillate oil, natural gas, and various renewable fuels. All of 
these sources are less carbon-intensive than coal, which is the primary source of 
electricity in the United States. If DG policy instruments motivate the adoption of DG 
units, and these systems replace power that would otherwise be generated from more 
carbon-intensive sources, than one could classify DG instruments as achieving 
decarbonization objectives. If, on the other hand, net metering and interconnection 
standards increase customer-owned DG in one location, a neighborhood for instance, 
only to result in excess generation that is shifted (or “leaked”) elsewhere, then DG 
instruments are not entirely effective at decarbonization. The essays included in this 
dissertation, however, do not provide enough information to draw any definitive 
conclusions about these dynamics. 
 
Tax Incentives 
This dissertation gave some attention to tax incentives but ultimately provided 
limited insights about the effects or effectiveness of this type of policy instrument. Before 
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discussing these findings, therefore, it is helpful to consider what the literature has 
already established regarding the use of energy policy tax instruments, and how well they 
compliment other tools. 
The political appeal to using tax instruments, as well as other types of financial 
incentives, is that they directly reduce the cost of alternative technologies (i.e. provide a 
“carrot”), but do not explicitly raise the cost of conventional technologies (i.e. use a 
“stick”). Tax incentives help the consumer, either an individual or a company, overcome 
the potential economic barriers associated with large start-up costs. Tax incentives also 
allow governments to set limits on exactly how much is spent on renewable energy 
policy. Financial incentives provide a number of additional benefits, including the 
following: they provide a price signal to the consumer or company, which has the 
potential to alter behavior even in the absence of regulations; they allow consumers or 
companies to make their own decisions based on personalized cost-benefit 
considerations; and they obviate the need for governmental regulatory decisions, as well 
as possible compliance and enforcement costs associated with such regulations 
(Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). 
 Despite the many advantages to using tax instruments, there are also a number of 
disadvantages. First, by adjusting the cost of alternative technologies but not 
conventional technologies, tax incentives do little to discourage the use of carbon-
intensive generation or, alternatively, encourage conservation. In fact, on some occasions, 
financial incentives actually encourage an increase in energy consumption (Newell, 
2007). Second, although the amount spent on the incentives can be pre-established, the 
actual amount of alternative energy that is developed as a result of the incentives cannot 
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be guaranteed. Third, tax incentives may affect the behavior of those who pay taxes, but 
will have no effect on entities that do not pay taxes. Fourth, the use of tax incentives 
often requires policymakers to choose favorites among a variety of alternative 
technologies. As a result, policymakers may devote money to technologies that have little 
commercial promise or are not in need of additional support. Funding may also continue 
for too long after a technology becomes commercially mature. Finally, the duration and 
amount of tax incentives may be unpredictable over time. 
In effort to mitigate the last two of these potential problems, policymakers should 
consider designing tax incentives that are transparent, predictable, and scale back over 
time as a technology matures (Geller, 2002).30 It is difficult, however, to construct tax 
incentives so that they are able to overcome the first two problems—a lack of 
encouragement to conserve energy and the inability to set renewable energy development 
levels. These issues are best addressed via the use of other policy tools that can 
compliment tax instruments, yet make up for their inherent shortcomings (Gunningham 
and Grabosky, 1998). 
The energy policy literature contains few analyses that explore the effects or 
effectiveness beyond this general understanding of the pros and cons of state tax 
incentives.31 In fact, state tax incentives appear to be the least researched, and particularly 
the least empirically researched, policy instrument of all state policy instruments, save 
                                                          
30
 Some also advocate for the use of production incentives in lieu of tax incentives, because production 
incentives provide financial compensation for the actual amount of generation output, as opposed to just the 
upfront costs. Production incentives, in other words, ensure that consumers chose alternative technologies 
that are promising enough to actually produce electricity (Gouchoe et al., 2002).  
31
 The literature on tax incentives for energy efficiency is a bit more extensive but not reviewed in this 
document.  
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perhaps the public benefit fund.32 Tax incentives are likely under-researched due to the 
immense variation in their design across location, which makes empirical evaluations of 
their effects difficult. Additionally, tax incentives are often implemented in conjunction 
with other instruments, which makes it difficult to tease out the effects of one instrument 
from the effects of the other in empirical evaluations.  
Despite the general lack of studies on the topic, a number of recent analyses have 
presented informative insights on the performance of tax incentives. The predominant 
finding within this body of research is that tax incentives play mostly an assisting role to 
other energy policy instruments, but are not the primary drivers of alternative energy 
development (Bird et al., 2005; Gouchoe et al., 2002; Lewis and Wiser, 2007).  
The second major finding is that tax incentives are effective at encouraging small-
scale renewable energy development. Although, relating back to the first point, they are 
still one of several factors that affect renewable energy development and not necessarily 
the primary driver. A couple of studies have also pointed out that tax incentives are well 
suited for smaller-scale energy systems and more efficient when used at the sub-national 
level (Gouchoe et al., 2002; Bushnell et al., 2007). Tax incentive design features 
generally limit the system size and costs of eligible technologies, which often prevents 
tax incentives from being used for larger-scale renewable energy development (Gouchoe 
et al., 2002). 
Third, several studies have documented the incidence of free-riding as it relates to 
tax incentives. Free-riders are those that would have purchased the alternative 
                                                          
32
 This statement is based on my informal assessment of the related literature and is not backed up by 
sources or quantitative estimates. 
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technologies regardless of the incentive; and the incentive merely serves as a bonus, or a 
“seal the deal” factor (Gouchoe et al., 2002; Geller, 2002; Newell, 2007). 
Lastly, one study reveals that tax instruments, as well as other types of financial 
instruments, also have the potential to cause—or at least contribute to—leakage problems 
(Bushnell et al., 2007). Tax incentives reduce the costs of renewable technologies, which, 
in turn, increases the demand for renewable energy and decreases the demand for fossil 
fuel generation. These trends eventually cause the price of fossil fuel generation to 
decrease, which causes the demand for the excess energy to increase elsewhere. 
Neighboring regions will then purchase this excess fossil fuel generation; and the carbon-
intensive electricity will leak across borders from the region with the incentive to the 
region without. Although, as Bushnell and his colleagues (2007) point out, financial 
incentives are less susceptible to leakage than other instruments, such as an RPS or cap-
and-trade policy, because the price impacts of financial incentives are relatively small 
compared to these alternative instruments. In fact, these authors believe that tax 
incentives are the most efficient state or local policy tool if the policy objective is 
decarbonization, since other instruments have greater price impacts and, therefore, 
greater potential for leakage. 
The first essay in this dissertation, chapter 2, found that tax incentives are not 
significant drivers of renewable energy. In light of others’ theories regarding the effects 
of energy tax instruments, possible explanations for these findings may include one or 
several of the following: 
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• Tax incentives are used more often for small-scale and less often for large-scale 
renewable energy systems. In the presence of an RPS, utilities are more inclined 
to deploy large-scale systems. 
• Tax incentives are susceptible to free-ridership, in which consumers develop 
renewable energy regardless of the incentive, yet still collect the financial outlay.  
• The tax incentive variable in the first essay is poorly constructed. Given that there 
is variation in the design of tax incentives across states, it is likely that the tax 
incentive scale variable that I used was unable to capture the actual effects of 
various tax incentive designs. This limitation highlights the difficulty of capturing 
tax incentive variation in a single model, and provides some insights on why state 
level energy tax incentives are under-explored in the empirical literature. 
The third essay found that tax incentives, as one instrument in a larger state policy 
portfolio, play a supporting but weak role in achieving decarbonization objectives. A tax 
incentive of 35 percent reduced capital costs, in absence of any climate policy, only 
rendered landfill technologies cost-competitive in the assessed regions. Landfill energy is 
not carbon-neutral, nor is it one of the “cleanest” of all alternative energy technologies. In 
combination with a carbon price, the same tax incentive leads to a significant increase in 
landfill, geothermal, and biomass deployment. Thus, one can conclude, tax incentives 
have a greater effect when used in combination with a regional or national climate policy. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that these findings are contingent on a number 
of modeling assumptions, as reviewed in the third essay. 
The third essay also found evidence of carbon leakage that results from 
inconsistency of energy regulations across states. It is impossible to tease out information 
 172 
on which instruments contribute more or less to leakage. Yet, insofar as the tax incentives 
modeled in this analysis contributed to the deployment of new renewable energy, the 
literature provides evidence that the tax incentives may also contribute to leakage but not 
be the major instigator.  
In summary, a tax incentive is a policy instrument that has potential to achieve 
multiple policy objectives. When adequately designed and paired with other policy 
instruments, tax incentives have the ability to perpetuate the diversification, 
decentralization, and decarbonization of the electricity sector. Tax incentives play a 
smaller role, however, in achieving each of these objectives than do other policy 
instruments; and as a result tax incentives often play supporting policy roles. Tax 
incentives have a smaller price impact than other instruments and, due to their relatively 
small contribution to carbon leakage, are believed by some to be one of the most effective 
decarbonization tools for state or local energy policy.  
 
 
Complementary and conflicting policy efforts 
Thus far, this conclusion has analyzed how individual policy instruments work, 
and attempted to identify trends, both planned and not planned, associated with each 
instruments’ use. In the process, I have also reviewed how well various instruments work 
together, with a particular concern for issues involving federalism and the scale of 
governmental operations. I do not attempt to identify a single instrument that is the most 
cost-effective; but, instead, the various findings collectively demonstrate that different 
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instruments serve different purposes or, alternatively phrased, address different market 
failures. 
Because different policy instruments serve different purposes, one cannot 
conclude that more instruments automatically equate to greater policy effectiveness. In 
some situations, instruments that hold the same objective can be paired together to 
enhance the effectiveness of a policy strategy that seeks to achieve a single objective. For 
instance, renewable energy tax incentives and renewable portfolio standards, both of 
which aim to increase diversification via renewable energy development, can be 
combined to produce a potentially greater effect on renewable energy markets than if 
either worked in isolation. This strategy is endorsed by Gunningham and Grabosky 
(1998), who refer to the use of multiple instruments for the sake of one objective as 
“killing one bird with two stones”. Combining two different instruments that are each 
designed to address a different market failure, however, does not ensure that either 
market failure will be mitigated with greater effectiveness. For instance, the combination 
of a renewable portfolio standard and a net metering policy will not necessarily be a more 
effective decentralization strategy than if the net metering policy was implemented in 
isolation. As another example, some authors (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; Gonzalez, 2007) 
contend that combining a carbon cap-and-trade with an RPS will raise the cost of carbon 
mitigation efforts but will not necessarily increase carbon savings beyond the cap. These 
types of instrument combinations have the potential to increase the cost of policy 
interventions without increasing the effectiveness. Instrument combinations of this 
variety are only “acceptable” so long as one policy instrument increases the efficiency of 
the other instrument, or provides other valuable outcomes (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). 
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In the event that a state has more than one policy objective (e.g. decentralization 
and decarbonization), it may want to consider more than one instrument, each of which 
targets a different market failure (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Sorrell and Sijm, 
2003; Gonzalez, 2007; Goulder and Parry, 2008). The challenge with this approach is that 
it requires an optimal alignment of policy instruments so that they work well together and 
are complimentary, without compromising the effectiveness or efficiency of any specific 
instrument (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; Gonzalez, 2007). The potential for various 
instruments to work together is strong, as discussed in the section above, although an 
optimal policy portfolio will necessitate that much effort is put into aligning policy 
objectives and the policy design features of various instruments. Policymakers’ must 
remain explicit about which public policy objectives they seek to attain, and which trade-
offs are made among various instrument options (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). Some 
researchers also suggest that, when combining multiple instruments, policymakers ought 
to keep the design of each instrument simple because too much complexity can degrade 
the synergy between instrument combinations (Gonzalez, 2007).  
 
 
Trends in the Era of State Energy Policy Innovation 
The study of the effects of state energy policy instruments lends a number of 
insights into broader trends associated with the state energy policy innovation era. This 
section highlights a number of trends that were identified in previous chapters, but is not 
meant to be an exhaustive review of all associated trends. This section synthesizes the 
lessons learned across the previous chapters, identifies limitations of the present analysis, 
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and suggests avenues of future research. Each trend or lesson learned is identified as a 
separate “note”, of which there are nine in total. The notes begin with findings that are 
specific to policy instruments, then turn to findings that relate to other factors that play 
supporting roles in state energy policy, and finally considers broader trends that mark the 
era of state energy policy innovation. 
 
Note 1: Each state has its own combination of different policy instruments. 
Each state has selected among a wide variety of different policy instruments, and 
crafted unique combinations to suit its own needs and objectives. No two state policy 
portfolios are the same, either in the types of instruments or the design of instruments. 
The energy policy literature offers no insights on which factors lead states to 
adopt different policy combinations, nor does it offer statistical analysis of which types of 
policy combinations are more prevalent. Future research in this realm could provide 
valuable information for states that are considering various energy policy options, states 
that seek to revise previously enacted policies, or the national government as it considers 
the possibility of a national energy and climate change bill. 
 
Note 2: Some instruments are more effective at achieving their objectives than others. 
Net metering and interconnection standards, both of which aim to reduce the 
barriers to distributed generation market growth and consumer adoption, are successful in 
both pursuits, but particularly the latter. Policy instruments that aim to increase renewable 
energy generation demonstrate mixed results. The renewable portfolio standard is able to 
increase total renewable energy generation, but is less successful at increasing the 
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percentage of renewable energy generation out of all generation sources. Tax incentives 
contribute to renewable energy growth but are not the major drivers. Policy portfolios 
that aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions demonstrate moderate to significant success, 
dependent on a variety of state level electricity sector factors as well as other 
unaccounted for factors. State level policy portfolios are not, however, the most effective 
decarbonization strategy. Regional or national policy coordination is more effective than 
isolated state policy efforts; and policy coordination in conjunction with a carbon price is 
more effective than either alternative. 
This dissertation took a detailed look at how several  policy instruments operate, 
both individually and collectively, but omitted a number of additional important 
instruments. It is worth noting that this dissertation was focused heavily on the supply 
side and devoted minimal attention to demand-side operations. Future efforts to 
synthesize the trends and lessons learned from the era of state energy policy innovation 
should incorporate insights on the effects of various demand-side instruments, such as 
public benefit funds, energy efficiency standards, building codes, energy efficiency 
portfolio standards, and a variety of other instruments. 
 
Note 3: The selection of policy objectives requires trade-offs 
If state policymakers have multiple policy objectives, the discussion above 
established that they may want to consider the use of multiple policy instruments. This 
analysis has also found that various state policy objectives have the potential to work 
together in concert. But there is some evidence that simultaneous pursuit of multiple 
objectives is challenging and may require making trade-offs. There are two types of 
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trade-offs in this context: 1) trade-offs involving government resources;33 and 2) trade-
offs involving the resources of the governed. Regarding the former, governments are 
constrained by budgets, administrative abilities, and political feasibility, all of which 
require that policymakers carefully weigh the costs and benefits of policy efforts, and 
compare potential outcomes across a variety of efforts. Regarding the latter, 
policymakers will need to be mindful of the resource constraints—fiscal, environmental, 
and other constraints—of the individuals and companies that are governed by these 
policies. These constraints may require that trade-offs be made between different 
resource options. For instance, at the intersection of diversification and decentralization 
objectives, trade-offs may be necessary between large-scale renewable energy and small-
scale distributed generation. At the intersection of decentralization and decarbonization, 
fossil-fuel-based distributed generation and renewable-energy-based distributed 
generation may stand at odds. At the intersection of diversification and decarbonization, 
trade-offs may be necessary between advanced, efficient fossil fuels and renewable 
energy, or demand-side management and renewable energy. Significant efforts are 
necessary to coordinate policy objectives and, therefore, the design of instruments used to 
achieve these objectives, so that individuals and companies can respond to multiple 
incentives and regulations in the most cost-effective and efficient manner possible. 
This dissertation focused exclusively on diversification, decentralization, and 
decarbonization policy objectives. It is possible that I have neglected other significant 
policy objectives, and the inclusion of which could change, or at least improve, the 
discussion of policy instrument effects and the trade-offs that may emerge among 
                                                          
33
 Note that there is a third trade-off as well— trade-offs among different decision criteria. For instance, 
one policy instrument may be the most efficient instrument, but another the most equitable. Policymakers 
must make trade-offs among a variety of criteria during the selection of policy instruments or efforts. 
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objectives. For instance, as documented elsewhere (Rabe, 2008), it may be the case that a 
primary objective for some state policymakers is economic development and job growth. 
These states may adopt various energy policies, such as an RPS or tax incentives, in 
efforts to increase manufacturing activities, employment, and competitive advantage in a 
renewable energy industry. The possibility that I have omitted this policy objective raises 
several questions about the ultimate intent of state policymakers. Do policymakers seek 
to increase jobs via the diversification of the electricity sector, or is it to diversify the 
sector with the help of economic development efforts? Or is an economic development 
objective being used to improve the political feasibility of energy legislation? This 
possible omission also raises questions about the conclusions drawn in this dissertation: if 
the ultimate intent of policymakers is to increase jobs, not electricity diversification or 
decarbonization, are some policy instruments more or less successful at achieving this 
objective? I raise these questions to highlight the possibility that there may be additional 
objectives that guide state energy policy efforts, the evaluation of which may lend greater 
insights into the effects and effectiveness of energy policy instruments or the trade-offs 
that are necessary between conflicting or complimentary policy instruments. 
 
Note 4: Energy policies affect different market actors differently 
In chapter 3, I found that net metering and interconnection standards are 
associated with a significant increase in the likelihood that a consumer (i.e., an individual 
or company that buys its power from a utility) will adopt a distributed generation system. 
I did not find that these same policies are significantly associated with utility DG 
adoption; instead, economic factors—including the price of electricity, status of 
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electricity sector regulation, and average household income—appear to be the main 
drivers of utility DG adoption. These findings highlight the fact that energy policies 
affect different market actors differently. 
The other two essays in this dissertation, chapter 2 and chapter 4, used state level 
aggregated data. Therefore, these essays did not have the resolution to measure the 
differences in response to policies among different utilities or other market actors. As a 
result, this dissertation cannot address how different utilities and renewable energy 
developers may respond to an RPS policy, or how these same market actors may respond 
to a policy portfolio. Future studies that focus on these trends will make great 
contributions to the literature. 
 
Note 5: Location matters…but how much? 
Clearly, locational considerations play a factor in a state’s adoption of a new 
energy policy. Locational considerations also set constraints on how much new energy 
supply a state can pursue, since energy resource potential varies by location; and some 
states are better endowed with wind, solar, geothermal, or biomass resources than others. 
Yet states are not evenly divided by location or resource potential in either their policy 
efforts or their renewable energy outcomes. In chapter 2, I found that both RPS adoption 
rates and renewable energy development is the greatest in states with average wind 
energy potential. States with the greatest wind energy potential lag behind the first group, 
in both RPS adoption rates and renewable energy generation. The last category of states, 
those with the lowest wind energy potential, also have the lowest RPS adoption rates and 
the least renewable energy generation. These findings demonstrate that there is currently 
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a mismatch between resource endowment and policy action, and resource endowment 
and renewable energy development.  
In the event that national energy policy legislation is passed, and that it contains a 
national RPS or some other renewable energy requirement, location and resource 
endowment will invariably become more important for two reasons. First, those states in 
regions with poorer energy resource endowments may struggle to meet national 
standards, and will potentially have to export significant sums of money to other states 
for renewable energy credits. Second, the same states that will be most compromised by 
national renewable energy legislation are those that have lagged behind other states in 
energy policy legislation and renewable energy development, respectively, over the past 
decade and a half. The failure to jumpstart renewable energy development, attract 
innovative energy businesses or industrial activity, or develop the political capacity to 
address energy and climate change issues throughout the era of state energy innovation 
policy will potentially put these states at a double-disadvantage, and force them to play a 
potentially expensive game of catch-up. 
 
Note 6: Status of market regulation matters 
The interaction between efforts to deregulate or restructure electricity markets and 
diversification, decentralization, or decarbonization policy interventions is not clearly 
established in the supporting literature. The empirical analyses presented in chapters 2 
and 3 both controlled for states’ electricity market deregulation status. The parameters 
estimates on the deregulation variable in both analyses provided noteworthy findings. In 
the diversification essay, results revealed that, all else constant, deregulation is associated 
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with an increase in total renewable energy development, but not an increase in the share 
of renewable energy. In the decentralization essay, I found that deregulation is positively 
and significantly associated with utility DG adoption, but not consumer adoption, holding 
all else constant. These findings suggest that deregulation increases competition in the 
industry and encourages power producers to adopt new and innovative sources of 
electricity as a response to consumer demand for more diverse and alternative fuel 
sources. I also found that, although deregulation encourages utility DG adoption, it is not 
associated with a greater magnitude of DG deployment. Combining the results of both 
essays, I conclude that the deregulation of a state electricity market does encourage 
utilities to adopt non-conventional fuel sources and to make some substitutions among 
fuel types, as is argued by Delmas and her colleagues (2006) and supported by Dahl and 
Ko (1998) in an analysis that explores natural gas market deregulation. Deregulation is 
not, however, a significant enough factor to substantially alter the balance of states’ 
generation assets. One possible explanation for this finding is that deregulation does not 
discourage the continued use of coal generation from amortized power plants (Dahl and 
Ko, 1998; Hyman, 2006); a transition away from a heavy reliance on coal generation, 
therefore, will require more policy intervention than deregulation of a state’s electricity 
market (Hyman, 2006).  
As indicated in both essays, these results are still preliminary and an interpretation 
of the parameter estimates is still largely speculative. The literature could benefit from 
future studies that empirically evaluate the relationship between regulation status and 
other policy interventions, and between combined policy efforts and electricity market 
outcomes. 
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Note 7: Energy policies are not climate policies 
Current state public policy efforts employ energy policies for climate policy 
objectives (i.e. in attempt to abate greenhouse gas emissions). Yet, results from the 
previous chapters reaffirm findings made by others (Rabe, 2008; Fisher and Newell, 
2007; Bushnell at al., 2007; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; Gonzalez, 2007; Palmer and Burtraw, 
2005; Goulder and Perry, 2008), that renewable energy policies are not the most cost-
effective policy tool for climate policy objectives. As Rabe (2008) explains, “there 
appears to be a nearly inverse relationship between those policies that policy analysts 
tend to endorse as holding the greatest promise to reduce emissions in a cost-effective 
manner and the political feasibility of respective policy options.” Although renewable 
energy or distributed generation policies provide a number of societal benefits, the most 
cost-effective carbon mitigation policy is one that explicitly prices the use of carbon-
intensive generation. A price on carbon emissions causes utilities to seek alternative, less 
carbon-intensive fuel options and causes consumers to reduce their electricity use. Thus, 
energy policies are less cost-effective because they do not directly address the market 
failures associated with climate change, but also because the manner in which they are 
currently used is fraught with inefficiencies associated with carbon leakage. 
 
Note 8: Policy coordination across states improves the effectiveness of public policy 
efforts 
Many studies have established the importance of jurisdictional size as it relates to 
the effectiveness and efficiency of energy policy instruments (Bushnell et al., 2007; 
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Gonzalez, 2007; Goulder and Parry, 2008; Rabe, 2008). Each of these studies raises 
concern about the potential problems associated with policies that are not consistent 
across regulating jurisdictions.  
For the sake of illustration, let us consider two contiguous states, state1 and state2. 
I will also assume that state1 can save X in carbon emissions from its policy agenda (or 
portfolio) and state2 can save Y. If both states pursue their research agendas, then one 
should expect total carbon savings of X + Y. Some argue that inconsistency in policy 
efforts across jurisdictions, even if all participating states seek the same objective, makes 
it difficult to align policy features so as to achieve a desired outcome in the most efficient 
manner (Gonzalez, 2007). If this statement is true, we should expect total carbon savings 
to equal X + Y – A, where A is the lost carbon savings that results from inconsistent policy 
efforts across state1 and state2. When one jurisdiction supports an energy policy agenda 
and a neighboring jurisdiction does not, one would expect that total carbon savings will 
be less than the potential savings if the two states were to each have their own policy 
agenda. If state1 is the state with the policy agenda and state2 is the state without, one 
should expect total carbon savings to be X. As chapter 4 provides evidence, however, the 
total carbon savings that results from state1 acting in isolation is actually less than X; 
instead, one should expect total savings to be X – B, where B is the lost carbon savings 
due to carbon leakage across state borders. Assuming that all policy instruments are 
optimally designed, it is likely that the carbon savings from the case of two policy 
agendas but with inefficiencies due to inconsistency is greater than the case of the one 
policy agenda with carbon leakage, or Y – A > -B.34  
                                                          
34
 I do not, however, have empirical evidence to back up this claim. 
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One could also identify additional benefits that accrue when two or more states, or 
an entire region, coordinate policy efforts. Although the literature has yet to devote much 
attention to this subject and this discussion remains fairly speculative, possible benefits 
include: greater economic development possibilities from regional competitive advantage 
strategies; enhanced opportunities to participate in cap-and-trade markets; or improved 
policy design features of individual states as a result of either peer-pressure or policy 
diffusion. If additional carbon saving benefits, C, accompany policy coordination, total 
carbon savings associated with the coordination between state1 and state2 is X + Y + C, 
which is the best possible outcome of all reviewed above.35 
These conclusions are recognized by many state policymakers, as evidenced by 
recent efforts to coordinate cap-and-trade markets, as well as and renewable energy credit 
markets, across regional lines.  
 
Note 9: The federalist implications of state leadership in energy policy requires further 
examination 
States are regarded in the federalism literature as “laboratories of democracy.” 
States can develop policies that are smaller in scale, and better tailored to local conditions 
and needs. This process may involve experimentation, borrowing lessons from other 
states, and, perhaps eventually, the identification of policy “winners.” As is often the 
case, after a period of state experimentation, the national government can craft a policy 
agenda that employs the best practices and avoids the worst. The disadvantages to state 
                                                          
35
 Given that the focus of this discussion is still on state-by-state coordination, and not national 
coordination, one should actually expect the total savings to equal X + Y + C – B/n, where n is a value that 
represents an improvement in carbon leakage. As more states join efforts, n increases, B/n decreases, and 
total carbon savings increase. 
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policy leadership, on the other hand, include the possibility of duplication of efforts, a 
lack of regulatory consistency that may affect individuals or companies that cross state 
lines, budget constraints, inter-state competition, or a “race to the bottom” in policy 
stringency. 
 Have developments in the era of state energy policy innovation revealed states to 
be effective laboratories of democracy? An answer to this question requires that I pose 
two additional questions: first, have states been effective at devising and implementing 
energy policies that increase the diversification, decentralization, and decarbonization of 
the U.S. electricity sector; and, second, have states set a good example for the national 
government? 
In response to the first question, this dissertation highlighted the mixed evidence 
of the effects and effectiveness of states’ energy policy efforts or, in some cases, lack of 
efforts to date. Some states have taken minimal action, others substantial action. Out of 
those states that have crafted energy policy instruments, some have experienced early 
success in attaining desired outcomes. Others have encountered difficulties with their 
policy approaches, and gone back to the drawing board to craft new or additional 
mechanisms, or revise previous ones. A consideration of all states’ experiences with 
various policy instruments reveals that some instruments are more effective at achieving 
various objectives, and have fewer unintended outcomes, when used at the state level. 
Empirical results from previous chapters suggest that state level policy instruments have 
the potential to achieve all three policy objectives reviewed in this analysis, yet states 
have experienced greater success in this pursuit with instruments that encourage 
decentralization than those that encourage diversification or decarbonization. States have 
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experienced some success, but with limitations, with their instruments that aim to 
diversify the electricity sector. States’ ability to use policy instruments that decarbonize 
the electricity sector, however, have been and will continue to be plagued by limitations, 
so long as states continue to use energy tools instead of climate policy tools and lack 
policy coordination across state or regional lines. 
Regarding the second question, it is important to note that “good” is subjective. 
This not withstanding, the states’ experiences are exemplary in a number of ways, 
including but not limited to the following: 
• The majority of state governments have demonstrated a concern for energy and 
climate issues, and translated this concern into policy action. 
• Many states have crafted innovative policy tools that combine elements from 
other market-based instruments as well as from command-and-control 
instruments, with flexibility mechanisms built in. 
• Many states have continually reevaluated their policy portfolios, with particular 
attention devoted to policy design features of their various tools. These states 
have demonstrated a tendency to enhance the strength—or “stretch”—of policy 
instruments over time.36 
• The majority of states have pursued an open and democratic policy process, with 
all stakeholders invited to the table (Peterson and Rose, 2006). 
• State policymakers have demonstrated a concern for equity across 
“socioeconomic groups, regions, and generations” (Peterson and Rose, 2006). 
                                                          
36
 Some states have redrafted their policy instruments to mandate greater renewable energy benchmarks, or 
increase the amount of funding that is devoted to renewable energy, distributed generation, or less carbon-
intensive fuels. However, a counter-trend may be occurring simultaneously. Although this phenomena has 
not yet been identified in the literature, a cursory glance at various states’ RPS design features reveals that, 
as time goes on, new RPS adopters are tending toward weaker design features.  
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• More recently, as states have begun to form regional partnerships, they have 
demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with states or jurisdictions that do not 
necessarily share the same ideology, fiscal resources, or generation assets. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of the era of state energy policy innovation, states have selected a 
variety of policy instrument “winners”—or “front-runners”—that they believe to hold the 
greatest potential to achieve diversification, decentralization, and decarbonization 
objectives. Yet, the effects and effectiveness of these instruments on the U.S. electricity 
sector are not entirely understood, as evidenced by the lack of empirical literature on state 
level energy policies. Nor is there clear understanding in the literature regarding how well 
these instruments work together, whether multiple objectives can be pursued both 
effectively and simultaneously, and what are the limits of state leadership in energy and 
climate policy. 
This dissertation sought to address some of the unanswered questions about the 
era of state energy policy innovation via a series of essays on the effects and 
effectiveness of different state level energy policy instruments. Each essay addressed a 
different policy objective with an empirical approach that was tailored specifically to the 
research question. The conclusion reviewed and synthesized these results, and attempted 
to further highlight significant trends, necessary trade-offs, potential issues that may 
warrant public policy concern, and avenues for future research. 
The need to address remaining questions and expand on these findings is ever-
present. Until the U.S. and its global partners can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, 
 188 
devise advanced, efficient, and clean energy alternatives, and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, the need for optimal policy solutions will remain significant. Policy solutions 
will require making trade-offs, and a continual reevaluation of progress. 
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